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ABSTRACT 
Feminist theories emerged out of the revolutionary enthusiasm that swept the Western world 
during the late eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Based on the assumption that all 
persons have "inalienable or natural" rights upon which governments may not intrude, 
feminists in Europe and America advocated that equal rights should be extended to women 
who up to this point were Ilot considered legal beings separate and deserving of these rights. 
Most African writers and feminists have argued that since most of the theories of feminist 
jurisprudence have their roots in this Euro-centric context, they cannot be applicable to 
African women and should therefore be discarded. The thesis acknowledges that to a certain 
extent their assertions are true. For years feminist jurisprudence has been restricted to an 
academic engagement with the law failing to take into account the practices and customs of 
different communities. It has largely been the realm of the middle class bourgeois white 
female and therefore has been inaccessible to the African woman. The thesis aims, however, 
to prove that these theories of feminist jurisprudence although Euro-centric have a place in the 
understanding and advancement of African women' s rights in South Africa. In Chapter One 
the writer traces the history of South African women's rights and the laws that affect African 
women. Chapter Two presents the emergence of feminist theories and categories of feminism. 
The writer then seeks to identify the misunderstandings and tensions that exist between the 
two. The narrow conception of Euro-centric feminism has been that its sole purpose has been 
the eradication of gender discrimination, however, for African women in South Africa they 
have had to deal with a multiplicity of oppressions that include but are not restricted to 
gender, race, economic and social disempowerment. This is dealt with in Chapter Three. It is 
the opinion of the writer that despite these differences feminism does playa critical role in the 
advancement of women's rights in South Africa. Taking the South African governments 
commitment to the advancement of universal rights, the writers is of the opinion that African 
women can look to the example set by Western feminists, and broaden these theories to suit 
and be adaptable to the South African context. The answer is not to totally discard feminist 
theories but to extract commonalities that exist between African and European women, by so 
doing acknowledging that women's oppression is a global phenomenon. This is the focus of 
Chapter Four. To avoid making this work a mere academic endeavour, the writer in Chapter 
Five also aims, through interviews, to include the voices of African women and to indicate 
areas that still need attention from both the lawmakers and women' s rights movements 
II 
(Feminists). Finally, the writer aims to present a way forward, one that is not merely formal 
but also substantively attainable. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION: SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 
In a recent study I commissioned by the United Nations Research Institute of Social 
Development (UNRISD) in Geneva, Diane Elson2 observes that there has been a 
significant improvement in the attention given to the development of gender justice in 
various regions in the world. Quoting from a 2001 World Bank report on gender, she 
notes that while gender equality in political and legal rights is highest in the OECD) 
countries, the greatest progress has been within sub-Saharan Africa. She goes further to 
state, however, that these improvements in legal rights have not been extended to women 
within their social contexts4 This trend has been observed within the South African 
context, especially with the advent of the new Constitution. While the legal rights 
extended to women have improved noticeably, this improvement has not been 
experienced in their social contexts. 
In South Africa, Van Zyl,5 in her attempt to address the question, "What do women want 
from the law?" comments as follows: 
"Throughout history, the law has reflected society's views of consigning women to a 
subordinate status, usually based on her supposed biological inferiority and frai lty. 
Attitudes of passivity and subservience were inculcated and were characteristic of the 
female half of the world's popUlation for many millennia. However, more than half a 
century ago it occurred to women in the Western world that when laws were made they 
were not consulted, nor were they counted among the legislators having been for the most 
part illiterate and fully occupied with more mundane occupations.,,6 
1 This important work entitled Gender Justice, Development and Rights, 2002 covers women's issues on a 
global scale . It invites researchers worldwide to comment on gender justice in specific countries. M. 
Molyneux and S. Razavi, 2002, edit this work. 
2 D. Elson "Gender Justice, Human Rights and Neo-Liberal Economic Policies" in Molyneux and Razavi 
(eds) Gender Justice, Development and Rights, 2002:90-91. 
3 The OEeD is an organisation consisting of 30 members whose primary aim is the commitment to 
democratic government and market economy. Among them are countries such as Australia, the 
Netherlands, United Kingdom and United Nations (most so-called first world countries). 
4 Here she quotes the World Bank report as stating that there have been no improvements in gender 
equality in social and economic rights within sub-Saharan Africa between 1985-1990. 
5 L. Van Zy11992: 509. 
6 ibid. 
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While what Van Zyl expresses is true as far as women in the Western world are 
concerned, the same knowledge and realisation has taken longer in the case of African? 
women. This is not to suggest that the latter has been accepting of this unfavourable 
situation. On the contrary, there has been vigorous opposition to this status quo. 
However, African women more so South African women, unlike Western women, have 
dealt with and operated from a different social and political framework. The colonial 
gender politics in South Africa illustrates the dichotomy that existed between the rights of 
black women and their white counterparts. While, for example, suffrage was extended to 
the privileged on the basis of race and sex, black women were the very last to be 
extended this honour. Simons8 accurately summarises this as follows: 
"Africans have carried the main burden of South Africa' s rapid industrialisation. Their 
own social order splintered in the process, and ceased long ago to operate as a complete, 
distinct entity. Its elements - the subsistence economy, joint families, an elaborate 
network of kinship ties, devotion to ancestors, hereditary chieftainship - withered away or 
blended with elements of the alien culture. The discrepancy between the old rules and 
new facts is greatest where women are concerned, and is most harmful to their interests. 
They are worse off, in terms of customary law, than they were before industrialisation set 
in. This is so partly because the courts have interpreted the law to the disadvantage of 
their sex. But the main reason for the unfavourable trend is that women have outgrown 
the status assigned to them in the traditional society." 
The aim of this research project is to analyse the legal position of South African women 
in light of the new constitutional commitment.9 The new dispensation has ushered in a 
glimmer of hope for a society that has risen from the vestiges of a shameful past to 
embrace democratic values. While the Constitution asserts equality between men and 
women as clearly expressed in section 9,10 it also seeks to accept the practice of what has 
been a "long established, parallel system of customary law, a body oftraditional practices 
7 For the purposes of this thesis, African women denote black women. This is not to suggest that white, 
Indian or coloured women afe not African. It is merely for the purposes of this work and the context and 
questions it seeks to address that "African women" denote black women. 
'H.J.Simons 1968: 9. 
9 As expressed in the fundamental rights enshrined in chapter two of the Constitution the Republic of South 
Africa Act 108 of 1996. From hereon referred to simply as the Constitution. 
to Section 9 (1) establishes that "everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law." 
Section 9 (4) notes ''No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds in terms of subsection (3) i.e. race, gender, sex, pregnancy. marital status, ethnic or social 
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distinctly African in origin, and largely dependent on the principle ofpatriarchy.,,11 
The thesis will investigate whether theories of feminist jurisprudence, most of which are 
arguably rooted in European scholarship, can be applied to South African women in their 
context. Much of feminist writings has been branded as "bourgeois Western 
phenomenon" and has been dismissed as irrelevant and inapplicable to the African 
context. 12 The research seeks to explore the accuracy of this assertion. As indicated above 
the issue of gender equality and more specifically women and the law is not, by any 
means, a novel one; it is one that has been widely researched by many a respectable 
scholar. 13 However, the position that South African women find themselves in is unique 
in that, while seeking to gain independence from the shackles of apartheid, the issue of 
gender equality took an inferior position. As a result, African women's rights have 
therefore operated within a different framework from the mainstream scholarship that has 
shaped feminist jurisprudence. Therefore, it is necessary to question whether previous 
models that shape gender research can provide sustainable solutions where South African 
women are concerned. In an environment pervaded by poverty, exploitation and 
underdevelopment, there may exist a need to deconstruct mainstream theories of gender. 
According to Meena 14 researchers on gender/women issues in Southern Africa have had 
to grapple with various conceptual and theoretical issues in this region: 
"There is confusion with regard to definitions of various concepts such as gender, 
women, men, sex, sexuality, feminism, gender studies, women studies, feminist studies, 
and so on. There is confusion on whether or not traditional methodologies and research 
instruments are still valid in analysing and collecting data on gender/women issues. 
Scholars are also questioning the relevance of those concepts in the African context.,,15 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth." 
(my emphasis). 
11 A. Van Blerk 1997:608. See also section 211 read with section 39(3) of the Constitution. This dichotomy 
12 F. Kaganas & c. Murray 1991:118. 
13 See in this regard a series of contributions included in Molyneux and Razavi op cit noted in footnote 1 
above. 
14 R. Meena "Introduction" in Meena (ed) Gender in Southern Africa: Conceptions and Theoretical Issues, 
1992: (ix). 
15 ibid. 
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The proposition made above does not seek in any way to minimise the similarities that 
may exist issues between Western and African women. It is prudent to note that, in 
varying degrees, both are affected by the structures of patriarchy and the history of male 
supremacy. As Sachs l6 comments, "It is a sad fact that one of the few profoundly non-
racial institutions (in South Africa) is patriarchy." Although this research has drawn 
heavily on the academic writings of leading feminists and lawyers such as Catherine 
Mackinnon (1983) and Carol Gilligan (1981), the wide range of scholarly research on 
feminist jurisprudence will not be neglected or undermined. 
The writer will go further and will investigate the South African governments's 
commitment to the advancement of universal women's rights. It is the writer's opinion 
that African women can look to the Western feminists and seek commonalities that will 
serve the African woman in her own context. This will also serve to show that the 
struggle for gender equality is and will remain a global struggle. Finally, the writer will 
include, through empirical research, the voices of African women and will suggest a way 
forward for the struggle for gender equality. 
The writer is aware and seeks to remain wary throughout to ensure that the research 
remains a legal exertion despite the various overtones of politics and sociology. It is, 
however, imperative to acknowledge that the law is a living instrument used, abused and 
interpreted by society. It cannot be considered in a vacuum and must be placed in a social 
context. This is more so where customary law is concerned, where most of the principles 
that underlie it are unwritten, uncodified and largely subject to societal interpretations. In 
considering the legal rights of women, the writer takes cognisance of the distinction 
between "living law" and the "official customary law,,17 and recognises that despite 
several legislative developments, customary practices are still embedded in the moral 
code of African society. 18 
16 See Sachs as quoted with approval by S. Bazilli "Introduction" in Bazilli (ed) Putting Women on the 
Agenda, 1991:9. 
17 This distinction has been encapsulated in the leading case of Mabeno v Letsoalo 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T) 
1074 H-I where Du Plessis J states that customary law exists not only in the "official version" as 
documented by writers but also in "living law" denoting "law actually observed by African communities." 
18 R.B. Mqeke quotes Fallers 1969:2 who describes the relationship between law and society as follows: 
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1.2 DEFINITIONS OF MAJOR TERMS 
This section defines major concepts that will be used often in this chapter and throughout 
the thesis generally. As the thesis deals with theories of feminism and the development of 
laws concerning women, it is essential that one examine terms often used when referring 
to women. Such terms may not be within the sphere of the legal world and may therefore 
be unfamiliar to the legal person. However, all the terms will be familiar to the 
disciplines that study society; disciplines such as politics, sociology and anthropology. As 
the law cannot be studied in a vacuum but is a reflection of societies' mores, these terms 
ought to be defined for the purpose of this thesis. 
1.2.1 GENDER 
In her introduction to the 1991 edition of Putting Women on the Agenda, Susan Bazilli 19 
writes that men and women are "gendered beings". What she describes is that outside of 
our biological attributes as "man" and "woman", persons are socialised to act or react to 
certain situations in particular ways: 
"The ways in which men and women operate in society is not natural and given, but is 
historically and culturally constructed and socially located." 
According to Stoller,2o gender has psychological and cultural connotations. In his view 
gender is more than just a mere synonym for woman, or a substitute for sex, which is a 
biological characterisation of "man" and "woman". Other writers such as Schoemaker21 
regard gender as a social, cultural and political construct that unlike sex changes as the 
norms of society change. Socialisation, be it within the family or within the society in 
general, creates and sustains gender differences. The socia-anthropological approach to 
"Whatever else the law is about, it concerns the major institutionalised values of societies, the values to 
which people are sufficiently committed to be willing to impose them upon themselves in an authoritative 
manner. Such values are "cultural" in the sense that they form elements in the interrelated system of ideas 
shared by a people; and they are "social" in the sense that commitment underlies the mutuality of 
expectations upon which ordered social life rests. An interest in legal institutions leads quite naturally into a 
concern with the social system out of which .. , they arise," 
19 Bazilli op cit at 8. 
20 M. Haralambos e/ al 2000; 126. 
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the definition of gender places emphasis on their social role and status, thus their social 
existence. In turn, the social status of women and the relationship between them and men 
cannot be thought of outside the power that determines social dynamics22 The result is a 
development of what feminists describe as a "gendered personality", which is internalised 
within the male or female . In a patriarchal society this allows for the acceptance of 
practices that are oppressive to women. In fact, ironically because women in such a 
society will have been socialised from an early age to believe that a man has superior 
authority over them, they too begin to accept the status quo without questioning it.2J The 
writer agrees that while sex differentiates between male and female, society defines and 
shapes gender. Gender is therefore a product of society, and consequently gender 
inequality a result of social structures. 
1.2.2 PATRIARCHY 
The term patriarchy as used in this study refers to the "hierarchy of authority that is 
controlled and dominated by males in which women are subordinated to the role of 
minors.,,24 By patriarchy, feminists refer to the arrangement of society under which 
standards, be they political, economic, social or legal are set by and fixed in the interest 
of men25 In the African context patriarchy originates within the family structure and the 
social system where male power over females is seen as acceptable. The result of such a 
system is the progressive disempowerment of women. Because this system is so 
pervasive, it is "upheld by means of a web of laws. ,,26 As seen below,27 the law becomes 
a vehicle of oppression and upholds these patriarchal structures reflecting the male 
experiences and perspectives that are the reference point in relation to which the law is 
fixed. While the structures of patriarchy in pre-colonial times were sustained by the social 
21 R. Schoemaker 1998:l. 
22 P.B. Logo and E.L. Bikkie "Women and Land in Cameroon: Questioning Women's Land Status and 
Claims for Change" in L. Muthoni-Wanyeki (ed) Women and Land in Africa: Culture, Religion and 
Realising Women's Rights, 2003:32. 
23 See also the survey done by writer in Grahamstown discussed in Chapter Five. 
24 P. Knauss 1987:xii. 
25 J.G. Riddall 1999:273. 
26 Bazilli op cit at 10. 
27 See pages 7-9 below. 
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structures, in post-colonial times it was due to the need by traditional leaders to assert 
their power at a time when it seemed they were slowly losing it. In order to construct 
laws that will effectively benefit women, Bazilli28 suggests that there is a need to 
understand how patriarchal structures work and how they influence the law. 
1.2.3 FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 
The idea behind feminist jurisprudence lies in the assumption that because women have 
historically been placed in positions of subservience, the laws that govern women have 
reflected these indiscrepencies. As a result, in the same manner that society has oppressed 
women, the laws, which are "man-made", will tend naturally to favour the male over the 
female. This has been termed aptly as " legally-sanctioned" discrimination or the 
"masculinism,,29 of the law. McGlynn writes that: 
"The language, logic, and structure of the law are male created and reinforce male values. 
By presenting male's characteristics as a 'norm' and females characteristics as deviation 
from the 'norm' the prevailing conceptions of law reinforce and perpetuate patriarchal 
power.,,30 
Feminist jurisprudence was fully developed within "second wave" feminist movement, 
notably among them writers such as Catherine Mackinnon3l and Carol Gilligan. 32 
28 ibid. 
29 R. West "Jurisprudence and Gender" in Bridgeman and Millins (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Law: 
Law 's engagement with the Female Body, 1998: 66. West writes that "rnasculinism" oflaw is the view that 
women's lives are not reflected at any level in the legal doctrine. The law has historically been 
individualistic and this alienates women from participation as women's values are traditionally collective 
and intimate as opposed to individualistic. This is more so where African women are concerned. She 
writes: "Jurisprudence is masculine because jurisprudence is about the relationship between human beings 
and laws we actually have, and the laws we actually have are 'masculine ' both in terms of their intended 
beneficiary and in authorship." One important aim of ferrrinist jurisprudence is the "unmasking and 
critiquing of the principle of patriarchy" wiih the aim of exposing that jurisprudence and the legal doctrine 
protects and defines men not women. 
30 C. McGlynn 1998: 21. For the African woman, as mentioned, the situation is exaggerated by the fact that 
they also had to contend with racially discrirrrinatory laws. 
31 R. Tong "Ferrrinist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction" in Bridgeman and Millins (eds) Femillist 
Perspectives on Law: Law's ellgagement with the Female Body, 1998: 69, Catherine Mackinnon argues 
that laws are in themselves gendered and alihough presented as neutral and impartial, the reality lies in that 
they are fashioned to advantage the power holders in society, who traditionally have been men. She 
considers that the State, and therefore lawmakers through its laws, maintains the power afmen over women 
and thus ensures the subordination of women to men. 
32 Gilligan argues ihat males and females have differing perceptions of ihe law. The former focus on 
justice, rights and autonomy while the laner focus more on responsibility and community. Sbe refers to 
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Feminism, therefore, builds on the themes that propose that discrimination is a social 
construct that is, in tum, "reproduced and legitimised")) to perpetuate inequalities within 
the law. One of the many criticisms of feminist jurisprudence is the assertion that it is not 
in fact "jurisprudence". Ridda1l34 comments that feminism may not have a part in the law 
and should be considered as a part of sociology, history or politics but not jurisprudence. 
Because different voices form part of the feminist movement, it has been criticised for 
not being consistent and objective in its approach. The present writer is in disagreement 
with this view and contends that what feminism advocates for is women's rights and as 
rights are matters that form a part of the law and justice, it is therefore not a misnomer to 
tenn this study of women's issues "feminist jurisprudence". By locating discrimination 
within the broader social and cultural context, feminists argue that only then can effective 
changes be made to the laws. Feminist legal theory raises questions about the 
compatibility of the legal order with women's experiences and calls for a re-evaluation of 
the role of law in promoting social change. For the African woman, the law must go far 
beyond recognition of gender and should simultaneously confront issues of race, class 
and culture, which adversely affect how women view and participate in society. 
Feminist jurisprudence thus means two main things, firstly the process of "unmasking 
and critiquing,,35 patriarchy, which involves lawmakers acknowledging that laws are in 
fact biased against women and can therefore not be beneficial to them. This process is 
deconstructive in nature. It involves the break down of those structures that perpetuate 
gender discrimination and shield men. Robin West and Mackinnon state that in order to 
achieve an "ungendered' jurisprudence, it is important to ensure the total abolition of 
patriarchy. It is only with this abolition that there can be a non-masculine feminist 
jurisprudence.36 The second theme involves the "reconstruction" of laws, to 
these differing perceptions as an "ethic of justice" and an "ethic of care" She argues that as a result males 
and females view the law and apply it in different ways. Because the power holders are male, it therefore 
naturally results in the law taking a more "masculine" stance. 
33 West op cil at 66. 
34 Riddall op cit at 289. 
3S West op cil at 67-68. 
36 C. Smart "The Women of Legal Discourse" in Naffine (ed) Gender and Justice, 2002:30. 
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accommodate women and to ensure that laws that were previously discriminatory or 
oppressive to women are corrected]? 
Naffine38 identifies three phases of feminist jurisprudence: the first presents the law as 
sexist, the second sees the law as male whilst the third sees it as gendered. He argues that 
if these three perceptions of the law are properly understood, then the impact of feminism 
on the law will be better appreciated. 
1.2.4 FIRST STAGE - THE LAW AS SEXIST 
The argument that the law is sexist is based on the fact that the law treats men and 
women differently, thereby actively disadvantaging women. This it does by denying 
women the power to control resources and by denying women equal opportunities. For 
example, the fact that women cannot own land in their name makes them economically 
dependent and seeks to advantage men over women. The attribution of the law as sexist is 
based on the fact that it is biased in its allocation of rights or in whom it gives rights. 
What this also means is that if the law ensures "equality" and "equal opportunity" then 
the result will be a correction of this bias. Much like the arguments by liberal feminists, 
what this does is assumes that once the imbalance is corrected, the result will be a society 
based on non-discrimination. Like the liberal feminist theory, this theory fails to 
acknowledge the social structures that cause this discrimination. Instead of recognising 
the differences between men and women, it creates an androgynous society, which is, in 
reality, not possible3 9 
1.2.5 SECOND STAGE - THE LAW AS MALE 
This works on the hypothesis that the lawmakers are male and therefore influence the 
tone that the law takes. Although the laws are presented as impartial and obj ective, in 
reality they favour the male. The law is "judged by the values of masculinity. ,,40 Gilligan 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 Smart op cit at 85. 
40 Smart op cit at 33. 
9 
writes that men see the law as rights while women see the law as responsibility. Simone 
De Beauvoir correctly summarises this as follows: 
"Humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to h im, she is 
regarded not as an autonomous being ... she is incidental, the inessential as opposed to 
the essential.'.41 
De Beauvoir suggests that within the operation of the law, the male perspective is taken 
into account to the detriment of the female. This view differs from the "law is sexist" 
only but slightly. The hypothesis suggests that it is not that the law fails to be objective in 
itself but that it does apply the objective criteria, the criteria themselves being male. The 
irony lies in the fact that in its objectivity it relies on masculine values. According to 
feminists such as Mackinnon,42 it is an objective standard of application that argues, for 
example, for equality in the workplace. However, where this male objectivity becomes 
oppressive is when it fails to take into account the fact that a woman unlike a man can 
become pregnant and therefore needs to be treated differently from a man and be 
accommodated as such. The male norm in this case is what is used as a standard for 
behaviour, and though it may itself be objective, it "subordinates the different norms of 
women.,,43 A feminist critique of the law is an analysis of how some or all women are 
disqualified from the design of the legal system or the application of law. 
1.2.6 THIRD STAGE - LAW AS GENDERED 
In terms of this phase women are seen as being socially constructed to cope and react to 
the world in a certain manner, often times the result being that they are unable to use and 
define the law. The law is seen as "man-made" and thus reflects and advantages the male 
gender. Women do not possess the practical skills to deal with this "male-order". So, for 
example, it is for this reason, that women would find the notion of marital rape alien and 
are more willing to accept violence against them. It is a societal structuring that will not 
allow a woman despite the formal laws protecting her to report a case of rape or marital 
4 1 D. Johnson et al. 2001:221. 
42 Mackinnon 1991: 1281. 
43 Johnson op cit at 224. 
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violence. The law in itself also works to perpetuate gender divisions. Naffine44 describes 
this as "law as gendering" 45 
While relying on Finley, Albertyn46 expresses the view that in order to fully understand 
the inequality of women "we must grapple with the nature of the law itself, the extent to 
which it is male-defined and the extent to which its language and process of reasoning are 
built on the male conception .. .. " 
The history of black South African women makes the above feminist theories applicable 
and relevant to South Africa. One cannot help but see the similarities in the struggle for 
equality between South African women and their Euro-American counterparts. Both seek 
to fight the structures of patriarchy that are still a part of their day-to-day lives. 47 It is the 
opinion of the writer that the foundation set by the Euro-American feminists need not be 
totally ignored but instead be applied within the context of South Africa. 
1.3 THE LEGAL POSITION OF WOMEN UNDER CUSTOMARY LAW: AN 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
1.3.1 THE PRE-COLONIAL POSITION OF AFRICAN WOMEN 
Before embarking on the laws that affect women, it is important to provide an overview 
of the position of African women during pre-colonial times. The recordings and writings 
of the colonists present a dismal picture of the position of women in pre-colonial times. 
These sources seem to suggest that women in African societies were treated "no better 
than slaves. ,,48 It was only with the writings and research of men like Soga,49 Whitfield50 
44 Smart op cit at 33. 
45 Smart op cit at 34. 
46 C. Albertyn " The discriminatory and gendered nature of the law and institutions of Criminal Justice" in 
Jagwanth, Schwikkard and Grant (eds) Women and the Law, 1994: 19. 
47 As noted below, there is a distinction between formal and substantive law. Despite the constitutional 
commitment to equality, changes need to seen at the grassroots levels. See also Chapter Five on research 
done on women in Grahamstown for the effect the laws have on women on their day-ta-day lives. 
4& G.M.B. Whitfield 1948:222. 
49 J.H. Soga 1931. 
so op cit. 
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and Simons51 that some accurate insight was given to the rights of African women in the 
pre-colonial communities. 
Simons52 argues that the advent of industrialisation and colonialism resulted in the 
erosion of many of the African customs that protected women. He goes further to say that 
the special courts that were established to deal with issues pertaining to Africans, 
interpreted customs and traditions in a manner that disadvantaged women. The African 
society is largely communal and within that system it was not unusual to have practices 
such as patriarchal rule, primogeniture, arranged marriages and polygamy. Each of these 
received disdain from colonialists and was held unacceptable under what was known as 
the "Repugnancy Clause,,5J Yet it is the opinion of many writers notably among them, 
Soga, that the view of such practices as being oppressive to women, is a misconception. 
He remarks that such customs in many instances were present to provide "protection and 
to secure the rights of women.,,54 He argues that lobolos5 for example, was created to 
secure the status of married women and to protect them from physical abuse. By paying 
labolo the husband would be obliged to protect his wife and ensure her welfare. African 
women did not see this practice as a sale56 but rather as protection in the case of neglect 
or gross ill treatment.57 Soga5S writes that: 
"Bantu women had their protection entirely in their own hands, with the full and 
immediate support of custom, without the necessity of appealing to a court oflaw." 
" H.J. Simons 1968. 
51 S' . 9 mlOns op CIt at . 
" Simons op cit at 60. The acceptance of African customs was subject to the repugnancy clause, which 
stated that any custom that was "opposed to the principles of public policy and natural justice" would be 
held inapplicable. 
54 Soga op cit at 263. 
55 A practice common in most African cultures. It is generally the payment of dowry, which is a result of a 
contract that arises from a proposed marriage by which the future husband delivers or promises to deliver to 
the father of the future wife, stock or property. It had received criticism from feminists, who are of the 
opinion that this practice amounts to the selling of a bride and is therefore degrading to women. Whitfield 
op cit 235 writes that payment of dowry is seen among the Africans as the creation of a bond between 
families from which flow certain rights, duties and obligations. 
" Soga op cit at 269 writes that there is no parallel/comparison between a purchase and /ob%; it is a 
friendly contract with no recognised time limit and no fixed value in numbers. 
57 Should ill treatment arise, the woman has a claim for the protection of her father, who could opt to return 
the /ob% received and dissolve the marriage. 
58 Soga op cit at 269. 
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The writer also goes further to write: 
"If the Bantu woman were "bought", "purchased" or "owned" as some assert, her 
subservience would be complete, her spirit would be broken. But the spirit of the Bantu 
woman is not broken, far from that, she is proud, has a high sense of her independence 
and makes her influence felt in the home and in the tribe." 
While the African system of succession and inheritance is patrilineal and primo geniture is 
a governing principle, it was well understood and "not unsuitable to the conditions of all 
involved."s9 Whitfield60 writes that among the people of Pedi, despite the opinion of 
colonists to the contrary, there is evidence that it was not unusual for women upon the 
death of their husbands to take charge of the affairs of the family. Females were often 
given priority over males in their own homes and they could succeed in preference to 
males. Although this was rare, it was not impossible. The writer goes further to say that 
the principle underlying succession although patrilineal in nature was not cast in stone. It 
was based on the need to protect and promote the communal nature of the African family 
where reciprocal responsibility was expected of the males who inherited. Widows often 
inherited domestic property, which included in most cases the house, gardens and 
utensils: 
"The property is regarded ... as belonging essentially to females and as passing to female 
heirs, whether or not through a female line of succession ... . Houses are built, and 
gardens are acquired, by a famil y for the occupation and use of the women belonging or 
accruing to it, and the woman in occupation of the house and/or in possession of a 
garden, has absolute right over them, such right devolving on her death to the female 
members of her own family .... ,,61 
Bekker62 argues that in many ways the African culture protected and empowered women. 
Where a male inherited, he takes up the duties to maintain suitably the widow and minor 
children of the house. He is also obliged to consult the widow in dealing with the 
property of the house and she has the right to restrain him from dissipating its assets or 
impoverishing it. 
" Whitfield op cit at 262. 
60 ibid, 
6J Whitfield op cit at 50. 
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It is difficult to get a finn grasp on women's rights before colonisation. As painted above, 
although most of the literature recognises that women were subjected to patriarchal 
control, there is also evidence that points to the fact that women did have rights. There is 
no denying, as will be seen in the subsection below, that one of the results of colonial 
legislature was to impose perpetual tutelage63 This is not to argue that women were 
empowered prior to colonial use and abuse of customary law. Instead this section seeks to 
demonstrate that the security which women had enjoyed under traditional customary law, 
was eroded by the colonial legislature. 
1.3.2 AFRICAN WOMEN UNDER COLONIAL LEGISLATION 
In his first speech to Parliament in May 1994 fonner President Nelson Mandela stated: 
"Freedom cannot be achieved unless the woman has been emancipated from all fonns of 
oppression ... unless we see in visible practical tenns that the conditions of women in our 
country has radically changed for the better, and that they have been empowered to 
intervene in all aspects oflife as equals with any other member ofsociety.,,64 
His speech marked a defining point in what was to become a new course for African 
women. Such rhetoric was not characteristic of the pre-199465 South Africa, where 
various Acts (notably the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927, the Kwa-Zulu Act on the 
Code of Zulu Law, Act 16 of 1985 and Natal Code of Zulu Law Proclamation RI51 of 
1987) and other customary law66 traditions had succeeded in consigning women to the 
position of mere minority. In tracing the historical background, the writer is not by any 
means stating that the transfonnation is as yet complete. Such a notion would be gravely 
naive and flawed. Nonetheless, as noted by Samantha Willan67 in her thesis, the year 
62 J.C. Bekker 1989:298. 
63 S. Willan 1998:53 writes "The codes treatment of the situation was a serious abrogation of rights that 
women had traditionally enjoyed." 
"M.Myakayaka-Manzini "Women empowered: Women in Parliament in South Africa" at 
htto:11www.idea.intiwomeniparVstudies5a.html accessed on 3 November 2003. 
" The first significant statement issued regarding the emancipation of women came in 1990. The ANC's 
National Executive Committee issued a statement, which enshrined the rights of women as a fundamental 
policy. TIlls was the frrst comprehensive statement on women 's emancipation released by a political party 
in South Africa. 
66 There have been changes in the nomenclature used to describe customary law. It is important to state 
from the onset that customary law and indigenous law will be used interchangeably. 
67 Willan op cit at 57. 
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1994 presents an important benchmark as the beginning of a new era based on non-
discrimination. In South Africa, as elsewhere, women are not a homogenous entity. There 
are black rural women, black urban women, white women, Indian women and coloured 
women. Although all categories have, for the most part, occupied subservient positions, it 
is the rural black women who as a result of the abuse of traditional customary principles 
have suffered the most. It is in light of this that customary law has been perceived as 
inimical to women's rights. Thandabantu Nhlap068 explains the position thus: 
"It is everything that emanates from an attitude to women in marriage and in the family, 
which sees them solely as adjuncts to the group, means to the anachronistic end of clan 
survival, rather than as valuable in themselves and deserving of recognition for their 
human worth on the same tenus as men." 
In order to properly analyse the legal rights of South African women, it is important to 
provide a historical overview of the laws that governed their lives pre-1994. Simons69 
notes that while white South Africans of the last century resented the African person's 
way of life, seeing it as "backward and immoral, yet the governments recognised the risk 
of making a frontal assault on the institutions and beliefs of a people who had only just 
been conquered and held an aversion to alien rule." The only solution left to them was to 
sanction customary principles and to subscribe to a dual of system of law, which began 
first in Natal and later spread to the rest of the territories. 
In tracing the history and application of customary law, it is apt to draw a distinction 
between the "official" and "non-official" customary law. The "official" customary law, 
which is embodied in legislation and court decisions, appears to be the result of a process 
of change, which involved an alliance between the colonial administration and African 
male elders. Traditionally male elders who were in control of strategic resources 
attempted to gain power by manipulating customary law. In 1842, after five years of 
armed struggle for supremacy between the British and the Boers, the Volksraad finally 
capitulated to the British authority. By May the following year, Natal became a British 
colony under Advocate Henry Cloete. Months later Natal was successfully annexed to the 
68 Nhlapo is quoted with approval in Van Zyl op cit at 263. 
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Cape. In adherence to Ordinance 50 of 1828, the British guaranteed equal treatment of all 
persons within the colony70 
By 1845 Roman-Dutch law became the legal system for the entire population of the 
colony. Although this may have seemed at the time a remarkable enactment aimed at 
securing that all persons in the colony were treated equally, such a decree failed to 
acknowledge the customs and traditions of the people settled in these regions. Non-
recognition led to tension between the two races and persisted in a long and acrimonious 
debate about the future of tribalism and the status of customary principles. 71 
In 1846 Theophilus Shepstone became diplomatic agent to the tribes. His duties included 
being paramount chief and he assumed this role in his dealings with the Natal tribes, 
According to Simons72 and Guy/J Shepstone was one of the few colonialists who had a 
thorough knowledge of the Zulu language and customs, He was opposed to the 
codification of customary law. He was, nevertheless, even more opposed to customs and 
tribal laws that were incompatible with the principles of European law. It was imperative 
to raise the status of women, Sitting on the Locations Commission of 1846, he 
maintained that tribal marriages and divorces should be remodelled so as to give them a 
much greater significance than under traditional law,74 Such an endeavour would have 
cost more than the Natal treasury or the British government was willing to cough up. The 
seemingly insoluble problem was resolved by a scheme approved by George Grey who 
was secretary of State at the time. Shepstone decided to use the tribal leaders to govern. 
Such an endeavour would achieve the necessary control over a large restive African 
population75 This was not a popular move for Shepstone and he received much 
opposition from men such as Hemy Cloete, Policy according to those who opposed 
Shepstone ought to be aimed at the "amalgamation of the different races" and the merger 
69 Simons op cit at 15 . 
70 For the full account of the historical discourse see Chapter Three ofTW, Bennett 1985: 40-48. 
71 Simons op cil at 15, 
72S' ' 18 lmons op ell at . 
73 Willans op cil at 31. 
74 Simons op cit at 19. 
75 Bennett op cit at 43, 
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of the different systems of law into one and the same authority.76 It was through a chance 
move by Shepstone that traditional leadership and custom was recognised. With the 
enactment of Ordinance 3 of 1949 customary law was reinstated in its entirety except so 
far as it was "repugnant to the general principles of humanity observed throughout the 
civilised world.,,77 In defence ofthe official position taken, Shepstone insisted that such a 
move would be to the benefit of the colony allowing for greater control of the natives. In 
giving evidence before the 1883 Commission, he explained it as such "customary law 
must be recognised to ensure control of the natives. You cannot control savages by 
civilised law.,,78 The codification of customary law, however, became inevitable despite 
Shepstone's efforts to the contrary. The earliest sources of knowledge of Native law are 
the reports of Commissions appointed to inquire into particular problems. 
Between 1852 and 1891, these Commissions dealt mainly with administrative problems 
arising from the conflict of European or "colonial law" and what became known as native 
law.79 Hence, with time, the situation with regards to the extent ofrecognition of African 
customary law differed in various provinces. To remedy this and to bring a degree of 
uniformity, the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 was promulgated. Preceded by the 
Natal Code, the Transkein Proclamation 142 of 1910 and 145 of 1923, the Native 
Administration Act came into being in 1927 as a means to provide a uniform approach to 
the application of customary law in South Africa. The Governor-General was made the 
Supreme chief of all Africans and as Simons8o notes, was conferred all the rights and 
powers over all Africans. For African women this period saw some change their legal 
status of African women. This is not to say that change was positive. Although the 
Governor-General was given powers and rights to appoint and depose chiefs and 
headmen, which in theory ought to have included women, in practice such changes were 
more often than not never reflected. Section 29 of the Native Administration Act which 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid. 
78 ibid. 
79 J. Lewin 1947:1 Native law was terminology used before the Union of South Africa. The main source of 
native law is found in the writings of those who record their own knowledge of it based on direct contact or 
observation. Another early source is the reports of commissions appointed to enquire into particular 
r,roblems. 
o Simons op cit at 19. 
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was enthusiastically termed the "incitement clause", sought to limit "feelings of hostility 
between natives and Europeans", saw to it that the focus remained that of "maintenance 
and accommodation of the gendered society" of Africans which was based largely on 
patriarchy. On the one hand, was a desire by Europeans and missionaries to implement 
Christian rites and prevent what they termed "barbaric practises" and, on the other, was 
the need to ensure that no feelings of hostility existed among the natives that would result 
in any militancy that would unsettle European power. The overriding results were 
decisions made that would not "rock the boat" where customary law was concerned. 
The distinctive Cape and Natal approaches to the application of customary law were 
retained many years after the Act was passed8 1 The Act82 also sought to create a separate 
court system, made up of Chiefs Courts, Native Commissioners' Courts, Native Appeal 
and Native Divorce Courts8J With respect to section 11(3)(b), the Act had very 
unfavourable legal, social and economic consequence for African women in customary 
unions. Despite the fact that social changes dictated that strictures of a traditional African 
society be abandoned, many African women were burdened with the oppressive policies, 
which were applied to them under customary law. In the case of Yako v Bevi84 an African 
woman sued for seduction. McLoughlin P concluded "native women had no right of 
action to sue for seduction in their own right, since this right rested with their guardians." 
Relying on the case of Matsheng v Dhlamini85 he remarked that it was the wish of 
Africans that the courts in their decisions retain native laws and customs. It was only in 
1943 that the Parliament sought to remedy the situation, by providing that the contractual 
capacity and locus standi of African women was generally determined as if she were 
81 Bennett op cit at 43 writes that in the Natal and Transvaal Divisions customary law was primarily 
applied, and it was only in exceptional cases that common law could be applied. Customary law therefore 
was to be generally applied in cases involving Africans as it was considered "the system familiar to them 
and unquestionably the only system they contemplate and follow in their daily dealings .... " 
82 The Native Administration Act 38 of 1927. 
83 S· . 53 lIncns op CIt at . 
B4 1944 NAC (C and 0) 72. 
BS 1937 NAC (N and T) 89. In this case McLoughlin P was firmly opposed to the emancipation of African 
women and favoured the concept of perpetual tutelage. In his view allowing any emancipation of women 
would be encouraging Africans to break away from the "restraint of Native law with the complete 
subversion of Native life and institutions." To do this would be to "promote social dislocation." 
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European86 By 1969, most of the customary law relating to marriage and divorce and 
thus directly affecting women had been affected by legislation87 A limitation was put on 
the amount of bride wealth that could be stipulated for marriage; consent was made 
essential for a valid union and all marriages had to be registered. 88 
Willan89 notes that one of the results of codification of customary law was the 
manipulation of customary law. Quoting from writers like Guy and Ranger, she gives 
evidence that points to the assertion that many of the chiefs and traditional leaders who 
felt they were losing their power, saw an opportunity to increase it by actively 
participating in the process of manipUlating traditional customary principles. Chanock9o 
states that the manipulation of customary law was an attempt by traditional leaders "to 
cope with social dislocation" caused by colonialism. He writes: 
"The law was the cutting edge of colonialism, an instrument of power of an alien state 
and part of the process of coercion. And it also came to be a new way of conceptualising 
relationships and powers and was used as a weapon within the African society." 
The African community was undergoing economic changes, and many traditional leaders 
interpreted customs as a means of survival in this new social and economic climate, often 
to the detriment of women. While authentic traditional customs had provided protection 
against abuse to women, colonial laws developed customary law in a manner that that 
changed its content and form 91 In a society that was patriarchal, women were not 
accommodated for in the new dispensation. 
In Natal and Zulu land the manipUlation of customary law was summarised by Ranger92 
as follows: 
86 BeIUlett op cit at 67. 
87 Most had been reduced to written code. 
ss BeIUlett op cit at 44. 
89 Willian op cit at 36. 
90 M. Chanock 1985:4. 
91 Chanock ibid writes that customary law during this period was neither "customary nor law". 
92 T. Ranger "Untitled Contribution" in Hobsbawn and Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition, 1992:254. 
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"Elders tended to appeal to 'tradition' in order to defend their dominance of the rural 
means of production against challenge by the young. Men tended to appeal to "tradition" 
in order to ensure that the increasing role, which women played in production in the rural 
areas, did not result in any diminution of male control over women as economic assets. 
Paramount chiefs and ruling aristocracies in politics, which included numbers of ethnic 
and social groupings, appealed to 'tradition' in order to maintain and extend their control 
over their subjects. Indigenous populations appealed to 'tradition' in order to ensure that 
migrants who settled among them did not achieve political and economic rights." 
Power once more was vested in the senior men of the ruling class, lineages and joint 
household. The men in the society were entitled to exercise control over their wives and 
daughters. Willan,93 quoting from Kaganas and Murray, captures concisely the position 
of African women throughout the last one and half centuries, in the following terms: 
"Under customary law, women are always subjected to the authority of a patriarch, 
moving from the control of their guardians to that of their husbands (perpetual minority 
status). The male head of the household represents the family and a woman cannot 
generally contract or litigate without assistance. Husbands control virtually all the 
fami ly's property while wives rights are confined to things such as items of personal 
nature. Women cannot initiate the divorce process but must enlist the help of the 
bridewealth holder, who may have a vested interest in the continued existence of the 
marriage. Husbands, on the other hand, may simply unilaterally repudiate their wives or, 
if they wish to retain the bridewealth can rely on specified grounds. Finally, on divorce, 
the children "belong" to the husband's family." 
The system of patriarchy was not restricted only to those practising customary principles. 
Women married in accordance with civil or Christian rites were subject to the same 
patriarchal tradition. However, the latter' s legal disability was removed by the enactment 
of legislation in the form of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984. The change only 
affected non-African women and was not extended to customary marriages as well as 
civil marriages of blacks in terms of Section 22 (b) of the Black Administration Act 38 of 
192794 As a result the legal status of most white women was advanced, while that of 
OJ Willan op cit at 48. 
94 J. Sinclair 1996:126-127 writes the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 abolished marital power, but 
even though calls were made for the reform to affect African women, section 11 of the Act expressly 
excluded those marriages governed by the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927. This was only amended 
by the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988, which equalised the 
consequences of marriages of persons of different races. However section 22(6) reared its ugly head even 
within this amended Act. The consequence was that unless an ante nuptial contract was entered, marital 
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Afiican women remained stagnant. Afiican women took up their positions merely as 
child bearers, house manager and food producers and remained "obedient, submissive 
and humble.,,95 It was commonly accepted that Afiican women lacked legal capacity and 
were considered perpetual minors who could not own property in their own rights, inherit 
or act as guardians to their children96 With few exceptions women of any age or marital 
condition were considered minors, had no locus standi and could not conclude contracts 
without male guardian's consent. As stated in Zwane v Dhlamini: 
"A woman cannot enter a valid for the loan of livestock without the consent of the head 
of her household.,,97 
The institution of marriage cannot be separated from issues of African women's rights. 
Much as feminists would like to see a broader definition of family, the legal position of 
women is defined in the relationship that arises from marriage. The present writer is in 
agreement with Thandabantu Nhlapo who writes that African women were not seen as 
separate entities, but as an "adjunct to the family.,,98 One of Friedrich Engel's important 
contributions to Marxist feminism relates to the interpretation of the status of women in 
different societies. According to the author the general subordination of women is rooted 
in the patriarchal form of the family99 As sanctioned by section 11(3) (b) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927, a black woman in a customary union was deemed a 
minor and her husband was deemed to be her guardian.lOo As a result marital power has 
power continued to apply regardless of the matrimonial property system. Few black women had ante 
nuptial agreements, and most became subject to marital power. 
95 Nhlapo op cit at 99. 
96 See also Siiila v Masumba 1940 NAC (C & 0) 44 where McLoughlin, P writes "Among the tribes, 
women have far less share and say in the administration of the estate, being themselves regarded as assets 
and 'inberited' by the heir or some other favoured male relative of the deceased, who thereafter has the 
duty of supporting the women." 
97 1938 NAC (N&T) 278. 
98 Nhlapo 1991:135. 
99 F. Engels 1985: 88. 
100 See also sections 27(3) of the Kwa-Zulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law and section 37 of the Transkei 
Marriage Act 21 of 1978 had the similar legal effect on the status of wives in customary unions . Section 37 
of the Transkei Marriage Act provided: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law, a woman married 
in terms of the provisions of this Act shall ... be under the guardianship of her husband for the duration of 
her marriage." See also Prior v Battle 1998 (8) BCLR 1013 [Tk] where the applicant attacked the 
institution of marital power, which had existed by virtue of the Transkei Marriage Act. Miller J in this case 
declined to extend the order to abolish marital power where customary unions were concerned. This is yet 
another example of the reluctance by judges to refonn customary law. The result is that most African 
women are placed at a disadvantage in comparison to their white counterparts. 
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been aptly described as "the most glaring inequality in our law." IOI In litigation a woman 
could not appear without the assistance of her husband or her guardian. The legal 
disability of African women was exacerbated by the practice of polygamy, which made it 
made it possible for African men to marry two different women under different legal 
systems. '02 African women therefore found themselves parties to unions that were 
governed by dual systems of marriage law. The civil marriage had the effect of nullifying 
the customary union. This meant that most rural African women were left in the dark 
about the subsequent marriage, and in the majority of cases only discovered about the 
second marriage upon the death of the husband. Such women were left with no 
bargaining power and often empty-handed upon the death of their husbands. 103 
Because the African property system is communal in nature, women were unable to hold 
property in their own name. '04 In 1998 the South African Law Commission Report on 
Customary Marriages acknowledged the disadvantages women face in that although they 
playa vital role in food production, they are often denied control over property in the 
form of land or otherwise. The decisions of the Native Appeal Court had the effect of 
entrenching the subordination of women. The case of Ndlovu v NdioVU lO5 for example, 
asserted the rule that women had no capacity "to hold or deal with property." On the 
other hand, some writers, notably among them Dlarnini, ,06 are of the view that the 
institution of customary marriages is not the cause of such inequities. Dlamini argues 
that: 
IOIM.L.Sultan "Equality and Gender in African Customary Law In South Africa" at 
www.ucl.ac.zaldepts!rgru!eguapaps!golcul.pdfaccessed on 24 August 2003. 
102 Section 3(1) of the Transkei Marriage Act 21 f 1978 notes that a male person exercising his statutory 
rights to enter into a second marriage while his first one subsists is not required to get his fITst wife's 
consent. See also Makholiso and Others v Makholiso and Others 1997 (4) SA 509 (Tk). 
103 Willan op cit at 49. 
104 As seen in Siiila v Masumba supra the Native Appeal Court described property possession in the 
African society as follows: "It is a joint corrununal possession .... Hence though the kraal head is legal 
owner of the estate, his ownership is burdened with what we might call personal rights of various types of 
which maintenance and habitation are two of the chief, subject to mutual corresponding duties on the part 
of the beneficiaries." See also 0010 v Ntshini 1950 NAC (S) 234 at 235 where the court declared "As a rule 
the heir in whom the ownership of the estate property vests, will provide the support and the widow has no 
rifht to dispose of any assets without his consent." 
10 1954 NAC 59. 
106 C.R.M. Dlamini 1991:71. 
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"The subordinate position of women in the traditional black society is not a product of a 
customary marriage. It is attributed to the simple technology and subsistence economy 
that gave the family head control of property. By virtue of this, he would conclude 
contracts with outsiders, represent all inmates in his family home in litigation and assume 
liability for their delicts. There would have been little sense in granting these various 
capacities to women if they didn't have any control over property." 
According to Martin Chanock,107 customary law was constructed and informed by the 
political structure of the times. Martin Chanock's phrase that "customary law was neither 
customary or law,,108 invokes the question of whether traditional customs and practices 
existed to perpetuate male dominance. In his account he draws attention to the shift from 
custom to customary law, which took place prominently in the sphere of the family and 
was a consequence of the alliance between colonial administration and African male 
elders. Traditional holders of power over strategic resources saw this power dwindling 
and "sought to regain it by manipUlating customary institutions ... ,,109 Sachs l lO states that 
colonialism and apartheid managed to diminish those aspects of traditional African 
society that were democratic and emphasised vertical power and patriarchy. African 
women neither had the protection they possessed under custom nor were they conferred 
any individual rights by the state. While in many ways this may be true, it is also 
important to acknowledge that the role of women in the African family operated in 
denying women equal rights to their male counterparts, this even before the advent of 
colonialism. 
Central also to the argument that customary marriages resulted in the unequal treatment 
of women, is the assertion that polygyny, the customary practice that allowed men to 
marry many wives, was degrading to women and created a number of social inequities. 
Unlike civil marriages, customary unions were seen as inferior in nature. According to 
Simons the colonialists saw polygyny as a "licensed system of unbridled lust." 11 1 
Kaganas and Murra/ 12 contend that in the earliest reported cases or decisions in South 
107 Chanock op cit at 4. 
108 NhIapo op cit at 136. 
109 ibid. 
110 A. Sachs 199:2. 
111 Simons op cit at 15 . 
112 Kaganas and Murray op cit at 119, 
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Africa, it was taken as self-evident that the Christian forms of marriage were the only 
ones to be recognised by the law. The reality, however, was that whether married under 
customary law or civil law African women continued to bear the brunt of the patriarchal 
structure of the time. Dlamini 113 is ofthe view that "the idea that polygyny was a blatant 
degradation of or discrimination against women is a misconception". In his own words 
polygyny is calculated to protect women who cannot find a single man to marry and is 
prepared to settle for a married man: 
"It provides her a stable relationship and companionship. The first married woman 
although she may be aggrieved is also protected in that she still remains a wife and may 
be given the status of great wife . . .. " 
The writer is by no means denying that the views of white colonisers were often 
ethnocentric and intolerant. It would, however, be parochial if one fails to recognise the 
view that polygyny is a practice that often contributes to the inequities experienced by 
African women, especially in their familial contexts. Kaganas and Murray I 14 correctly 
observe that "cultural relativism does not absolve us from the responsibility to respond to 
oppression and suffering in different cultures." While there is no concrete evidence to 
support the assertion that polygyny entails the oppression of women, it cannot be denied 
that it is "inextricably linked to social practices that are oppressive to women.,,115 
1.4 ACCESS TO LAND FOR WOMEN 
In light of the African National Congress's recent commitments to include women in 
their Land redistribution policy, a historical trace of the denial of women to the right to 
1 13 Dlamini op cit at 77. 
114 Kaganas and Murray op cit at 113. 
115 ibid. The writer is aware that such remarks are generalisations, which could have the effect of implying 
that the all African traditions are oppressive to women. This is not her intention. As Aili Mari Tripp "The 
Politics of Women's Rights and Cultural Diversity in Uganda" in Molyneus and Razavi (eds) Gender 
Justice, Development and Rights, 2002:415-416 writes, such statements tend to lack sociological insight 
and could be held as highly offensive. The writer feels, however, that it is legitimate to state that many 
forms of oppression faced by African women have their origins in culture. This is not a situation particular 
to African women. Cultural rationales are used throughout the world to protect the status quo when it 
comes to advancing women 's rights. 
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land is wanting. Gregory Alexanderl16 has observed that land law has not been 
conventionally considered from the perspective of gender. Yet, as land is considered 
paramount to survival in an agro based economy such as South Africa, it is important to 
address the injustice that resulted from the colonialists' dispossessing Africans of their 
land. Such measures were primarily based on race; they had an impact on the right to 
ownership by women. Women are generally disadvantaged, compared with men of the 
same race and class in access to land. The result is that in general women often find 
themselves insecure in their rights of access to land. Access often largely depends on 
their link to a man and married women are placed in even a greater dilemma as they are 
often forced to remain in unfavourable marriages to secure the income and resources that 
come with land control and ownership. 
According to Small and Kompe 117 in addition to the failure to access these resources, 
women are also disadvantaged in the control they are able to exercise over them. It is 
generally accepted that Bantu-speaking tribes of Southern Africa did not practise a 
system of individual land tenure.118 The traditional system of land holding is often 
described as communal. 119 Some writers l20 argue that the conception of land being held 
communally is misleading. 121 Apparently there is no tribal law stating that women cannot 
have access to land in their own right. The issue of women owning land depends to a 
great degree on the extent to which women can persuade the tribal authorities to grant 
them land rights. Women are, in practice, often disadvantaged by social assumptions and 
informal land practices rather than by law. As Murphy states a woman gaining land in her 
own right appears in many traditional African societies as an exception rather than the 
rule. Whatever the opinions of different scholars, land ownership was characterised by 
the dominant role of the ChiefiHeadman, who in turn allotted stands to individuals for 
116 G. Alexander "Critical Land Law" in Bright and Dewar (eds) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, 
1998:l. 
117 J. Small and L. Kompe 1991: l. 
118 N.J.J. Olivier "Indigenous Land Law in South Africa" in Sanders (ed) Southern Africa in need of Law 
Reform: Proceedings of the Southern African Law Reform Conference,1980: 70. 
119 Mqeke quoting from McLoughlin op cit at 132 who expresses the view "that the principle underlying all 
land-tenure among the native trihes is that land belongs to the tribes . . .. " 
120 Simons op cit at 26 1. 
121 All writers do not share this opinion, notably Mqeke op cil at 130 ffwho quotes many writers as noting 
that land was communally owned. 
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cultivation and residence. Older African tenure systems generally viewed land more as a 
social and political issue rather than one of production and reproduction. Under European 
rule, extensive changes were made to the status quo of the time. The Natal Native Trust 
Act of 1864 saw to it that tribal areas were registered in the name of the Natal Locations 
Commission who in turn would administer the areas on behalf of the Africans. The Cape 
Commission on Native Law and Customs 1883 saw to the gradual replacement of 
communal tenure with a system of individual freehold. 122 With the exclusion of Africans 
from access to land, it is true to note that land became a scarce commodity; its social and 
political value became a vehicle for the maintenance of power. Coupled by the power 
conferred on chiefs, such conditions established an even more secure stronghold of the 
system of patriarchy. While the traditional customary position allowed that a wife, 
divorcee, widow or woman could own land in her own right and assert her claim against 
male counterparts, I2l the Native Land Act 27 of 1913 and the policy on "one man one 
lot" resulted in scarcity of land and the rights of women taking a subsidiary position. 
Under indigenous law, widows could legitimately reside at the kraal of her deceased 
husband until her death or remarriage. Such a situation was akin to an "unregistered 
personal servitude." Proclamation 16 of 1905 and Proclamation R188 of 1969 ensured 
that the law protected a widow's servitude. However, as a result of the radical change in 
the traditional system of land holding, few women could own land in their own right. 
Married women were relegated to positions of minors, and could not dispose of their 
property without their husbands' consent. Women could not inherit as inheritance 
devolved on the male heirs according to the rules of primogeniture. 124 Women were 
rarely owners of land, and since they lacked proprietary rights, widows who remarried 
forfeited their rights to land, and unmarried women could not or had little prospect of 
122 Olivier op cit at 71. 
123 Simons lac cil states that although often unjust in their allocations of rights and resources, older 
patriarchal land systems had the value of guaranteeing women support through husbands. See also section 
9( 1) of Proclamation 142 of 1910 still applicable in the Iranskean territories, which gave a widows the 
right to legal possession and use of land in the same capacity as her late husband was entitled. See also the 
case of Dvas! v Dyasi 1935 NAC (C&O) 1. In this case a widow's claim to eject a defendant heir was 
disputed. In the appeal, the court stressed the need to take customary law rules into account when seeking 
the intention of the legislature. The purpose of Proclamation 142 of 1910 according to the court was to 
ensure that widows were safeguarded against exploitation from the family of the deceased and to ensure 
that she could claim for support for herself and her children. 
124 ibid. 
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obtaining aliotments. 125 The result of this unsatisfactory situation was that widows were 
forced by circumstances into entering ukungena relationships or what was irregular 
cohabitation that allowed them to obtain rights to land. With the new migration policies, 
the system of social production changed from home production to reliance on wages. 
Men took over the burden of supporting the household. The change from older values has 
seen many men withdrawing from the commitment of maintaining the household. 
Without access to land, authority and other resources, women are still faced with the 
difficulty of supporting their families. 
Feminist scholars contend that both historically and currently land law has treated men 
and women differently in ways that have nearly always disadvantaged women. Both 
women and men's claims to resources, power and authority are fashioned principally 
through intersections between race, class and gender. These interconnections are located 
and deployed within specific cultural and historical contexts. Depending on the varying 
personalities of the various chiefs and his headmen, it appears that customary tenure and 
the circumstance of women's rights are often ambiguous and non-existent. As with the 
struggle to obtain any of the other Constitutional rights, rural black women find 
themselves consigned to inferior positions, while men hold the exclusive power to "use 
and control the profits on allland.,,126 It is women who are often in the first line of attack 
when housing, land and basic needs are threatened, and in these instances women 
mobilise themselves across the community, yet as Small and Kempel27 have observed, it 
is the very same community political structures that prevent active involvement by 
women in decision making. The existence of married women's right to land depended on 
consent to such an arrangement, or on the "altruistic" nature of the male heir to the land. 
Either way, the woman was dependent on someone else. 
125 Simons op cit at 263. 
126 Alexander op cit at 61. 
127 Referred to with approval by S. Meer "Introduction" in Meer (ed) Women, Land and Authority: 
Perspectives from South Aji-ica, 1997:4. 
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The history of such disadvantage is not unique to South Africa. Aili Mari Tripp l28 gives 
an account of the position in Uganda where since 1996 the debate over the amendment of 
an Act that prevented women from owning land,129 illustrated not only how political and 
social structures contribute to the oppression of women, but also the impact of feminists 
in changing that status quo. The President of the country, Museveni, argued against the 
Act on the grounds that it would be in conflict with "tradition" and "custom", while 
traditional leaders feared loss of land to another clan should a woman be married outside 
the clan.llo According to Tripplll in Uganda, as elsewhere in the world, women provide 
70-80 per cent of all agricultural labour and 90 per cent of all labour involving food 
production: 
"Yet they own 7 per cent of the land. They are generally responsible for providing for the 
household therefore their access to land is critical. Yet women are dependent on men to 
access that land .. .. " 
Until July 1998 women in Uganda could jointly acquire land with their husbands but 
could not claim ownership in their own name. As a result they were placed at the mercy 
of men where land ownership was concerned. Most were left with no form of subsistence 
upon the death of their husbands and although heirs had to provide for women, in most 
cases they did not. Another result of the lack of capacity to hold land was that often men 
would sell off land without consulting wives and women lacked the power to contest this. 
In response to this, feminists in Uganda mobilised and demanded that legislation be 
amended to allow ownership. The result was the Land Act of 1998 which provided 
among other things, that "decisions regarding land held under customary law either 
individually or communally shall be taken in accordance with the custom, traditions and 
communities concerned unless they deny women ownership, occupation or use of 
land."ll2 
128 Tripp op cit at 420. 
129 In pre-1998 Uganda a woman could jointly acquire land with her husband but could not claim 
ownership of the property her own name. 
130 Uganda is a patrilineal society, where fathers often do not bequeath land to their daughters for fear that 
should the daughter marry outside the clan, land will transfer to another clan. To ensure that land remains 
in the clan, female ownership is discouraged. 
III Tripp op cit at 421. 
Il2 Section 28 of the Land Act of 1998 taken from Tripp op cit at 423 . 
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What needs to be acknowledged and has been argued by many feminist scho lars is that 
gendered power relations resulted In women's subordination. Despite popular 
misconceptions, it was not simply race, class and the impacts of colonialism and 
apartheid policy that led to the present South African situation of access to and control 
over resources. These processes operated within a gender framework and interacted with 
existing gender relations to bring about the present circumstances of race, class and 
gender inequities.1l3 Moreover, the roots of gender inequalities lay not only within the 
domain of state and economic policies but were largely a result of inequalities that exist 
in household and community structures. Dependence on men and lack of community 
support inhibited women from acting contrary to men's expectations. Even though 
measures were taken to improve women's status as property owners, equality and 
independence remained and still remain elusive goals for many women. 
An awareness of the difficulties women expenence In relation to land has led to 
implementation of policy decisions implemented first within the ANC framework and in 
govemment. 134 Sharnim Meer1J5 lists them as follows: 
i) that women must participate in decision-making structures from local to national 
level; 
ii) that women's demands must be taken up so that their priorities get addressed in 
community and national decision making forums; and 
iii) that women must be organised and empowered at community level. 
133 Meer op cit at 6. 
134 This same corrunitment to an equitable land policy is reflected in both the Green Paper on South African 
Land Policy, 1996 and the White Paper on South African Land Policy, April 1997. In this the vision of the 
Department of Land Affairs includes among others the acknowledgement that traditional communal land 
tenure systems are discriminatory to women and the need to break down these systems. It includes as one 
of its four basic objectives the need to "ensure that aU reforms reflect the values of basic human rights and 
equality as required by the Constitution." D.L Carey Miller, 2000:459. M. Robertson "Land and Post-
Apartheid Reconstruction in South Africa"in Bright and Dewar (eds) Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, 
1998 quotes from the preamble to the R.D.P which among its many objectives was the need to encourage 
"the profound transformation of all levels of government and society", by giving equal opportunity to 
women in land access. The R.D.P was replaced by the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy, 
better known as GEAR. See below for a discussion of how GEAR has affected African women. 
135 Meer op cit at 1. 
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Meer contends that though the revision of policy by government to allow for greater 
emphasis on women and equal opportunity is a welcome step for women, it is fraught 
with negatives. Academics and activists in their approach tend to shroud women's 
experiences by presenting policy measures in a gender-neutral or gender-blind manner. 
The result of this is that government implement and pursues policy that is oversimplified 
and ignores or underestimates the complexities that exist in communities. By 
camouflaging the difference in gender, policy guidelines emerge with men's experiences 
serving as reflections for the entire community. Like a vicious cycle benefits of policy 
leave out the women and the poor who ironically are the very targets for the policies. It 
has been observed that for most rural women access to land is synonymous with and is 
viewed in conjunction with access to other resources and that without income, access to 
land is worthless for many women. 1J6 Using Zimbabwe's case study as an example of the 
problems that result from approaching land issues in a gender neutral manner, Jacobs lJJ 
argues that gender-neutral policies have the impact of entrenching gender inequalities 
even if more often than not it hardly ever is the intention of policy-makers. According to 
the author, in Zimbabwe such an approach has led to and continue to see women as 
dependants of men. He reasons that policy that ignores differences and different needs 
often ends up as being gender-biased in favour of men. Women then become excluded 
and neglected in state policy and though formal law demands equality, substantively 
these policies hardly do benefit women. Norms and values that frame gender roles and 
behaviour and are ingrained in custom and tradition ought to be addressed by policy 
makers. Agarwal lJ8 gives the example of India where changes in the law allowed women 
to inherit land but custom remained unchanged and demanded that a good woman was 
one who would give land to a male counterpart such as a brother or a father. Changes in 
the law unaccompanied by changes in attitude and custom will not allow w;:>men to claim 
rights. According to Walker,139 within the South African context it is important to 
acknowledge the role that tradition plays yet "if democratisation of society is the goal, 
then what is preserved in the name of tradition has to be subjected to a very serious 
\36 Meer op cit at 4, 
137 ibid. 
138 Referred to by Meer, 1997 op cit at 12. 
139 ibid. 
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review." Any gains that are made by the Constitution are likely to be lost if traditionalists 
are acceded to . Tradition is "the product of contestation, co-option, reconstruction and 
invention. Having been refashioned in the past it can be shaped to fit the goals of a non-
sexist and non-racist society.,,140 
1.S INHERlTANCE LAWS - SUCCESSION 
The Native system of succession and inheritance is invariably patrilineal. Primogeniture 
is the governing principle and the universal practice of polygamy is fundamental. Central 
to the principle of primogeniture is the postulation that only males can inherit. Widows 
are therefore denied benefiting from their deceased husbands' estates141 rn traditional 
African society, a widow had to look to the male heir for support and for payment of 
debts that may arise from the estate. The Native Appeal decision of Madolo v Nomawu142 
clearly outlines that women cannot inherit, but rather remain under the heir's 
guardianship who, in turn, is obliged to provide support. African estates devolve on a son, 
brother or nephew of the deceased, but never on his widow or daughter. 143 The rule of 
primogeniture is consistent with the structure and functions of the joint family. The 
general heir, who succeeds to an office as well as to an estate, must be a male, as only a 
male can take the position as head of a household in the traditional society. In a 
household each wife creates a separate establishment, and the moveable property of the 
husband accrues under custom or is allotted by him to his different establishments or 
houses. The eldest son of each wife or house, upon the father's decease, succeeds to the 
property appertaining to that house and thereupon becomes charged with the legal 
obligation of providing for the widow and dependants of that household. l44 In the same 
manner land, whether occupied under the system of communal or individual tenure, is 
apportioned among his different houses, and the respective divisions of land become 
substantially subject to the same laws of succession and inheritance. 
140 ibid, 
141 Kaganas and Murray op cit at 123. 
1421 NAC 12 (1896). 
143 Simons op cit at 239. 
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The advantages of the system lie in that the subdivision ofland and property are provided 
against, and thereupon there is no interruption of the uses to which his property was 
devoted during his lifetime, and due provision is continued for the maintenance of his 
dependants] 45 In the Sotho culture it is possible for a woman to be heir in the absence of 
a male heir; however she is still bound by the principle of patriarchy that dictates that she 
administer her estate with her guardian's (who is male) approval. 146 In terms ofthe state 
of customary family law, Bennettl47 comments as follows: "By mid-twentieth century, it 
was obvious that legal reforms were urgently needed to ameliorate the position of women 
and children." Yet the courts and at least until 1985, the legislature clung to their policy 
of non-intervention. The 1943 amendment of the notorious section 11(3)(b) was one of 
the few amendments made applicable to women married in African customary law. In his 
contribution to the South African Journal on Human Rights, Likhapha Mbatha 148 asserts 
the need for South Africa to reform the customary law of succession. He writes that the 
codified customary law of succession in South Africa no longer serves the original 
purpose underlying this system: 
"In particular, the rule that control of family property should be entrusted to a male heir 
with a corresponding obligation to care for the deceased dependants has been distorted by 
changing socio-economic conditions. The living customary law has already began to 
change in order to allocate family property after the death of their husbands." 
The recent case of Bhe v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha l49 has seen a complete overall of 
the customary law principle of primogeniture, with the Cape High Court declaring it to be 
unconstitutional. The case was brought by the Women's Legal Centre on behalf of two 
illegitimate girls, aged two and nine. The girl's father, Maboyisi Mgolombane, died 
intestate and their mother, Nontupheko Bhe, was never married to him although they 
lived in monogamous partnership for 12 years until his death. Their grandfather, who in 
terms of African custom would have inherited the estate, had indicated that he intended to 
144 See also Dvasi v Dyasi 1935 NAC (C&O) I as discussed above. 
145 Whitfield op cit 314. 
146 My"z" v Norenti I NAC 74 (1904) u •.. the respondent shall have the use of the property, but ownership 
in it shall not vest in her, but that for the purposes of administration of this stock, she shall be considered to 
the ward .... " 
141 Bennett 1985:32. 
148 Mbatha 2002:259. 
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sell the girls' home150 He argued that the Black Administration Act prevented black 
women from inheriting from their parents if they died intestate. The court decided that 
the Black Administration Act discriminated on grounds of race and gender and was 
"offensive to their right to equality" and therefore unconstitutional. 151 
The principle of primogeniture does not extend only where property is concerned but also 
spreads its influence in the sphere of succession to status as in the office traditional 
leadership.152 Traditionally women cannot hold positions as traditional leaders or as 
amakhosi. Only first-born males of particular houses could be heirs. However, they can 
hold the position of amabamba, where they act on their children's behalf where conflict 
has arisen because those acting in the interim, while a son is coming of age, refuse to 
leave their position. 153 Many of those who are in support of the preservation of this 
unequal state argue that custom does not discriminate female children but also against all 
other male children. The submissions note: 
"It is not any and every male who can become the heir. It is a particular male born of a 
. I ·c ,,154 partlcu ar wile .. .. 
149 Bhe and Others v The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2004 (I) BCLR 27 (C) . 
150 As discussed above, the African rules of succession are based on a traditional ideal that the family unit is 
preserved through the family head. When the head of the fami ly dies, his heir takes his position as head of 
the family and becomes holder of the property. Although the family head holds the property, it is owned for 
the collecti ve benefit of family members. 
lSI In the Cape Argus Newspaper, 7 October 2003, the Traditional Leaders' of South Africa President 
Pathekile Holomisa comments: "It is unjust for those girls not to inherit their father's property. If the 
grandfather wanted to secure the property for the benefit of the children, then fine, but he is not entitled to 
it for his own interests. Women are proving to be capable of looking after their families' interests. If 
someone feels she can look after the property then they can have it." However, he warns that the 
grandfather's behaviour must not be a reflection of African customary law in general. 
IS' K.B Motshabi and S.G Volks 1993: Ill. 
IS' Submissions on the Draft White Paper on Traditional Leaders and Governance Vol 2 (2003). 
154 Submissions on the Draft White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance Vol 2 (2003). A 
summary of the responses to the Draft White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance shows that 
the majority of Traditional Leaders are opposed to women succession to traditional leadership positions. In 
K wa-Zulu Natal they argue that since ubukhosi runs along bloodline, installing female amakhosi has the 
potential of contaminating the bloodline, which normally results in conflict and war. In the Limpopo 
Province the traditional leaders acknowledged that women in the past (citing an example of Mkabayi ka 
Jama) did hold position of power but did not get married, so did not contaminate the bloodline. Yet they go 
further to argue that because women have monthly periods, they cannot stand in front of men, as this would 
affect them. In the North-West Province, the leaders were of the opinion that representation by women in 
positions of leadership was acceptable, yet appointment of amakhosi was unlikely to work. The 
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This view is justified by adding that ubukhosi runs along bloodline and women holding 
such a position could lead to potential for the contamination of this bloodline. The 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 155 which stresses in its preamble 
that the institution of traditional leadership must "promote freedom, human dignity and 
achievement of equality and non-sexism". It requires that at least one-third of the 
members of the traditional council must be women. This Act is an indication of the 
government's commitment to gender equality. It remains to be seen whether such 
changes will be acceptable to the people at large. 156 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
It is important to acknowledge that the perception that customary law was oppressive to 
women is not always accurate. As Willan l57 notes there are many areas in which women 
were protected by customary practices. She quotes Burman as follows: 
"Some man is always responsible for providing for a woman and her children, and while 
the head of the family may control the product of 'his' woman's labour, he does not own 
it absolutely. He is more in the position of the manager of a joint estate. He has 
obligations to protect the interest of each house formed by a wife and her offspring . .. 
and even to consult the 'house' and his heirs inherit his obligations to provide for widows 
remaining under the heirs' control.,,158 
However, what is not arguable is that African women are often assigned positions of 
subservience, and remain unernpowered and oppressed. The codification of custom and 
submissions by IDASA and COSA TU were that gender equity was to be exercised but warned against 
deviating from traditional rules of succession. 
'" Act 41 of2003. 
156 The case of Mkhatshwa v Mkhatshwa and Another 2002 (3) SA 441 is an indication that some changes 
are already evidenced at the grass root levels. In a dispute over the lawful successor to the chieftainship of 
the Mawewe tribe, Moseneke J upheld the appointment by the Premier of Mpumalanga of one Miriam 
Mkhathswa as chief of the Mawewe tribe. 
157 Willan op cit at 52. 
ISS see also as discussed above the case of Sima v Masumba 1940 NAC (C & 0) 42 and Mpullgose v 
Mpungose 1946 NAC (T & N) 37 where McLoughlin P declares that" the native social system regards the 
family as a whole and all members of the family participate in its possession". (my emphasis) 
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traditions led to inconsistency with what was authentic traditional customs. Gordon l59 
captures it as follows: 
"It is now generally accepted at least by revisionists that "customary law" as it emerged 
in the colonial era was not the product of some authentic communal tradition, but was 
rather a tool developed by local indigenous elites and colonisers to control resources .. . . " 
The protection that women could claim under customary law was eroded by the 
codification of customs. 160 As discussed above, institutionalising the power of chiefs and 
headman had a similar effect on customary law. Traditional leaders in many instances 
manipulated tradition in order to establish their power. 161 Although the practice of 
patriarchy had existed way before colonial times, increasing the powers of the chiefs, led 
to an institutionalisation of this principle. Where before, women had enjoyed protection 
in culture, the changes led to 'legislated gender inequities ' . What a remains true however 
is that women were unempowered and in most instances subjugated. Their position has 
been captured in the following terms: 
"The ethnocentrism ofthe white coloniser in their approach to African family law is now 
easily recognised and we should be alert to the dangers of generalising from culturally 
specific notions ... But this insight need not inevitably lead to an ethical quicksand of 
cultural relativism and does not absolve us from a responsibility to respond to oppression 
and suffering in different cultures .... ,,162 
Much as we ought to acknowledge the part played by colonialism in diluting "authentic 
customs and traditions" and in "perpetuating patriarchy" we must also be wary of the 
1S9 R.I. Gordon 1991:93. 
160 Willan op cit at 54. 
161 Mbatha op cit at 263 writes that the codification of customary law led in many ways to the distortion of 
various customary values and purposes. He gives the example of land ownership where he notes that 
changes in colonial land policies and laws increased the pressure on black occupied land and meant that 
there was a struggle for land ownership. To curb this, many of the traditional leaders and males in the 
African society used customs as a means to prevent women from owning land. The manipulation of culture 
was in many ways also caused by poverty, migracy and high unemployment. It was essentially a maner of 
"survival of the fittest", where leaders and males in society used their positions as a means to survive in the 
new social order. 
162 Kaganas and Murray op cit at 125. Tripp op cit at 415 criticises Western theorist who tend to make 
sweeping generalisations about the position of women in Africa. She instead argues that feminists must 
acknowledge that patriarchy is not a system that is unique to Africa, but is and has been a part of the 
World 's tradition and cultures in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. See the discussions by 
the present writer on human rights versus cultural relativity in Chapter four of this work. 
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danger of "the trap of parochialism and romanticisation of the past ... which could so 
easi ly become an excuse for not facing up to the challenges posed by African patriarchy 
in its present context. ,,163 
The struggle to empower women took an inferior role throughout the apartheid era. 
Although within the African National Congress women were deeply involved in all the 
Congress campaigns, almost exclusively men dominated the leadership of the Congress 
organisations164And although in the 1950's, the A.N.C's National Executive Committee 
acknowledged the importance of women to the struggle and the significance of 
addressing issues affecting women, the hardships faced by women more especially 
African women remained throughout the resistance era. As Elizabeth Schmidt observes, 
African women played a leading role in the resistance movement and more especially, 
were pass legislation was concerned: 
"It was through the pass laws that the influx control system was enforced, and it was this 
system that turned their husbands into migrant workers and made them into widows in 
the reserves. Passes deprived them of the basic right to live with their husbands and to 
raise their children in a stable family unit. On the basis of race, African women suffered 
the same disabilities as African men. Because of their sex, they carried a double burden." 
Even in the 1990's, gender took a peripheral role. 165 The 1990 draft Constitution of the 
African National Congress Women's League is an illustration of this point. The first of 
its aims and objectives was to "mobilise and organise South African women into 
participation in the struggle for liberation of all oppressed groups." The oppressive 
condition of African women though mentioned did not constitute a central aim. In her 
introductory topic Susan Bazilli 166 observes that while gender equality was of concern to 
the African National Congress' aims and objectives, slogans such as "a woman's place in 
163 P. Mc Fadden 1992: 162. 
164 E. Schimdt "Now you have touched the woman" at www.anc.org.za accessed on 10 August 2003 . It was 
only in 1956 that a woman was elected to the National Executive Committee of the African National 
Congress, despite women being actively involved since inception in 1912. 
165 In spite of gender being subsidiary to the discussions on race post 1990) several conferences and 
meetings were held that ensured that women's issues were put "on the agenda". Primary among them was 
South African Council of Churches Women and Constitution held in October 1990 in Durban, the ANC's 
conference on gender held in November 1990 and the Lawyers for Human Rights Conference Putting 
women Oil the Agenda held Johannesburg. 
166 Bazilli op cit at 11. 
36 
the struggle" and "mothers of the nation", are an indication that women 's issues were 
held not as separate and distinct issues for discussion, but in connection with and 
contextualised within the political struggle for racial equality. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.1 INTRODUCTION - FEMINISM AS A GLOBAL PHENOMENON 
This chapter intends to examine the history of feminism and to present it as a global 
phenomenon. By tracing the history and origin of feminism within the Euro-American 
context, the writer aims to attend to the question of whether feminist theories that have 
their foundations in the Western world can be used or applied to the African context and 
more particularly the South African context. While a great number of African feminists 
have established their mark in the struggle for equality between men and women, it is not 
a slight to state that the realm of feminist work has from the nineteenth century been 
Euro·American. J The study of feminism and the theories that surround it are both 
mystifying and incomprehensible to say the least. They are often times so largely 
categorised and divided that it is difficult to define the terms and conditions that govern 
them. 
Although quite a great deal of literature has been devoted to the subject of "gender and 
justice", for several reasons it has concentrated on the situation of women. Feminists 
have observed that gender is a much greater concern for women than it is for men and 
therefore argue that the leading justice theories both tend to assume "men as their 
subjects and fail to recognise gender-specificity of much of their scholarship.,,2 The result 
in contrast is that men are more likely to experience their gender as a social, political or 
legal advantage than women. The women's right activities from the 1840's to the 1920's 
was known as "first wave" feminism,] in the 1960's, 1970's and the early 1980's there 
was a move towards what was popularly known as "second wave" feminism. The "third 
wave" feminism has its roots in the 1990's onwards. There is also a further classification 
into Contractarian, Liberal (bourgeois), Marxist and Radical feminism. With the rise of 
1 The author 1. Donovan 2001 traces the earliest work offeminists to the period between 1405-1726. In her 
book entitled Women and the Rise of the Novel, J 405-1726 she documents the beginning of the movement 
as going as far back as the l5 th century. She writes that even then women were aware of the inequalities 
that existed and voiced concern about their position as the disadvantaged sex. 
2 N. Naffine "Introduction" in Naffine (ed) Gender and Justice, 2002:xi. 
3 1. Donavan 200 1: 11-12 notes that the idea that "first wave" feminism was a product of this period is a 
fallacy. According to the author feminism began much earlier in the 15th, 16th and 1 t h Centuries in Western 
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"third wave" feminism comes yet another division in an already heterogeneous theory, 
that of African (Nationalist), Islamic and Western feminism. It is within this realm that 
this chapter focuses. A further classification exists in the modernist and post-modernist 
version of feminism. Despite the great strides made in recent history, African women 
face the mammoth challenge of advocating for women's rights. This they must do in the 
face of challenges of race, religion, culture and poverty. Any feminist work that focuses 
on African women naturally ought to recognize and deal with the multiple oppressions 
underpinning their existence. Their positions not only deal with current and present issues 
of economics and politics that face their contemporary communities, but as Mike1l4 has 
observed, African women have to go further and grapple with and affirm "their own 
identities" in the midst of and within the agenda of the "societal notions of gender and 
familial roles."s Arndt6 comments thus: 
"There is hardly a debate that is more controversial than the African discourse on 
feminism. Anti-feminist positions are widespread in Africa. On the one hand, there are 
those who reject feminist ideas fundamentally. Most of their arguments do injustice to the 
heterogeneity of feminism and do not really threaten the existence of feminism in Africa. 
On the other hand, there are the critical positions of those who sympathize with feminist 
ideas, but do not feel at home with Western feminism. Their central reproach is that 
feminism does not see beyond Western societies, and hence ignores or marginalizes the 
specific problems of African women." 
According to Amina Marna,7 a well-known African feminist, African women are quite 
often reluctant to be associated with feminism. Such an attitude is manifested by 
expressions such as "I am not a feminist but I do believe in women's rights." The very 
definition of feminism in light of the great many sub-divisions discussed above is not 
well known and is therefore beyond the understanding of many. Because most African 
scholars consider feminism as a foreign and bourgeois importation, which has no 
Europe. Even then many of the issues that later feminists were concerned about (rape and violence against 
women) had already been the subjects of much debate. 
4 G. Mikell "Introduction" in Mikell (ed) African Feminism: The Politics of Survival in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 1997:1. 
5 ibid. The argument used by African writers in their rejection of feminism is based largely on the premises 
that Western feminists base their theories around the nuclear family whereas the African family is 
characterised by the extended family with a communitarian tradition. 
6 S. Arndt "The dynamics of African Feminism: Defming and classifying African Feminist Literature" at 
http://shop.store.vahoo.com/africanworldl0865438986.html accessed on 19 October 2003. 
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relevance to the African situation, it remains in most writings an elusive and invisible 
concept8 Mama feels that instead ofrejecting wholly the concept of "feminism" African 
women ought to give the notion meaning that is appropriate to the African context9 
Although sometimes the term has been associated with anti-democratic interests it 
occupies a presence in the African society. l0 The reality of feminism is that it deals with 
the problems facing women, be they economic or otherwise. While it might be implied 
that everyone is included, given the history of the movement, the definition needs to do 
more than name the enemies of women as patriarchy and cultural practices. Msimang 11 
makes the following observations: 
"Given the limitations of western, liberal conceptions of democracy we want to 
conceptuali se what might be called 'feminist democracy' in relation to the proj ect of 
decolonisation - in other words to think through an anticolonialist, anticapitalist vision of 
feminist practice ... . Such a vision necessarily involves acknowledging the objectifying, 
dehumanising effects of colonisation (eg imitation of the coloniser, horizontal violence, 
self-depreciation due to internalised oppression, self-destruct, psychic and material 
dependency, desire to assimilate) - and build actively anticolonialist relationships and 
cultures as a crucial part of the project of feminist democracy." 
There is consensus among many African feminists that Western feminist theory does not 
always cater for all women. This has led to the emergence of anti-essentialists who 
postulate that instead of merely questioning the difference between men and women, 
feminists ought to question the differences that exists between women themselves. By 
recognising that those differences in race, religion, ethnicity and socio-economic 
7 A. Mama referred to with approval by S. Essof2001: 125. 
, R. Meena "Gender Research! Studies in Southern Africa: An Overview" in Meena (ed) Gender in 
Southern Africa: Conceptions and Theoretical Issues, 1992: 4 . 
9 See also R. Meena ibid who by quoting Tsikata defines feminism as "the recognition of the systematic 
discrimination against women on the grounds of gender and the commitment to work towards change." She 
goes so far as to claim that anyone who advocates for equality and equal opportunity between men and 
women, is a feminist. The fact that African male scholars have used culture as merely an excuse to conceal 
the existing oppressive gender relations and to legitimise the perpetuation of these oppressive relations. 
Msimang (see below) argues that in light oftbe critiques of feminism that have emerged from third world 
feminists, and African feminists in particular, this definition is inadequate. To simply state that feminism 
and feminist movements merely address women 's subordination, is to ignore what happens to women who 
happen to be black, poor, immigrants, lesbian, or otherwise at the periphery of the category "woman", that 
is to ignore what in the past has been known as the "other". 
10 See in this regard E. Sa10 at http: //www.a2enda.org.za/focus.btml accessed on 23 October 2003 . 
II S. Msimang 2002: 11. 
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positions exist; feminists acknowledge that there is no universal experience. 12 Catherine 
Mackinnon 13 is of the view that anti-essentialists have no place in the feminist movement. 
She writes that "all men have their feet on women's necks, regardless of race or class" 
and that "all (women) are measured by a male standard." It is the present writer's view 
that although commonalities can be drawn from all women; it is essential that feminists 
acknowledge that differences do exist between different women in different contexts. 14 
Eryn Scott encapsulates this view in the following comment: 
"Global feminism is far beyond our grasp for many reasons: the inequities of the 
international division of labour; the hierarchical stratifications among women socially, 
economically, and racially; and the unacknowledged prejUdices and privileges between 
women of the North and South. While feminists of all circumstances work against all 
forms of male domination and oppression, the socio-political reality of the capitalist 
structure inhibits universal sisterhood.,,15 
Such a notion gave rise to what became known as "critical" or "third wave" feminism, 
which incorporates Marxist, nationalist and post-structural (post modem) feminism. This 
focuses on the social relations that exist between gender, class and race. Most African 
feminists are incorporated into this approach. It tends to be multi-disciplinary and multi-
dimensional taking into account the economic, political, cultural and psychological issues 
that face and are part of the history of many African women. One of the many theories 
that underlie this ideology is the concept of "women-in-development", which as 
Mbilinyil6 notes, has its roots in Western feminism but is more context-sensitive and 
moves away from the academic to focus more on being practice-oriented. This school of 
thought arises from the need as Mama 17 comments, "to retain the concept of feminism 
and make it our own (that is applicable to the African woman) 18 by filling the name 
12 A.E. Van Blerk 1996:184. 
13 C. Mackinnon 1987:324. 
14 Harris referred to with approval by Van Blerk op cit at 280 writes that "the consequence of gender 
essentialism is not only that some voices are silenced in order to privilege others but that the voices that are 
silenced turn out to be the same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice". 
15 E. Scott" Differences and Intersections between Feminism in Africa and Feminism in the United States" 
at http://www.columbia.edulcu/sister/Differences.htrnl accessed on 20 October 2003. 
16 M. Mbilinyi "Research Methodologies in Gender Issues" in Meena (ed) Gender in Southern Africa: 
Conceptions and Theoretical Issues, 1992:46. 
17 Mama referred to by Essof op cit at 125. 
18 My emphasis. 
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with meaning." Feminists such as Abrahams19 acknowledge the need and rights of white 
women but stress the necessity to aim for a "single gendered, single-racial space for 
solidarity and struggle among black women." 
Another criticism against feminism is based on the fact that what the global community 
knows about African women is largely as a result of the writings of white female 
scholars2o The valuable contribution of these writers cannot be denied. However, the 
debate is that many of them, although well meaning, often fail to understand the African 
woman and the context in which she operates. Claire Robertson21 states that even with the 
best data collection most white feminists fail to contend with the relationships that exist 
within indigenous communities. Even where one is aware of the need for subjectivity it is 
a sad fact that lifestyles that are alien to one's own are often considered and identified as 
"the other". She remarks that "culturally specific knowledge is essential" and that 
"subjective consciousness is very difficult for outsiders (no matter how well intentioned) 
to explore effectively.,,22 Because of this, some writers have advocated that the struggle 
within the African context be separated from the feminist perspectives of the West. This 
school of thought acknowledges the importance offeminism but feels the need for it to be 
named differently. Advocates for this include women such as Alice Walker23 and 
Chikwenye Ogunyemi who are of the opinion that the movement be known instead as 
"womanism". Ogunyemi24 argues that the term "womanism" be used as alternative to 
"feminism" and states that African men and women are united in a common struggle 
against colonialism and can, therefore, not be identified with Western philosophies. 
I. Abrahams referred to by Essof op cil at 126. 
20 At the First International Conference on Women in Africa and the African Diaspora held in Nigeria, one 
of the main issues on the agenda was the role that white/European women had on the growth of feminism 
in Africa. It was argued by many African feminists that white women could not present papers about the 
experiences of black women, as they would be unable to fully capture these experiences. Volume One was 
a combination of papers presented by women and compiled to make up what was known as "Sisterhood: 
Feminism and Power." In this volume it was contended that there was a need to present feminism as a 
trans formative process aimed at acknowledging the life experiences, concerns, and values of women from 
differing backgrounds and recognising feminism as a global issue. 
21 C. Robertson referred to by P.E. Okeke 1996:225. 
" ibid. 
23 Essof op cit at 126. 
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According to Abrahams25 the term "womanism" can be applied within the South African 
context and is more applicable to the African woman. However, Mama26 argues that a 
change of names is merely a matter of semantics. She suggests that having agreed that 
different women are oppressed differently, and having acknowledged the importance of 
class and race and culture in configuring gender relations, all that needs to be done 
instead is to define the struggle towards equality in African terms. It is conceded that the 
same arguments against Western feminists could be applied with equal force to African 
feminists themselves. Many African feminists are from East Africa and have very little 
perception of the indigenous communities in Southern Africa. While most of these 
writers aim to be emancipatory, often times, their work ends up being alienating. If their 
works are to be discarded on the basis that they are written outside the context of 
Southern Africa then what will result is abandonment of the struggle against inequality 
where surrender is unnecessary. It is the opinion of the present writer that it is more 
beneficial to view feminism as a global phenomenon where different theories can be 
adapted to suit diverse situations. 
South African feminists emerged within a context that differed both from the Euro-
American as well as from the other African feminists. As Penny Andrews27 observes, 
before South African women forced their concerns to the fore, only the urgent task of 
abolishing apartheid and designing the new non-racial order occupied the attention of the 
architects of the new South African democracy. Further, many of the traditional leaders 
demanded during the negotiation stages that Constitutional lawmakers recognise 
traditional laws and institutions. As a result, although South African women benefited 
from the global feminist endeavour, they have had to adopt the shape and substance of 
women's rights to accommodate conditions peculiar to South Africa. This issue is not 
unusual to the South African context alone; the recent trend among feminists has been to 
adopt a stance that is more in tune with the concerns of the "international community" 
and not just the European or American perspective. In this regard Andrews states: 
24 D. Lewis at http ://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/genderiLEWIS.pdf accessed on 21 October 
2003. 
2S See page 40 above. 
26 See page 40 above . 
43 
"Issues raised by third world feminists ... require reorientation of feminism to deal with 
the problem of the most oppressed women, rather than those ofthe most privileged.,,28 
Another difficulty that arises when assessing whether Western feminist perspectives are 
applicable to African women is the fact that, as many African writers have pointed out, 
personal and subjective material is often used and justified as being academic fact. These 
"facts" are often constructed and legitimated by the minority group that is the white 
middle class. As Evans29 writes: 
"So powerful was the hold of this section (on feminist theories/perspectives) that 
different views and experiences particularly and crucially views and experiences from 
outside that group, were seldom, if ever, given space or credence .... ,,30 
It is Evans ' view, that although writings by feminists from the West are often presented 
as exclusive and narrow, they ought not to be wholly discarded. Instead there is a need to 
develop new ways of debating and viewing the central issues in accordance with present 
situations. The boundaries of these theories are not firm and fixed but can be re-read and 
reinterpreted in light of different social and cultural worlds. The author observes that: 
" gendered assumptions are interwoven into the fabric of our culture. Unpicking the 
strands of gendered bias is thus a crucial task for feminists : what follows hopefully is a 
guide to the ways in which the manifest inadequacies of what has so far passed as 
universal knowledge might be rejected in favour of more truly representative accounts of 
the world.,,3! 
Whatever the main focus of concern may be and whatever the differences that may exist 
between Western feminists and Third World feminism, a constant theme in both is the 
invariable challenge to the construction of both societies that are built on patriarchy and 
male domination. The rise of the international feminist perspective has the goal of 
"rethinking and revising" these social structures and of bringing women's issues to the 
fore. So despite working in different contexts, the focus among feminists has been to 
ensure the establishment oflegal structures that promote women's rights. In South Africa 
27 P. Andrews 1999:125. 
28 ibid. 
29 M. Evans 1997:2-3. 
30 M h' yernp aSlS. 
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it was paramount that women strike a balance between respect for indigenous culture and 
the eradication of all forms of sexism. 
2.2 THE EMERGENCE OF FEMINIST THOUGHT 
As already alluded to in the beginning of this chapter, feminism literature emerged in 
Europe, Great Britain, and the United States between 1792 and 1869, with the publication 
of writers such as Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792) and 
John Stuart Mill's The Subjection of Women (1869). Wollstonecraft insisted that women 
were born equal to men and that their inequality was a social construction. In this era, the 
terms women 's rights and women's emancipation were used interchangeably to refer to 
what we today would call "feminism." These early feminists included both women and 
men who advocated greater equality for women in public institutions, such as the church 
and government, and in the family and household, and the equality of the sexes in 
general. These "first wave" feminists as they are popularly referred to, were also known 
as liberal feminist. Some of the more radical feminists also insisted on a woman's right to 
exercise control over her body, including the right to remain single, to develop sexual 
relations and to bear children outside of marriage. Almost all feminists in this period 
viewed a woman's right to higher education as one of their most important demands. 
With the advent of the Enlightenment period, feminist writers and philosophers such as 
Condorcet32 published works on the rights of women. The claim of most of these 
philosophers was that women had the same natural rights as men. In 1791, Olympe de 
Gouges published a Declaration of the Rights of Woman. )) These 18th Century feminists 
were responding to the tide of revolutionary enthusiasm that was sweeping the Western 
world. This period became known as the Enlightenment Period or the Age of Reason. 
The Enlightenment period was a period where philosophers and writers challenged the 
status quo of the times, be it the power of the church or that of the state. Based on the 
idea that people have certain "inalienable or natural" rights upon which governments may 
not intrude, these theories were firmly based both in the American Declaration of 
31 ibid. My emphasis. 
32 Donavan op cit at 18. 
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Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789). 
Revolutionary movements in the United States (1770's) and France (1790's), dominated 
by middle-class (or bourgeois) groups, overthrew monarchical orders that claimed to rule 
by divine ri ght. Feminists used this period to emphasis women's basic humanity and 
equality with men. However, despite the theories on women's rights as were postulated 
by the various feminists, they focused mainly on middle class women and had little or no 
reference to the poor or working class womanJ4 Opposition to this early women's 
liberation movement was found, surprisingly, among the male theorists who themselves 
were in support of the natural rights doctrine. It was argued that while the belief that man 
possessed natural rights such rights were not to be extended to women. Women belonged 
to emotional and non-rational world and were not to be included in the scheme of things. 
It was presumed therefore that all "that did not operate according to reason, was the 
"other", that is secondary, not significant."J5 It was in this class that women were to be 
placed. Male liberal thinkers viewed the rational world as superior and that "order ought 
to be imposed on the marginal other."J6 Women belonged not in the rational world but in 
the home taking up positions as mothers and wives, isolated and kept in the domestic 
sphereJ7 
"Every male is assumed to be sufficiently rationale, or "naturally" to have the capacity, to 
govern a family .... In Locke's theory it is women who are seen as "naturally" lacking in 
rationality and as "naturally" excluded from the status of "free and equal individual" and 
so unfit to participate in public life."J8 
Such rationalism led to the divide between the public sphere, which identified with the 
rational, and the private, which identified with women and the non-rational world.J9 
Much as with the issues that plague African feminists, the divide between the "private" 
and the "public" sphere meant that women's issues were often hidden and that traditional 
]3 ibid. 
34 M. Wollstonecraft 1759-1797: Chapter XIII It was her contention that the "rights which women in 
cornmon with men ought to contend for ... are a natural consequence of their education and station in 
society." 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 See the note above on the view by traditional leaders of women in African societies. 
38 Evans op cit at 24. 
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patriarchal expectations of women were established as "truths." What this meant was that 
the laws, which are a construction of the "public" world, were organised around male 
experiences. Women were therefore excluded from the law, the church and politics, 
which are the strongest pillars of the public world. This disempowerment meant that 
society was gender stratified4 0 As a result, women had no property right, no right to 
inheritance, no custodial rights and no rights to litigate. As with the critical issues facing 
most African women, marital power was firmly placed in the hands of the men. 
Donavan4 l writes that marriage resulted in the law interpreting husbands and wives as 
one entity. The very being and existence of women was suspended during marriage and 
women became not legal beings with separate rights but were consolidated under the 
power and control of their husbands. So despite the rhetoric of "natural rights" as being 
unequivocally applicable to "all mankind", such rights did not extend to women who 
were not considered legal beings separate and deserving of these rights. As 
W ollstonecraft wrote: 
"Females, in fact, denied all political privileges, and not allowed, as married women, 
excepting in criminal cases, a civil existence, have their attention naturally drawn from 
the interest of the whole community to that of the minute parts, though the private duty of 
any member of society must be very imperfectly performed when not connected with the 
general good. The mighty business of female life is to please, and restrained into entering 
into more important concerns by political and civil oppression .... ,,42 
Some of the more prominent feminists to emerge from these times were Sarah Grimke43 
and Francis Wright44 who like their predecessor Wollstonecraft, asserted that women and 
men ought to be viewed as intellectual equals. However, unlike her they presented a more 
39 ibid. 
•• ibid. 
41 Donavan op cit at 19. 
42 Wollstonecraft op cit at Chapter X Ill. 
43 Sarah Grimke was the first woman in the United States of America to publicly denounce slavery. She 
argues that women could contribute to the politics of the time, and challenged the conventional beliefs of a 
woman 's place. What makes Grimke interesting and applicable in the South African context is that she 
advocates simultaneously for both gender and racial equality despite opposition by many abolitionists who 
believed racial equality was more important than gender equality. In her book Letters on the Equality of the 
Sexes (1 838) Grimke linked the rights of slaves to the rights of women. See S. Grirnke "Letters of Equality 
of the Sexes" at http://www.pinn.netl-sunshinelbook-sumlgrimke3.html accessed on 2 October 2003 . 
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radical vIew of feminism claiming that men as a class kept women as a class in 
subordinate positions. By denying women their rights, women are kept in positions much 
like slaves. Grimke45 postulates that women by denying their roles in the domestic 
sphere, it was only then that they achieved equality with men. Following closely were 
feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton46 and Susan B Anthon/7 who became the 
cornerstone of liberal feminism and what was "first wave" feminism. Working within the 
American context they advocated for women possessing rights as "citizens" in a country, 
more particularly the right to the elective franchise. This view of women as citizens was 
in direct conflict with the idea that a woman's place was in the home. One of the main 
weaknesses of liberal feminists lies in that even though they advocated for rights and 
opportunities for women, they fail to question the structural inequities that prevail in the 
society. According to Mackinnon48 the failure to acknowledge structural inequities has 
the impact of masking hierarchy and the reality of male dominance. 
Although this women's rights movement had its origins in the anti-slavery movement and 
although black feminists such as Sojourner Truth49 did advocate for the improvement of 
black women's rights, the women's movement of the nineteenth century has been 
criticised for the fact that it failed to concern itself with issues other than those of the 
44 In her writing, Francis Wright campaigned for social reform including the abolishment of slavery and the 
development of feminist issues. However, she is best known for her work in advocating for the need for 
equality in education between men and women. 
4S See footnote 42 above. 
46 Elizabeth Cady Stanton was one of the foremost early American feminists; Stanton was influential in the 
Women's Right movement of the 1800's. She was also the driving force of the 1848 Convention, the first 
Women's Rights Convention where she argued that women had a natural right to equality in all spheres. 
She also in her lifetime focused increasingly on social reforms related to women's concerns and the issue of 
woman's suffrage. See "Elizabeth Cady Stanton" at http://www.nps.gov/wori/ecs.htm accessed on 2 
October 2003. 
47 Was behind the extension of civil and political rights to women. She and other early feminists believed 
that the power of the vote was the key to fulfilling all other goals. See also F. Matthews-Green 
"Susan.B.Anthony: A Pro-Life Feminist" at http: //www.family.org/fofmag/sVa0024084.cfin accessed on 2 
October 2003. 
48 C.A. Mackinnon 1989: 116-7. 
49 "First wave" feminism was largely defined and led by the educated middle-class white women who built 
the movement primarily around their own concerns. This created an ambivalent, if not contentious, 
relationship with women of other classes and races. By highlighting the different ITeatment of white and 
black women, Truth drew attention to the limitations of the bourgeois women's feminist movement. While 
white, rich women were talking about struggling for the vote, black women were still struggling against 
slavery, and most poor women lacked even basic economic independence. She passionately believed that 
these diverse movements needed to work together and support each other's aims. 
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middle-class, white woman. Like African feminists, black feminists in America were not 
concerned much with the public sphere issues such as the vote but had to deal with issues 
concerning race. So while much was achieved by the "first wave" feminists importantly, 
the right to vote, protective legislature for married women and the right to education, 
such privileges were more the realm and success of the few middle class bourgeois class. 
Little was done for the black women or for the working class population. However, these 
early feminists, and important liberal theorist set the foundation for later feminists and 
remain significant in later writings. In the late 1880's as a reaction against the mainstream 
feminist theories of the day Marxist feminism was established. Marxist feminism was 
founded on the ideology of class-consciousness. Based on the idea that the minority 
ruling class who controlled the means of production rules the proletariat, Karl Marxso 
went further, stating that within the family context the husband rules the wife. The family 
or the marital institution was in itself oppressive and created unequal distribution. He 
goes so far as to say it creates "slaves" of women. The fact that in the "modem family the 
husband is obliged to earn a living and support his family ... gives him a position of 
supremacy." The author further states that it is only when these social structures are 
abolished that equality can exist between men and women. 
"Second wave" feminism saw the growth and redefinition of radical feminism, social 
feminist and cultural feminists. This era developed in the late 1960's and 1970's largely 
in America. Many of these theories were as a result of and a reaction against the political 
activities of civi l rights and anti-war campaigns of the 1960's. By this time many of the 
important works by modem feminists such as Simone de Beavouir's The Second Sex 
(1949)51 and Mary Daly's Beyond God the Father (1973) had been written. The basis of 
these writing was the belief that in a patriarchal society, women are socialised to believe 
the male or masculine is the "positive or the norm" while the female or feminine is 
negative and abnormal and therefore set as the "Other."s2 It was within this era that black 
50 K. Marx 1938 in a publication edited by F.Engels, 1975:89. 
" J.G. Riddall 1999:274 cormnenting on this work writes that theme of the book was that" man defines 
woman not in herself but relative to him, she is not regarded as an autonomous being thus she is 
differentiated with reference to a man and not with reference to herself, she is incidental .... " The tone of 
this passage is similar to Nhlapo's who postulates that women are "adjuncts to the family. " 
52 Donavan op cit at 136. 
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feminist found a voice. Yet even within this solidarity, many black feminists emphasised 
that the experiences between white and black women were varied and therefore many of 
the theories that applied to the white voices could not be applied to the black woman. 
Writing in 1964, Pauli Murray aptly described it as follows: 
"The black woman ... bears more children ... has less education, earns less, is widowed 
earlier and carries a heavier economic burden as a family head than a white sister."s3 
Many of the "second wave" feminists insisted that feminism ought to go further than 
merely granting rights but must also ensure that it contributes towards social reform. The 
cultural feminists propose that women experience the world in a different way to men. 
This is as a result not only of the fact that they have in the past had no political power and 
have therefore been excluded from the public sphere but also because they experience the 
society differently from men. "Second wave" feminists are of the opinion that the 
dichotomy between private/public is reflected within the law. Women are seen primarily 
within the context of the home. And because the ideology of privacy and non-
intervention are so interwoven, the law does not involve itself with the matters arising 
within the private sphere. This situation conceals women's oppression and precludes it 
from public scrutiny. Men, on the other hand, receive the full protection of the law and 
can pass freely between the private and the public sphere54 It was also during this era that 
feminism established itself as an academic discipline. "Second wave" feminism presented 
the more obvious ways in which women are affected by the law (e.g. sexual 
discrimination) arguing that the concerns of women must be recognised by the legislature 
and the courts. Feminism was expanded to include not only issues of discrimination but 
also of violence, childcare, women's involvement in the labour market and abortion. The 
80's saw writers like Carol Gilligan and Catharine Mackinnonss refining contemporary 
feminist jurisprudence and questioning the laws applicability to women's lives. 
Mackinnon argues that the law is biased in that it presumes that neutrality and 
impartiality assure fairness. The disadvantage of this assumption lies in the fact that it 
ignores the reality of women's lives. The underlying debate is whether women ought to 
53 Donavan op cit at 170. 
54 R. Graycar and J. Morgan 1990:32-33. 
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be identified as a special group that needs special legal treatment or whether equal 
treatment ought to be applied to all persons. This debate became popularly known as the 
"equality versus difference" debate. Mackinnon argued that treatment of women as equal 
to men, only led to the assessment of women's issues in male terms. On the other hand, 
other feminists advocated for it on the basis that "institutionalising" differences would 
only lead to the "intensification of the differences. ,,56 
"Third wave" feminists, inspired by larger theoretical discussions about race and 
sexuality, have started to place a greater emphasis on establishing multiracial alliances 
among women. 57 The movement seeks to broaden the parameters of feminism to include 
certain groups of women who have previously been excluded as a result of race, class, 
and sexual orientation prejudice. It is within this realm that African women and their 
rights are discussed more fully. This period fTom the early 1980's to the mid-1990's is 
consequently an important shaping moment for African feminist scholarship and women's 
studies. Interventions by scholars like Chikwenye Ogunyemi58 (1984) and Molara 
Ogundipe-Leslie59 (1985) challenged Euro-centric traditions to define distinct forms and 
goals for feminism in Africa. From the late eighties, an emerging emphasis among 
Africanists was the preoccupation with literary and cultural studies whose main aim was 
critiquing western feminisms. This gave way in subsequent years to more goal-oriented 
work addressing the numerous challenges posed by gender oppression in different 
African contexts. Careful analysis of particular processes also shaped a growing emphasis 
on gendered social processes. While much earlier scholarship registers an interest in 
55 Mackinnon and Gilligan are discussed by Evans. See below. 
56 M. Evans op cit at 118. 
57 See in this regard page 40 above. 
" In her writings Ogunyemi is strongly opposed to the theories of western feminism. She argues that they 
ignore the peculiarities and differences that exist between the Western woman and the African woman and 
either ignore African women's problems completely or speak in the name of all women without really being 
sufficiently informed about the situations. She goes further to say that even Blacks outside Africa cannot 
fully grasp and understand the situation of the African woman. African women have to deal with extreme 
poverty, polygamy, religion and culture, all of which are experienced and understood only by the African 
woman. 
" M. Gyimab 2003:3 writes that Ogundipe-Leslie coined the popular words "stiwanism" or Social 
Transfonnation including Women in Africa and "motherism". Ogundipe-Leslie believed that by replacing 
feminism with Stiwanism, those who advocate for women's rights in Africa can avoid the debate by anti-
feminists that feminism has no part in Africa. She also advocates that feminism must not be viewed as 
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celebrating women's activism, more recent scholarship intricately theorises women's 
agency to develop multi-disciplinary explorations of the ways in which gender affects all 
social relationships both personal and collective60 "Third wave" feminism takes into 
account the differing cultural and societal influences, and broadens the feminist theory 
from being largely applicable to middle class white women to include the black and poor 
female population. "Third wave" feminism does not totally discard the lessons learnt 
from "second wave" feminism but seeks instead to incorporate the lessons from the 
women's movement of the 1960's and 1970's (second wave feminism) into their own 
unique, lived experiences. "Third wave" feminism seeks to reconstruct and redefine the 
parameters of mainstream feminism. Ironically the greatest criticism that faces third wave 
feminists is that they embrace their contradictions and so-called pluralities to such an 
extent that they compromise many important core feminist principles created by our 
feminist foremothers, that is, the original bourgeois feminists 6 1 
Although all feminist share the same goal, that is to ensure equality between men and 
women, the main schools of feminist jurisprudence are categorised not in terms of the 
decade in which they were most popular but in terms of theories they advocated for. They 
are summarised as liberal, cultural, radical and post-modem feminists. The liberal 
feminists are the believers that both men and women possess rights and must, therefore, 
have equal opportunity and equal rights. The belief is that the law must formally 
articulate these rights and once this is done, equality is achieved. Radical feminists, on 
the other hand, believe that the law reflects society's male dominated norms. They 
advocate that merely changing the laws will not do enough to ensure equality but that 
there ought to be a thorough breakdown of the structures that perpetuate the oppression of 
women. Women need to be totally stripped of their "socialised" being if they are to be 
placed at par with men. Cultural feminist believe much like radical feminists that the laws 
are biased and favourable to men; however, they differ in that they do not deny the 
socialisation of women. They believe that it is not necessary to create an androgynous 
being in opposition to men. Secondly, that the struggle for women's rights in Africa ought to be viewed 
within the context of African culture and traditions. 
60 Accessed at http://www.gwsafrica.org/knowledgeiafrica.html on 20 October 2003. 
61 K. Jacobs 200:1-2. 
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society in order to achieve equality and that "feminist jurisprudence must reflect the 
I· f ' I' ,,62 rea lty 0 women s lves .... 
Perhaps the most difficult to understand is the post-modernist feminism. Post-modernist 
feminism begins from the premise that where there is society, there are divisions 
according to gender. It aims to expose the gendered realities of social relations, 
particularly the influence of patriarchy on women's lives. By revealing these so called 
realities and deconstructing them, the claim by post-modernist feminists is that new 
realities are created which will guarantee equal access to power and recognise the 
diversity of women. Post-modernists acknowledge differences and recognise that cultural 
and social environments shape persons' identities. They reject any assumptions of 
universality. Laws that claim to be universal and applicable to all women would not have 
a place in this theory. Narnia Bohler-Muller63 argues that post-modem feminist theory 
plays an integral role in post-Constitutional South Africa. She writes that because the 
theory acknowledges the differences in cultural background of many South African 
women, it overcomes the weaknesses of the other theories that have the effect of 
sidelining African women and constructing these women as "the other." She contends 
that the "post modem feminist legal theory has assisted in the development of the 
capacity to accommodate particularity in a caring and compassionate manner and 
consequently to avoid exclusions.,,64 
Ironically some African writers and feminists have criticised this theory, stating that it is 
too academic and totally ignores the need for "democratic thinking" that may have been 
62 lolmson op cit at 22. Cultural feminism is similar in its approach to what Parvin Paider "Encounters 
between Feminism: Democracy and Reformism in Contemporary Iran" in Molyneux and Razavi (eds) 
Gender Justice. Development and Rights, 2002: 270 coins the term "pragmatic feminism." This has its 
roots in the Islamic context and advocates a pragmatic approach to the issue of difference and multi-
culturism. Instead of presenting a war of cultures e.g. West versus "The Other", Paider argues that 
feminism should not call for women to totally discard their culture or religion rather to use it as a 
determinant to the overall success of feminism. Using contemporary Iran as an example, he writes that 
"pragmatic feminism" advocates the collaboration across feminists irrespective of their perceived 
limitations on gender issues, a kind of alliance building that is based on the recognition of difference, not 
for the purpose of setting limits and drawing lines but in order to build across them. He recognises that to 
do this, however, Western feminists should be acknowledged but the goal of feminism ought to be more 
accommodating of differences that exist between women globally. 
63 N. Bohler-Muller 2002:629. 
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developed in other parts of the world65 If the post-modernist perspective were to be 
applied in South Africa, it would deny women the basic ideals of democracy that are 
documented in conventions such as CEDA Wand the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: 
"The post-modernist critique ... could demoralise the emerging feminist movement in 
Africa and weaken the struggle which has been ongoing-the struggle for equality .... ,,66 
So even though it may seem an advantage that difference and diversity be recognised, the 
disadvantage is that African women do not exist in a vacuum and there is a need to look 
to the international world for some guidance to women's movement. 
2.3 FEMINIST THEORIES AND GENDER IN AFRICA 67 
In her contribution to the Southern Africa Political Economy Series, Changu 
Mannathok068 of the University of Botswana presents a thought-provoking debate in 
which she argues that feminism is in fact located within the pre-colonial patriarchal 
society in Africa. She rejects the argument that feminism is alien to the African context. 
The very fact that feminist theories are so diverse is credited to the diverse ways in which 
women from differing backgrounds view the origins of women's oppression. She 
presents an interesting viewpoint on feminist perspectives in Africa: 
Feminism has its roots in the African condition. This is because women in the 
continent have always been aware of the prevailing oppressive gender relations and have 
throughout history challenged these conditions in a variety of ways. It is a misconception 
to view feminism as a Western ideology which reflects Western culture simply because 
feminist theories, just like other theories, have been influenced by external pressures 
resulting from colonialism and imperialism.,,69 
64 ibid. 
65 M. Nzomo 1995:132. 
66 ibid. 
67 C. Mannathoko "Feminist Theories and the Study of Gender Issues in Southern Africa" in Meena (ed) 
Gender in Southern Africa: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues, 1992: 69. 
68 Mannathoko op cit at 69. 
69 ibid. 
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Amina Mama supports this VIew, adding that historically it is a misconception that 
feminism was strictly the realm of the white, middle class bourgeois. She argues that 
white women have always looked to Africa for alternatives to their own subordination 
since the days of the early anthropologists. She quotes anthropologists like Sylvia Leith 
Ross and Judith Van Allen who have seen Africa as the source of feminist writings. 
Africa has therefore "always been part of the early conceptualisations of so-called 
"Western feminism", even if not properly acknowledged as such.,,7o She goes further to 
say that African women have always defined and carried out their own struggles. 
"African feminism dates far back in our collective past - although much of the story has 
yet to be researched and told.,,71 Despite the argument that gender was a Western 
conception, anthropologists such as Sylvia Leith Ross write that as early as 1920 there is 
documented proof that many of the African women had become aware of the disparities 
in rights between men and women and had begun even then to advocate for equality 
between men and women. Shattering the pre-conceived view that women had no place in 
the public realm, many of the women in the liberation struggle in South Africa, for 
example, organised themselves and fought against racial discrimination. An amazing 
anthropological study is also presented by Leith-Ross. She writes that in the early 1930's, 
there is another historic example of women's successful attempts to protest. In this case, 
women were again very influential in changing the laws of the time which they believed 
were detrimental to their reproductive rights. 
In the 1920's Ghana experienced the increase in rate of venereal disease across the 
region. As a means to curb this, the Asante chiefs decided that all girls over the age of 15 
were to be married. This they believed would curb the spread of the disease. A jail 
sentence was given to all girls over 15 who were not married. The Chiefs argued that they 
were trying to put a stop to prostitution and the spread of the disease. The Asante chiefs 
believed that within the sanctity of marriage, the husband had exclusive sexual rights 
over his wife, without the reciprocal duty of support by the husband. History has it that as 
a reaction to these laws women stopped marrying. Because the women stopped marrying, 
70 Sa10 op cit at 1. 
71 ibid. 
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the colonial chiefs responded the way they did, arresting the women. However, often 
times the women thought ahead and evaded such arrests by making arrangements to get 
around the govenunent's plans. When women were arrested, they were all taken to jail, 
where they had to wait for a man to come to get them. The women had to mention the 
name of a man that they intended to marry and have him come and pay a fee in order to 
be released. Most women had arranged to have male relatives or friends to come and 
profess their plans to marry her. After the fee was paid, the girl was free to go. Women 
were so disgusted by the fact that men were no longer fulfilling their basic marital duty 
providing the bare necessities for their wives. As a result women began "assert(ing) a 
great deal of autonomy and independence, much of it linked to the establishment, of cocoa 
farms or to engagement in foodstuffs trade." During this period women were 
tremendously victorious at avoiding marriage. They manoeuvred the system and ensured 
that they were kept out of jail. They even went further by divorcing their husbands and 
claiming "matrilineal inheritance." This reaction to the laws they felt were oppressive, 
led to even more positive results. It is documented that during this period women moved 
in dramatic numbers into trading, especially in previously male-dominated commodities. 
Leith- Ross writes that although it is not definite, it is suggested that these women better 
survived the severe economic decline of the 1930's than many of their male peers. In this 
respect it is easy to see the difference in what men and women wanted. Men wanted total 
control of the women. The colonial chiefs felt that they were losing authority over the 
women, so they wanted to tighten their reigns. Women's uncontrollability had grown too 
large for the men not to act. The chiefs felt as if the respect from women and the Colonial 
government would diminish if they could not control their own women. The Asante 
women fought back because they wanted exclusive authority of their productive and 
reproductive rights. Also, when slavery was abolished, men began pawning their wives 
and exploiting them for use on their cocoa fanns. The women became so enraged at their 
SUbjugation by men that they reacted successfully. Leigh-Ross quotes Allman as 
affinning that these women were successful when she says that "this patticular fonn of 
coercion was unsuccessful in even minimally facilitating the exploitation of women's 
unpaid labour and one important reason for its failure was that the capture of unmarried 
women did not get the backing of the colonial govenunent." In this patticular instance, 
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women were able to "shape actively the emerging colonial world." The only thing that 
the chiefs succeeded in doing was making the arrest of women a profit-making venture; 
because every time a woman was released from jail, she or the man had to pay the fine. 
Unfortunately, this was not their goal, so they were ultimately unsuccessful. Women's 
productive and reproductive rights remained under their control. 72 
However, despite proof from various anthropologists who argue that feminism indeed 
had its origins in the African context, there still remain a great number of writers who 
disagree. Eryn Scott73 in her article, Differences in Intersections between Feminism in 
Africa and Feminism in the United States, argues that "black women in Africa have not 
yet fully engaged themselves in an organized feminist movement." Feminism is still 
deemed an imported concept detached from tradition and disruptive to African women 
despite the fact that African women have engaged in acts of resistance since pre-colonial 
days. While many of the women in Africa have been involved in the nationalist 
movements in their countries, they still remain the most unempowered, lacking any 
access or control over resources. Most Western women already possess these rights and 
as a result deal with and have to comprehend with differing social problems. While white 
women in Africa can identify themselves with the Western feminist perspectives, the 
same cannot be said of Black women who have to contend with not only race issues but 
also economic (dis)empowerment. Scott74 writes that "the patriarchal economic structure, 
which privileges white over non-white" leads to differing perspectives on gender and 
rights in Africa. Whatever the sentiments of the different writers, what cannot be denied 
are the realities within the African context. Commenting within the Ugandan context, 
Msimang75 writes: 
"The anti-western sentiment that colours the criticism of feminism in Africa remains a 
significant threat to women's efforts to end gender oppression. As Richard 
Ssewakiryanga points out in his article, many of the discussions about gender in Uganda, 
invoke 'that Beijing thing'. For the Ugandan public, gender is inextricably linked to a 
72 This account of the Asante women is taken in its entirety at http://www.ez-essavs.comlfree/2782.html 
accessed on 20 October 2003. 
73 Scott op cit at 5. 
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conference that took place far away in China. Ssewakiryanga suggests that to many 
Ugandans, the idea that feminism is a home-grown, indigenous movement, similar to the 
movements of independence that swept Africa in the '60s, seems far-fetched." 
The trends and perspectives of gender in Southern Africa have, however, been 
undeniably influenced by the Anglo-American models of feminism. It is no great sUllJrise 
therefore that the very values and concepts that were used by the liberal bourgeois in 
Britain are in fact applicable and can be adopted in the Southern African context. Liberal 
feminism has had a great impact on the development strategies and approaches to women 
in Southern Africa. Rudo Gaidzanwa76 argues that liberal feminists fail to question the 
structural inequities in society, merely contending that equal opportunity would lead to 
equality within the society. The same is applicable in the Southern African context, where 
the same mindset was popular among the nationalist governments established within the 
post-colonial era. Although they encouraged the creation of women's wings within their 
party, the African National Congress in South Africa and ZANU in Zimbabwe, failed to 
question the reasons behind the oppression of women. As noted below, many of the 
nationalist parties encouraged the formation of women's wings as a means to solicit the 
female masses support rather than to ensure the participation in the agenda of these 
parties. What resulted was merely "token participation." In South Africa, for example, 
women were given seats in Parliament yet the structures of decision-making remain 
male-dominated. The 1919 Constitution of the A.N.C granted full membership to women 
but failed to give them full voting rights. So although there has been some semblance of 
formal equality, both politics and economy are controlled and dominated by males and 
the position of women remains unchanged. 
Much like the criticism that faced liberal feminist jurisprudence, South African women 
have realised that the oppression of women is deeply embedded in the structures and 
institutions that are found in society. They advocate that the law be taken to another level 
and must include not only the formal laws, such as the mere naming of the rights acquired 
by the female, but must go further to include the breaking down of structures that create 
76 R. Gaidzanwa "Bourgeois Theories of Gender and Feminism and their Shortcomings with reference to 
Southern African Countries" in Meena (ed) Gender in Southern Africa: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues, 
1992:94-97. 
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these inequities in society. Structures such as traditional institutions that bar female 
participation must come within the scrutiny of the law. Although much of what "second 
wave" feminists have advocated for may seem at first glance too radical for the African 
society, their theories which state that laws are favourable to men, are as will be noted 
below, valid. They contend that gender identity is socially constructed. With reference to 
the interviews done in Grahamstown, it can be seen that even within the South African 
context it has become acceptable that women play traditionally feminine roles and that 
the values ascribed are those of a patriarchal society. Because of this, women are often 
times left powerless and unable to break away from the circle of abuse that pervades their 
lives. "Third wave" feminism manages to effectively capture the African context. It takes 
into consideration the differing cultural context in which women live in. It allows for the 
dichotomy that exists in the South African Constitution where women have rights to 
equality but are still able to participate within their cultural contexts. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
It is not an underestimation to claim that the South African feminist movement is one that 
is still in its embryonic stage. With a societ)f that has such an unfortunate past, it is no 
, 
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surprise that there is an absence of any significant South African feminist movement. 
Many of the women, partiCUlarly black women, remain concealed in the history, 
sociology and politics of the apartheid years, so that individual rights and freedoms took 
only but a minority role. This chapter has not aimed to conceal the fact that substantial 
feminist theories have their roots in the European context and more specifically in the 
bourgeois context and therefore often lack any awareness of the major social concerns 
that plague African women77 This dichotomy that exists between what Johnson-Odim 
terms Third World and Euro-American First World feminist movements,78 is one that the 
writer fully acknowledges, African feminism only took shape in the decade of the 1970's 
when many of the African countries were just emerging from colonialism, yet for many 
of the First World nations this era was already a part of what was known as "second 
wave" feminism. Although at this time many of the African nations were advocating for 
77 Bozzoli op cit at 1. 
78 Johnson-Odim op cit at 314. 
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equality and equal opportunity, their immediate aim was to deal with issues of race and 
economic development and so "neither the advent of independence in the former colonies 
nor legislation passed ... was to prove immediately victorious in improving the quality of 
life for the overwhelming majority of ... women.,,79 And so it was with the thrusting and 
revolutionary insights offeminists from the West that feminism and feminist thought was 
introduced to many of the African nations. It is the opinion of many writers that the basis 
of these "prior insights" that Western feminists deepened the understanding of women's 
rights in the African context. 80 The question of whether Western feminist theories can be 
applied in the African context is not one that can be answered with a simple affirmative 
or negative. As mentioned several times before, the perception of feminism is that it has 
emerged from white, middle-class Western women and therefore has no place in the 
African context. Euro-American feminist theory is constructed around gender and class 
while that of African women is linked more with race relations and imperialism. These 
tensions that exist between the two are tension between what is popularly known as 
"mainstream feminism" and "the other." The formers chief goal is sexual egalitarianism 
while for the latter gender discrimination "is neither the sole nor perhaps the primary 
locus of the oppression of women." Priority items that are essential for African women 
will therefore differ largely from the Euro-American woman8 1 For example, while 
Western women would view the payment of lobolo as perpetuation of a patriarchal 
system, research has shown that for African women this practice "is directly tied to the 
indigenous cultural context,,82 and is therefore not viewed as discriminatory or 
oppressive. Although the early 1960's saw a movement by radical feminists that did take 
into account the impact that race had on African American women, by and by the trend is 
that feminism is connected with popular liberal feminist perspectives which do not 
"sufficiently define racism and imperialism as major feminist issues.,,83 However, as 
J ohnson-Odim suggests, the answer is not in totalling discarding the writings and theories 
from the West but in viewing them and adapting them to the context of the African 
woman. This she suggests is achieved by acknowledging that unlike Western women, the 
79 ibid . 
• 0 ibid. 
81 Jolmson-Odim op cit at 32l. 
'2 Johnson-Odim op cit at 322. 
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rights of African women are closely associated with the need for racial equality and 
economic development. So she writes: 
"In "underdeveloped societies" it is not just a question of internal redistribution of 
resources, but of their generation and control, not just equal opportunity between men and 
women, but also the creation of opportunity itself .... Thus third world women cannot 
afford to embrace the notion that feminism seeks only to achieve equal treatment of men 
and women .. . rather it must address issues of race, class, and imperialism .... ,,84 
African women need to become a part of serious discussions surrounding feminist theory 
and feminist theories ought to accommodate and acknowledge the struggle and 
complexity that surround African women. The writer agrees that the definition of the 
term feminism should be redeveloped so as to ensure the participation and inclusion of 
African women in their various social and cultural contexts. The theories ought not to be 
discarded wholesome but instead ought to acknowledge the fair amount of universality in 
women's oppression85 Johnson-Idim writes: 
"For although the oppression of women is universal in nature ... it is time to move 
beyond simple truisms about the situation of women to a more profound analysis of the 
mechanisms perpetuating the subordination of women in society ... in the third world, 
women's demands have been explicitly political, with work, education and health as 
major issues per se and not so linked to their specific impact on women. In addition, 
women of the third World perceive imperialism as the main enemy of their continents 
and especially of women ... . ,,86 
By allowing the participation of African women in redefining feminism, the result will 
not be a complete overhaul of existing feminist theories but more an adaptation that seeks 
to include the once "excluded" group that is the poor, African woman. The solution as 
Johnson puts forward is not a blanket criticism and rejection of "mainstream feminism" 
but a reconstruction taking into account the needs of Third world women. A broader 
definition would be along these lines: 
83 ibid. 
84 ibid. 
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"Feminism ... constitutes the political expression of the concerns and interests of women 
from different regions, classes, nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. There is and must 
be a diversity of feminisms, responsive to the different needs and concerns of different 
women, and defined by them for themselves. This diversity builds on the common 
opposition to gender oppression and hierarchy .... ,,87 
87 Jolmson-Odim quoting Catagay, Grown and Santiago op cil at 325. My emphasis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION - AFRICAN WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE CURRENT 
DISPENSATION 
This chapter will focus on post-apartheid legislation that affects African women's rights. 
Both the interim and final Constitution envisage a new democracy that ensures that there 
exists in the new South Africa not only racial equality, but also gender equality. The task 
of the government is to redress the imbalances of the past and to guarantee that non-
sexism becomes endemic in our society. This inevitably requires the amendment of old 
laws that discriminate against women and introduce new laws that will facilitate gender 
equality. The new state in South Africa is compelled by the history of the country to 
become what some political scientists call a "development state."} As a result of the 
determined anti-apartheid movement overseas and the extensive censure of apartheid, 
important international expertise was made available to lawyers engaged in the South 
African constitutional process. The availability of international "experts" also bolstered 
the then burgeoning feminist movement in South Africa. For example, women's 
.campaigns conducted at the grassroots level in South Africa were often supported by 
women's organizations and development agencies in Europe, North America, and 
Australia. In addition, feminist scholars in South Africa were being exposed to the body 
of feminist literature elsewhere. Moreover, South African women activists were 
increasingly engaging with activists from other communities who were embarking on 
similar agendas in their own societies2 For African women this called for the 
establishment of mechanisms aimed at transforming "the institutions that resulted in 
placing black women in positions as minorities.,,3 Some would go so far as to say that 
patriarchy and sexism are older and even more insidious than apartheid, and that a failure 
'S.B.O. Gutto 2001 :8. This serves to indicate the legislation boom that characterised (and still 
characterizes) the first decade since the democratic dispensation in 1994. 
2 P. Andrews 2000:2. 
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63 
to construct a constitutional order expressly dedicated towards abolition is not a reflection 
of a true transition for South Africa4 Catheryn Albertyn summarizes it as follows: 
"The emancipation of women and the attainment of equality in the political, economic, 
social and cultural spheres of life is, we know, a long term process of social 
transformation that fundamentally challenges the way in which society is organized."j 
As noted earlier in the thesis, for Africans the 1996 Constitution and the right to equality 
present a dilemma, which requires on one hand that: 
"Every person shall have the right to equality and equal protection of the law. i) 
ii) 
iii) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly on one 
or more of the following ground in particular race, gender, sex, pregnancy, 
marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disabi lity, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. ,,6 
and, on the other, the right to" ... participate in the cultural life of their choice .... ,,7 under 
which the concept of gender equality is unfamiliar and the principle of patriarchy is 
centraL According to Andrews,8 the feminist project in South Africa had to confront 
contextuality and difference at the same time that it lobbied for women's rights in the 
new Constitution. Similarly, the strategy to ensure recognition of women's rights in 
South Africa also needs to incorporate the particularities of class, race, sexuality and 
culture. Women activists in South Africa recognised that, while the traditional law 
retained many patriarchal or sexist features, their aim was to discard these features 
without abandoning the whole of customary law. This chapter will deal with how the 
legislature and the courts have dealt with this predicament. As many authors have noted, 
unlike common law, customary law is a fairly underdeveloped legal discipline, due 
mostly to a lack of understanding and in the limited recognition of customary rules and 
4 A. Sachs 1996: 6. 
5 C. Albertyn 1995:9. 
6 Sections 9(1) and 9(3) of Act 108 of 1996. My emphasis. 
, Section 30 of the Constitution. 
8 Andrews op cit at 1. 
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principles9 Although the 1993 Constitution does not explicitly assure the continued 
application of indigenous law, in chapter II read together with section 229 and 
Constitutional Principle XIII, it is correct to assume that it was the aim of drafters of the 
Constitution to apply and give explicit recognition to customary law. Many have 
suggested that the problems that exist because of the dichotomy between customary law 
and common law as concerns women, would be dealt with effectively if the legislature 
synthesized the two systems of law. The end result would be a harmonisation of the two 
systems of law. As Joan Church lO comments, such moves have been made in Tanzania 
with some success, although it was argued that in the end the law reflected Western 
influence rather than traditional values. It is the opinion of the writer that whatever 
decisions are taken by the courts and the legislature, such decision ought to take into 
consideration that indigenous law should not remain rigid and inadaptable but must take 
into account the changes in the social status of African women and should reflect such 
change. Church writes that: 
"Logic, and history, and custom, and utility and the accepted standards of right conduct 
are the forces, which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of 
these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the comparative 
importance or value of the social interests that will thereby be promoted or impaired."]] 
Finally, the chapter seeks to acknowledge the difference between formal and substantive 
equality. There is a relationship that exists between women and society that perpetuates 
discriminatory practices. As the A.N.C. national executive statement on the emancipation 
of women states: "to achieve genuine equality, our policies must be based on a real 
understanding of gender oppression and the way in which it manifests itself in our 
society.,,12 Feminist theorists have argued that the concept of equality is fallacious as it 
ignores the social constructions upon which the discrimination of women is built. By 
presenting an abstract concept of equality, the Constitution fails to recognize the actual 
9 M. Pieterse 2000: 35. It is also the view of Thandabantu Nhlapo that one of the reasons there was a lack 
of understanding of customary law, was that in many cases it did not truthfully present the traditional 
African principles. Quoting Chanock 1985:4 he concedes that colonialism led to a watered down and in 
most cases, misleading account of customary law. This is encapsulated in the popular phrase "Customary 
law was neither customary nor law" See also Chapter One above. 
10 J. Church 1995:299-300. 
11 ibid. 
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expenences that women go through in reality. The very purpose of equal treatment 
should be the breaking down of complex systems such as patriarchy that perpetuate the 
inequality and subordination of women. Critical feminist scholars argue that it is only by 
recognizing the contextual realities of Afiican women that substantive equality can be 
achieved. Freedman writes that: 
"The question of equality (to be captured in constitutional rights) is the meaning of equal 
moral worth given the reality that in almost every conceivable concrete way we are not 
equal, but vastly different, vastly unequal in our needs and abilities. The object is not to 
make these differences disappear when we talk about equal rights, but to ask how we can 
structure relations of equality among people with many different concrete inequalities.,, \J 
3.2 AFRICAN WOMEN AND THE EQUALITY CLAUSE IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 
An understanding of South Afiica's Constitution requires a thorough understanding of 
the dire record of human rights under apartheid. It is accurate to suggest that when 
discussing racial equality, very little explanation is required to substantiate the choice of 
subject. South Afiican society is distinguishable from its long history of racial 
discrimination and we as a society are deeply aware of the consequences of the system of 
apartheid in our day-to-day living. Christina Murrai 4 points out, that while the focus on 
racial inequalities of the past is crucial in the re-modelling of the new South African 
community, it tends to obscure the complexities of oppression that many South Afiicans 
suffered. According to the author, more often than not black women are too easily 
forgotten when issues of race and the new Constitution are discussed. For African 
women, inequality is situated not only in sex and gender, but also inevitably in race, 
family status or responsibility and in marital status. So, while the most dominant clause 
as pertains women's rights lies in section 9 of the Constitution, it is essential to recognize 
that women face multiple oppressions based not merely on gender and sex. IS The final 
12 F. Ginwala 1991 :62. 
\3 W. Freedman, 2000:315. 
14 C. Murray 1994:19. 
15 H. Combrinck 2001 :223. 
66 
Constitution16 provides guarantees for women that go far beyond the right to equality, but 
affect women's lives nonetheless. Entrenched are the rights to human dignity, the right to 
security of person, 17 which are important considering the violence that women face both 
outside and within their public lives, the right to employment lS and the right health care l9 
which in the past meant that women were unable to access the correct reproductive health 
servIces. 
In the first Constitutional Court case to deal with equality after the interim Constitution, 
Brink v Kitshoff, O'Reagan J points out that: 
"Although our history is one which the most visible pattern of discrimination has been 
racial, other systematic motifs of discrimination were and are inscribed on our social 
fabric. In drafting s 8, the drafters recognized that systematic patterns of discrimination 
on grounds other than race have caused, and many continue to cause, considerable harm. 
For this reason, s (8) 2 lists a wide and not exhaustive, list of prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. ,,20 
December 1991 was a monumental time in South Africa in that it marked the start of 
multi-party negotiations, Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) at the 
World Trade Centre in Kempton Park outside Johannesburg. President FW de Klerk led 
the apartheid government. Dawie de Villiers led the National Party (NP). Opposition 
parties included the African National Congress (ANC) led by Nelson Mandela, the 
16 Act 108 of 1996. 
J7 Sec 12( I) Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person which includes the right -
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
(b) not to be detained without trial; 
(c) to be free from al1 forms of violence from either public or private (my emphasis) 
(d) not to be tortured in anyway; and 
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way-
Sec 12 (2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right-
(a) to make decisions concerning reproduction 
(b) to security in and control over their body; and (my emphasis) 
(c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent. 
J8 Section 23 (1) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices - which includes the right not to be unfairly 
discriminated on the bases of gender, sex or pregnancy (Employment Equity Act). 
J9 Section 27(1 lea) Everyone has the right to have access to -
(a) health care services, including reproductive health care (my emphasis). 
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Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, and the Democratic Party 
(DP) by Zac de Beer. The black traditional leaders represented the traditional Board 
sector. The main purpose of these different groups was to provide a basis for discussion 
for the Interim Constitution of South Africa that would provide a break from the 
apartheid system of the past and ensure a new democratic South Africa. Prior to these 
negotiations women had attended interminable meetings and conferences where they 
bemoaned the government which responded to their demands with merely incremental 
changes in legislation2 ! Angered by the passivity of the government, the/ 2 protested 
outside the World Trade Centre for representation in the negotiations. Commenting on 
the protests the African National Congress Women's League secretary general, Baleka 
Kgositsile noted that while the negotiations were primarily focused on race, it was 
important to acknowledge the part played by women in the struggle and to concede that 
African women were especially affected by the struggle: 
"That apartheid is still alive, well and particularly violent to women is illustrated by an 
article in the February 23(1991) Sowetan. The township paper reported that a gang of 
white youths stoned a black woman and her ll-month-old child; the little girl suffered 
brain damage and was in a coma fighting for her life. Although an "attempted murder 
docket" was opened against the youths, who were known to the police, a police 
spokesperson said that the assailants could not be arrested because "they are sitting for 
their exams. There is no use rushing the case .... " This is a fairly typical response to 
attacks on black women. Of course domestic violence and abuse of women by men are 
not limited to the black community. In fact, white women don't often realize that they 
suffer many of same problems as black women Women's issues must not wait for the new 
government to be in place for them to be addressed. This is why we are insisting that 
CODESA [Convention for a Democratic South Africa, the multiparty negotiations 
forum], must have a way of ensuring that these issues are taken on board.,,23 
Andrews24 writes that despite the formidable obstacles to women's equality, by the early 
1990's South African women had mobilized themselves creating a "highly organized, 
politically astute, articulate and vocal cadre of feminists." So that by 1990 when the 
20 1996 (4) SA 217 (CC) at 4lD. 
21 These included among others the General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993, Prevention of 
Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. 
22 This included groups varying. from the ANC Women's League, the Woman's Legal Status Committee 
(WLSA), Women for Peace, Kontak, the National Council of Women (NCW), Union of Jewish Women 
(UJW), the SA Association of University Women and several others. 
23 At www.creenleft.org,auaccessed on 5 September 2003. 
24 Andrews op cit at 2. 
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"delegates to South Africa's constitutional negotiations fought over details ofthe rights to 
be included in the new constitution, women activists within South Africa had already 
managed to organize and successfully influence the process.,,25 
In 1992, the South African South African National Women's Coalition was formed with 
the aim of ensuring that the interests of women were not ignored in the negotiation 
process. This was a preliminary to the creation of the Woman Charter for effective 
equality formed to ensure a "programme for equality in all sphere of [women's] lives." 
The Charter contained demands by women of issues that were a priority to them. The 
women identified the need to be included and to participate in the traditional institutions 
that were in the past largely the realm of males. Women also demanded the 
discontinuation of laws that failed to recognize the legality of customary marriages, 
calling for the recognition equal to that given to the other forms of marriage. Although 
the Charter expresses the freedom of women to "practise their own religion, culture or 
beliefs without fear", it also states unambiguously "custom, culture and religion shall be 
subject to the Equality clause of the Bill of Rights." The Charter acknowledges the 
necessity of allowing women "full participation, leadership and decision-making in 
religious and cultural practice." 
The culminating point of all these negotiations was the drafting of the Interim 
Constitution, which expressed the commitment to: 
"Create a new order in which all South Africans will be entitled to a common South 
African citizenship in a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which there is 
equality between men and women and people of all races so that all citizens shall enjoy 
and exercise their fundamental freedoms." 
Despite the acknowledgement given to women in the Interim Constitution, the lack of 
attention given to customary law is conspicuous. As Bennett26 points out, for African 
women section 229 which stated that all laws in force in the Bantustans remained in force 
unless repealed or amended, meant the continued existence of the Black Administration 
Act of 1927 and the Code of Zulu Law and Kwa-Zulu Act which had placed black 
25 ibid. 
26 T.W. Bennett 1994:122. 
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women In customary unIons m positions as minorities27 Further, the recognition of 
traditional authorities is an unqualified statement made by the drafters of the Constitution 
that the system of primogeniture of males was to be maintained. Hence, it would seem 
that the Interim Constitution contained clauses that conflicted, on one hand it guaranteed 
equality to all regardless of gender28, and on the other, the right by traditional leaders to 
be recognized and protected by the Constitution. Albertyn29 contends that one of the 
reasons for the establishment of the Commission for Gender Equality in the Interim 
Constitution was to bring about a compromise between on the one hand the traditional 
leaders who wanted customary law to be excluded from the operation of the Constitution, 
and on the other to pacify the women's groups that were lobbying for its inclusion. The 
Gender Commission was established "to promote gender equality ... and to advise and to 
make recommendations to parliament or any other legislature with regard to any laws or 
proposed legislation which affect gender equality and the status of women."JO The need 
to pacify the two opposing groups resulted in an Interim Constitution that contains 
language favourable to both traditionalistsJ I and feminists alike. Supporters of a structure 
that was separate from the Human Rights Commission were of the opinion that such a 
body would be able to deal comprehensively with women's issues without the fear of 
"marginalizing and trivialising" women's issuesn The fact that the drafters had to 
accommodate both parties creates certain difficulties in interpretation. The Interim 
27 The Interim Constitution did acknowledge in sectioo 31 that "every person will have the right to use the 
language and to participate in the cultural life of his or her choice" and in section II establishes that" the 
institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law, shall be recognised and 
protected in the Constitution" and s 33(2) which stated that no "rule of . .. customary law ... shall limit any 
right entrenched in this chapter." 
28 Chapter 3, section 8 
(1) Every person shall have the right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the 
law. 
(2) No person shall be unfairly discriminated against, directly or indirectly on one or more of 
the following grounds in particular: race, gender, sex, ethinic or social origin ... (my 
emphasis). 
29 C. Albertyn, 1995:64. 
3D Section 119(3). 
31 T. NhJapo, 1995:159 notes that amendments made that resulted in section 126(1) and Constitutional 
Principle XXXIV were aimed solely at persuading the Inkatha Freedom Party to participate in the 1994 
elections. 
32 According to Andrews op cit at 4 the same had been done during the negotiation stages were women's 
concerns had been incorporated under the general rubric of human rights, which led to racial issues taking 
priority over women's issues. Opponents of such a separation however were of the view that having two 
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Constitution fails to provide any guidelines for the resolution of the conflict that arises 
between customary law and women's rights33 Thandabantu Nhlapo describes the 
document aptly as more " ... akin to a peace treaty than a fundamental law .. .. ,,34 In 
drafting the final Constitution, debates raged between the two opposing groups. 
Traditional leaders attempted to get customary law exempted from any gender equality 
clause. This bid failed as a result of strong petitioning by many women's groups. Instead 
the technical committee proposed a compromise in consultation with the Ad Hoc 
Committee on which the traditional leaders were represented35 There was an effort to get 
customary law entrenched as a fundamental right. This was also unsuccessful, leaving 
customary law subject to the equality clause. Many asserted at the time that one of the 
main weaknesses of me mterim Constitution was me fa"l Ulal it recognizeci customary 
law, but as Nhlap036 argues its exclusion would have resulted in much opposition from 
various traditional leaders and chiefs. Strong constitutional recognition was inevitable in 
a country in which three-quarters of the population was black. Willan37 quoting with 
approval from Walker states: 
"In the final analysis a handful of women were pitted against an unyielding block of 
traditional leaders ... one suspects that political considerations (the chiefs wield 
considerable influence in the rural areas) may have outweighed a commitment to basic 
human rights principles." 
separate structures ignored the fact that "women's rights" were indeed "human rights" despite the rally 
against such a distinction by several feminists. 
)3 In the First Certification cited as Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assemblv: in Re 
Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) one of the issues 
brought before the court which was raised by the Congress of Traditional Leaders was the effect of the 
horizontal application of the Bill of Rights on customary law. The argument was that patriarchal principles 
would be outlawed by the Bill of Rights on customary law. As R.B. Mqeke 1997:8 notes "although the 
court felt that the obj ection fell outside its competence, it nevertheless expressed the view that the feared 
destructive confrontation between the Bill of Rights and the legislation on one hand and indigenous law on 
the other need not take place because the phrase in the New Text 8(2) had qualified the application of the 
Bill of Rights "if, and to the extent, it is applicable taking into account the nature of the right and the duty 
imposed by the Right." 
14 Nhlapo op cit at 159. 
35 L.M. du Plessis "A background to drafting the Chapter on Fundamental Rights" in DeVilliers (ed) Birth 
of the Constitution , 1994:98. 
36 ibid. 
37 S. Willan 1998:59. 
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The Constitution of South Africa was finalized in February 1997, entrenching in it a 
number of rights that are significant for women3 8 South African analysts have stressed 
that the role of women's movement was pivotal in driving a feminist agenda. By 
demanding that women have a place in the transitional negotiations, women forged for a 
more permanent place for feminism. Goetz and Hassim write: 
"In South Africa, the negotiated transition, involving consensus among the major 
political parties and liberation movements, produced a rights based discourse that opened 
a space for women activists to extend feminist conceptions of democracy.,,39 
It was now the duty of the legislature to ensure that the promises entrenched in the 
Constitution would become a reality to the majority of African women, most whom were 
uneducated and unempowered. Changes for women were to take place not only in the 
public sphere but more so in the private were the greater inconsistencies with the 
Constitution would be felt. Since the Ndlovu v Ndlovu4o case, it can be said that under 
colonial administration women had been viewed as "rightJess entities under the authority 
of men." In the private sphere, the family became the institution from which women's 
lives and consequently women's rights were constructed. The role of women was 
therefore measured and understood in terms of the needs of the group. Most African 
women's lives, more particularly in terms of personal independence and quality of 
decision making, was subjected to the needs of the group . What this meant as Nhlap041 
comments, was that ties to the group served to subordinate the interests of the woman as 
persons to the interest of the wider group. The final Constitution and the duty of 
subsequent legislation was to ensure not only that women's right to equality was 
maintained, but also that substantively the problems facing African women, most of 
which stem from their being "perceived not as separate entities but always as adjuncts to 
the family",42 were dealt with. This included their rights to acquire land, unequal 
treatment by chiefs courts and administrative justice in general, problems arising from 
" Section 9,12,15,16,25,26,27,29,30,31,34 of Act 108 of 1996. 
3' A.M. Goetz and S. Hassim "In and Against the party: Women's Representation and Constituency-
building in Uganda and South Africa" in Molyneux and Razavi (eds) Gender Justice, Development and 
Rights, 2002:312. 
40 1954 NAC 59. 
41 Nhlapo 1991:135. 
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divorce, lobolo, polygamy, legal capacity, personal status, child maintenance, custody 
and guardianship.43 To do this greater participation was to be made by women in decision 
making and in the enactment of just, fair and equitable laws that not only existed on 
paper, but also impacted the black uneducated woman in their day-to-day lives. 
3.3 FORMAL VERSUS SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITy44 
When discussing section 9 of the Constitution, the right to equal protection before the 
law, there is the need to distinguish between formal and substantive equality. Formal 
equality is a principle of equal treatment: individuals who are alike should be treated 
alike, according to their actual characteristics rather than stereotypical assumptions made 
about them. It is a principle that can be applied either to a single individual whose right to 
be treated on his or her own merits can be viewed as a right of individual autonomy, or to 
a group, whose members seek the same treatment as members of other similarly situated 
groups. So in relation to gender, what this means is that women and men have identical 
rights and status. It means that they are treated equally under the law and in society. This 
formulation is based on the fundamental Aristotelian maxim that likes should be treated 
alike. This formulation assumes a gender-neutral test stating that when men and women 
are similarly situated they ought to be treated similarly. By so doing it takes an essentially 
comparative approach and assumes it as the norm.45 By comparing man and woman it 
fails to take into account that the norm is male. This equality principle ignores that even 
where similarly situated there exist subtle differences that may not be visible, which 
42 ibid. 
43 Nhlapo op cit at 153. Also see the sections in the Final Constitution that deal with these problems. 
44 See also Chapter Five for the study done on some African women in Graharnsto\VIl, 
45 As seen in Chapter Two above liberal feminists initially insisted that men and women were equal in all 
respects. However, subsequent feminists argued that by so doing women were assimilated into the male 
norms and values and so advocated instead for seeing difference. S. Fredman, 1999:197 writes that it is 
myopic to look at the equality principle as a dichotomy. She writes, "not only does this obscure the richness 
of human experience and qualities, but it also continues to lise the male norm as a yardstick, even in respect 
of difference. The focus on this dichotomy thus prevents us from tackling the real disadvantage of women 
in society." 
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disadvantage women. By their very social upbringing, women invariably are 
fundamentally different to men46 
Gender equality although closely related to gender equity, differs from the latter. Certain 
social and economic structures and conditions disqualify women from getting the same 
treatment, advantages or privileges as men even though they have equal rights to them; 
these are issues of equity. In international human rights law, for example, in interpreting 
CEDAW,47 this distinction is seen as the difference between "formal equality" and 
"substantive equality". Although formal equality has led to important gains for women, 
more so African women, limiting women's rights to mere "formal" equality without 
substantial progress can indeed be counterproductive. Formal equality assumes that by 
removing gendered legal boundaries men and women of similar talent and motivation 
will enjoy the same opportunities and achieve the same successes. Formal equality treats 
discrimination as an aberration, which can be eliminated by extending the same rights 
and entitlements to all. However, formal equality is blind to entrenched structural 
inequalities and ignores actual social and economic disparities between groups and 
individuals. "Substantive equality" demands an examination of the actual conditions 
experienced by groups and individuals and requires the elimination of discriminatory 
structural barriers. This may mean taking affirmative action, which is not to be 
interpreted as discrimination. CEDA W's General Recommendation No. 5 recommends 
countries "make more use of temporary special measures such as positive action, 
preferential treatment or quota systems to advance women's integration into education, 
the economy, politics and enjoyment.,,48 
Traditional liberal legalism would postulate that all persons are created equal and that in 
order to reverse the unequal status of women there is need to change the legislation that 
prevents women having equal opportunity. It looks at the complete system and believes 
that if we remove laws, women will become equal with men. Its main thrust is that 
46 S. Fredman "Less Equal than Others - Equality and Women's Rights" in Gearty and Tomkins (eds) 
Understanding Human Rights, 1999: 197. 
47 Convention On the Elimination of All Fonns of Discrimination against Women. To be discussed in 
Chapter Four below. 
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female subordination is rooted in a set of customary and legal constraints that blocks 
women's entrance and/or success in the so-called "public world". Because society has the 
false belief that women are by nature less capable than men, it excludes women from the 
public sphere and relegates them to the private. As a result of this policy of exclusion, the 
true potential of many women goes unfulfilled.49 Liberal political and legal theory 
stresses the primacy of the individual and so by securing the equal protection of the law 
for all, it postulates that discrimination is eliminated 50 Such a notion has been criticized 
on the basis that it fails to acknowledge social patterns of discrimination and 
disadvantage based upon race, sex, religion and such. For African women, fonnal gender 
equality in the law is meaningless in a society where agents such as the family structures 
enforce that inequality. African women's rights are in practice bound up with the interests 
of the family and children and never as independent entities. Critical feminist theory will 
advocate for substantive equality and challenges the law to expose gender bias. Equality 
and equal treatment must take into account legal, social and cultural disadvantages of the 
past as a means to achieve equality5 1 For the African woman the Constitution requires 
not only a promise for "equal protection before the law"s2, but goes further to give 
content to the right when it notes that "equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of 
all rights and freedoms."s3 Albertyn et a/54 are of the opinion that this sentence supports 
the Constitution's commitment to substantive equality, which concedes that there is a 
need for policy that takes account of cultural and social constructions. In order to achieve 
equality, societies have to reject behavioural patterns that were previously male oriented. 
This is not achieved merely by enacting laws that claim equality of persons but by 
shifting mental constructions that claim that men are superior to women and more 
especially in the African tradition that they are the sole decision-makers and 
breadwinners. In Moseneke,55 Sachs J adds that discrimination is rooted in attitudes and 
48 At www.unifempacific.comaccessed on 6 of September 2003. 
49 Bartnett 1998,96. 
50 W. Freedman op cit at 314. 
51 C. Albertyn and B. Goldblatt 1998:252-253. 
52 Section 9( 1) of Act 108 of 1996. 
53 Section 9(2) of Act 108 of 1996. 
54 Albertyn op cit at 265. 
55 Moseneke and others v The Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 21 (Ce). 
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practices of the past, which need to change; yet "change cannot be achieved with a simple 
stroke of a pen." Van Blerk also makes this point in the following manner: 
"The equal state promised by the . . . Constitution should not, however, lull women into a 
false sense of security. Liberation requires more than paper statements; it requires that 
those statements be put into action. It is only when legal rights are translated into reality 
that they will transform society and women's lives for the better."s6 
The notion of substantive equality presents a challenge to the judges who apply equality 
legislation. As will be seen in subsequent subsections in this chapter at times judges have 
failed to take cognisance of this . In the words of the Honourable Justice L'Heureux-
Dube,57 real substantive equality cannot be achieved through the actions of judges and 
lawyers alone as sources of inequality lie in the realities of, for example, the labour 
market, the divisions of familial responsibilities and prejudicial attitudes held by 
members of society. Yet at the same time the promotion of equality is at the heart of the 
jurist's mandate. Speaking on behalf of the legal profession, judges in particular, the 
following ofMr Justice L'Heureax-Dube should be heeded, especially in South Africa: 
"The evaluation of social and historical context and the recognllJon of differing 
perspectives, hallmarks of a jurisprudence infused with the values of substantive equality, 
require of our profession a new sensitivity and openness to ideas and information about 
people and experiences perhaps previously unknown to us. ,,58 
The struggle for non-sexism is not as easy as it may appear at first sight. Although 
recognising the significance of these rights is of paramount importance, it will be the 
process leading up to the adoption and implementation that will present the greater 
challenge. Gender equality is in itself a multifaceted, complex and indefinable 
phenomenon. Mere guarantees in a document that promises to uphold the rights of 
women will unlikely be sufficient. It is important to note that it is the males that will both 
make the laws and apply and interpret them. Judges and parliamentarians are largely male 
and form a greater majority of the powerhouses that affect change. As Sachs59 indicates, 
5. A.E. van Blerk 1998: 190. 
S? C. L'Hereux-Dube 1997:335. 
" ibid. 
" Sachs op cit at 9. 
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there are several voices in the women's movement, which argue that the Constitution's 
emphasis on equality could prove to be detrimental to women. It is argued that by 
stressing equality, one obscures ways in which the legislature should intervene to correct 
the injustices to which women are sUbjected on a day-to-day basis. The Bill of Rights 
must not merely make provisions dealing with women's rights, because subjugation of 
women is multifaceted, the problems that women face should permeate every section of 
the Constitution and not only in special provisions. So the argument is that from the 
rights to citizenship, to the rights of choice and workers' right, the Constitution should be 
as non-gender as they are non-racial. It is my opinion that such an argument presents a 
gender-neutral manner of looking at the Constitution, which in the end could be more 
detrimental than beneficial. To ignore that there are differences that exist between men 
and women is to perpetuate male dominance. Although it is acceptable that all facets of 
life must acknowledge gender, it is paramount that the social and cultural differences 
imposed on women be conceded. An attempt to ignore differences that exist between men 
and women creates fallacious views on masculinity and femininity. It is more beneficial 
in my opinion to acknowledge the differences and to seek the breaking down of those 
man made or man imposed notions of women and their position in society. 
3.4 LEGISLATION THAT AFFECTS WOMEN'S LIVES - LAWS PASSED 
SINCE THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
This section will deal with and comment on the laws that affect women's lives directly 
and indirectly. It will also deal with the way the courts have interpreted the changes made 
in the Constitution as pertains women's rights in general and African women' s rights 
more particularly. One cannot argue that one of the most destructive pieces of legislation 
(at least as far as women's rights are concerned) was the Black Administration Act 38 of 
1927. As noted before in the thesis, traditionally women have been identified primarily 
in terms of their roles within the private realm and more particularly within the family 
nucleus. It is no surplise that the greatest changes made in .legislation are those in the 
realm of marriage. Because anti-discriminatory legislation is often based on the 
Aristotelian concept of equality, which requires that like should be treated, as like, it is 
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often difficult for black women to prove that they are unfavourably treated. Most African 
women were because of past legislation placed in subordinate positions and as a result it 
is often difficult for women to meet this Aristotelian concept of equality. As Catherine 
MacKinnon states: 
"The more unequal a society gets, the fewer such women are pennitted to exist. 
Therefore, the more unequal society gets, the less likely the difference doctrine (for 
example anti-discrimination legislation) is to be able to do anything about it .... ,,60 
Feminists have also criticized anti-discriminatory laws on the basis that they are too 
individualistic in focus . The present writer agrees w ith the comments by O'Reagan61 that 
this manifests itself first in cases brought before the courts and secondly in the tendency 
of legislation to treat women as individuals and not as members of a particular sex or 
gender. What this does is that it ignores the entrenched patterns of social disadvantages 
that exist in community. While I agree that such an individualistic approach can have its 
advantages, legislation must not fail to acknowledge that gender is a social depiction and 
laws ought to be promulgated to affect the group as well as the individual. It is a dilemma 
that requires the lawmakers to create a balance, which will allow for a positive change in 
women's fight for equality. 
3.4.1 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
The South African government has time and again expressed at the highest policy making 
levels the commitment to address all fonns of violence against women. The 
Reconstruction and Development Programme62 committed itself to the reconstruction of 
60 C. Mackinnon 1987:37-38. 
61 C. O'Reagan 1994: 72. 
62 The R.D.P. was drawn up by the A.N.C led alliance in consultation with other key mass organisations to 
create a policy framework to assist in the transformation period post 1994 in South Africa: The 
Reconstruction and Development Programme 1994:1. This was replaced by the Growth Employment and 
Redistribution Plan (GEAR) in June 1996. One of the many criticisms of GEAR lies in that although on 
paper it commits itself to gender equality, many of these commitments are vague and lacking. In an article 
titled "Why we say Asifune Gear" at http://flag.hlackened.net/revolt/africalwsfws/98/gear.html accessed on 
17 September 2003 , critics write that GEAR will benefit the rich male, putting the African woman, who 
lacks economic power at a disadvantage. See below on the relationship between economic empowennent 
and violence against women. 
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family and community life, and set to recognize the needs of women who have been 
victims of domestic and other forms of violence. South Africa carries a legacy of 
violence that underpinned the apartheid state and has led to all forms of violence 
throughout South Africa-both within and outside of the home. For African women, this 
legacy has impacted on them in the worst possible way. Violence ranged from their 
interaction with the police (especially during the apartheid years) and judicial officers and 
extending to the home where the "traditional,,63 values prevailing in all sections of South 
African society reinforce the attitude that "wife-beating"is not only acceptable but is a 
private affair64 The fact that violence is considered in many cases a private affair, has 
meant that it is hidden from the public view and therefore obscured from any scrutiny. 
Recognition of violence against women as a denial of fundamental rights means that the 
South African government has made itself accountable for the "acts of private individuals 
within the home and the community through the maintenance of a legal and social system 
in which violence against women is endemic and where such actions are trivialised or 
discounted. ,,65 
Gender violence is commonly defined as "violent acts (real or threatened) perpetrated on 
females because they are female. Whether gender violence operates as direct physical 
violence, threat or intimidation, the intent is to perpetuate and promote hierarchical 
gender relations. ,,66 Although the new Constitution contains a commitment to the 
elimination of discrimination on the basis of sex and gender, it is important to note that 
concern about the inequities in a family and focus on violence within the family has only 
until recently been concealed from public scrutiny. It is only towards the end of the 
63 I use the word "traditional" very cautiously, nowhere in my research have I found that traditional African 
societies in any way condone violence against women. However, with the manipulation of African 
customs, which created a peculiar hybrid system of law certain rigid rules of customary law led to rapid 
changes in African society. Research done in Cape Town by the Human Rights Watch/Africa between 
1990-1991 reflects that most of the violence experienced by African women is experienced within the 
borne. The position of African women as minorities tends to lead to African women internalising societal 
views to the extent that they see themselves as children. One woman who spoke at a focus group held by 
the Woman's National Coalition in 1994 was quoted as saying "a man should beat you up if you deserve 
it": Human Rights Watch/Africa 1995:47. 
64 ibid. 
65 C.M. Chinkin "Women's Rights as Human Rights under International Law" in Gearty and Tomkins (eds) 
Understanding Human Rights, 1999:563. 
O. W.R .Bohrnke quoting D. Green 1999:1-2. 
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1970's that the South African women's movements have drawn attention to the problems 
of domestic violence and rape. This transition was greatly influenced by the work of 
feminists, mostly American, who criticized the government's response to violence. Thus 
feminists such as Gelles, Steinmetz, Straus described the need to transform the mind set 
that domestic violence was a private affair to be dealt with in the private sphere. Kaganas 
and Murra/7 show that the 1980's saw an increasing number of academic work and 
research dealing with violence against women. In 1985, the South African Law 
Commission set to re-evaluate the treatment of domestic violence victims in the criminal 
justice system. Commenting on this project, the above writers note that although it was 
the single major intervention relating to violence against women during this period, its 
report failed to acknowledge the actual social and cultural (male supremacist ethos) that 
perpetuated violence against women68 Many African women feel the impact of violence 
more severely than white women. During the height of apartheid when political violence 
became a significant phenomenon in many black communities, it was the black women 
that were left to bear the brunt. Although the larger participants in political violence were 
men, it was the women and children who suffered indiscriminate killings. When conflict 
arose, it was women and children who formed the majority of the displaced and had to 
pick up the pieces and attempt to salvage homes that had been destroyed during the 
conflict. In rural areas of South Africa, violence against women also includes the 
phenomenon of witchcraft killings, most of which were directed against women. Outside 
of the home during the emergency of the 1980's, it was that majority of the black women 
that were detained without trial for political activities and it was them that were beaten 
and often raped by police either during custody or as a means to force them to reveal the 
location of their husbands who were involved in the struggle69 The recognition that 
violence actually exists is an important development in the black community. In the past 
it was felt that domestic violence and rape were issues for white women to deal with. It 
was felt that black women had other important political and anti-apartheid issues to focus 
on.
70 Within the home more black women find themselves in abusive relationships than 
67 C. Murray and F. Kaganas 1994:21. 
.8 ibid. 
69 Human llights Watch Women's Rights Project op cit at 13-25. 
70 ibid. 
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white women and more so find it harder to leave such relationships71 The reasons for 
this are unclear, but some possible explanations include the following: 
(1) African women have fewer options due to the inequalities that exist III marital 
partnerships. Being based on patriarchal society that considers women as "mere 
minorities" perpetuates the view of women as "property". Feminists argue that the 
payment of labala as is the tradition in African societies could encourage such notions. 
Women are therefore as a result of payment of labala considered property to be done 
with as the male feels : 
"Violence is best understood by the way our society constructs the social roles of men 
and women and by an analysis of the gendered imbalance of power in society. It is 
behaviour based on the assumption that the man owns his female partner, has a right to 
dominate and control, and that violence is used as means of exercising that domination 
and control." 72 
(2) African women on average are at a lower income level than that of most white 
women. There is no denying the fact that South Africa is one of the most unequal of 
societies. These inequities stem not only from race but pervade gender as well. The 
effects of apartheid are often reflected by the disparities that exist between rich and poor, 
with the poverty concentrated amongst the African population. A Report released by the 
Ministry of Finance early in 2002 states that 22 million South Africans live below the 
United Nations' poverty datum line; of these the greatest poverty is concentrated amongst 
the African population.73 African women have no access to land74 and resources . 
Unemployment rates range between 30-40 percent according to a report by Nicole Itano 
in the New York Times,75 of which not more than 30 percent of women make up the total 
workforce, even fewer are black. These disadvantages that black women face mean that 
7\ See the study done in Grahamstown as found Chapter Five. 
72 Murray and Kaganas op cit at 28. 
7J At www.woza.co.za feb02/budget19.htm accessed on 11 September 2003. 
74 As seen in the [lfSt chapter their access to land under communal tribal land tenure systems is through 
their male counterparts be it husbands or male relatives. Further allocation of land by chiefs is almost 
always exclusive to men. 
7l N. Itano at http: //www.nvtimes.com accessed on 9 September 2003. 
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in most cases they are unable to get out of marriages that are violent or potentially 
violent. 
(3) African women are often reluctant to report any violence to the police. This is more 
so were domestic violence is concerned. Social stigma and fear of reprisal often deters 
women affected by violence from reporting it.76 According to Ngaire Naffine77 "the 
silence that has surrounded domestic violence has, in fact, condoned it and has 
contributed to the reluctance of victims to seek legal and social remedies to protect 
themselves from their violent spouses." Indifference and hostility on the part of police 
and judicial officers have also further contributed to this reluctance by women to report 
violence against them. For black women this is intensified by the legacy of suspicion 
towards the police that was adopted from the apartheid era. In the courts the use (in the 
past) of such legal techniques as the cautionary rule, which requires that the court 
exercise additional care when assessing the credibility of the rape survivor, have also 
emphasised this reluctance. The notion of marital rape is also alien to the African woman. 
It is the duty of the wife to consent to all sexual advances by the male. The above 
mentioned author further states 78 that the fact that marital violence in general has been 
entrenched as behaviour that is normal, leads to not only silencing of women, but also to 
continuation of these violent practices. Ironically, taking what was a 17th European held 
century notion of marriage most African men feel that marital rape is alien to black 
people's traditions. It is the view of most that "the husband cannot be guilty of a rape 
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and 
contract, the wife has given herself in kind to the husband which she cannot retract." In 
1795 Blackstone wrote "a husband must give his wife moderate correction. For as he is to 
answer for her misbehaviours, the law thought it reasonable to entrust him with the power 
of restraining her by domestic chastisement.,,79 When reporting cases to the police, 
violence within the home is often considered a domestic affair that ought to be dealt with 
76 A recent case on Morning Live (30 September 2003) reported an incidence where a woman was brutally 
assaulted by her husband (Sam Maluleka) in the presence of police officers who were unwilling to 
intervene justifying that this was a domestic issue. 
n N. Naffine 2002: 86. 
78 Naffine op cit at 88. See also the views of women in Grahamstown as presented by research done by the 
writer in this peri-urban area. 
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within the private realm. The Human Rights Watch Project quotes a November 1994 
case, where a 30-year-old man was acquitted in the regional court for raping his wife. 
According to the statement given by the wife, the husband had come home inebriated, 
had threatened her and forced her to have sex. Because the case was not corroborated, the 
magistrate in this court stated that it should be viewed with caution. It was his opinion 
that the woman should have fought off her husband and her failure to do so was 
tantamount to consent80 
Feminists argue that the patriarchal system of gender inequalities that is characteristic of 
African families seeks and succeeds in empowering men while oppressing women. It is 
for this reason, in their opinion, that violence becomes prevalent in such communities. 
According to Ward81 it is this "stratification and social control" that becomes 
fundamental causes for domination of women and leads subsequently to violence. The 
major arguments from the many varying feminist perspectives revolve around power 
inequality between the genders as well as mentioned above, the institutionalized system 
of patriarchy. Desiree Hansson82 refers to the preamble of the African National 
Congress's constitutional guidelines which state: 
"[ w)e also have to acknowledge that the oppression of women in South Africa is not only 
a consequence of conquest and white domination, and make commitment to abolish all 
vestiges of patriarchy in our institutions and practices, not just those that followed 
conquest. " 
The assumption is that patriarchy exists in the structure of society and the impact and 
influence of Western feminist studies is pertinent III African structures83 When 
discussing the "traditional" African family, there is no denying that the family is 
fundamental. It is within this realm that the power differences that exist between men and 
women are most visible. As Nhlap084 writes, the values underlying the African marriage 
are such that men ultimately gain power over women resulting in the transformation of 
79 Blackstone referred to with approval by Naffme ibid. 
8. Human Rights Watch/Africa op cit at 107. 
81 C.A. Ward 1995:4. 
82 D. Hansson "Working Against Violence Against Women: Recommendations from Rape Crisis (Cape 
Town) in Bazilli (ed) Putting Women on the Agenda, 1991:180. 
83 Bohmke op cit at 3. He also adds that women are taught to be helpless, dependant, submissive, passive, 
cooperative and obedient to society. Cultural values and beliefs are transmitted tlrrough the socialisation 
process and it is surrounding these values that women perceive violence. 
83 
women into commodities and property which in turn tends to depersonalize them and has 
implications towards male attitude in respect of issues concerning violence. Practices 
such as labala and the Xhosa custom of ukuthwala have come under strong criticism by 
feminists who believe that they succeed in perpetuating the view of women as property, 
which leads to power inequalities between gender and ultimately violence against 
women. Ukuthwala,85 is seen as the "ritualized" abduction of a bride by a prospective 
bridegroom, and in which a certain amount of physical resistance from the bride is 
expected86 It is Bohmke's opinion that practices such as these have important 
implications for the way in which resistance to male overtures are viewed by the Xhosa 
society. So that even where the female might be set against the prospective union, her 
resistance is not acknowledged. Such gender relations could have an influence on the way 
males in the society view resistance by a woman and could perpetuate acceptance of 
gender violence87 
Domestic violence IS endemic III most societies across the world but remallls 
unrecognized from national and international agendas. The most detailed document 
detailing rights to which women are entitled is the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W). However, it is the Vienna 
Declaration that clearly outlines the issue of violence against women as a human right. In 
1993, the United Nations as its World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
recognized the specificity of women's rights as part of the International Human Rights 
agenda. The Vienna Declaration identifies and condemns "gender-based violence and all 
forms of sexual harassment and exploitation" and calls upon the General Assembly to 
"adopt a draft declaration on violence against women." That South Africa is the first 
African country to express a commitment at policy levels to eradicate gender-violence is 
a positive testament to the government's commitments to upholding women's rights . 
'4 Nhlapo op cit at 113 . 
• 5 This practice still common in the Eastern Cape . 
• 6 Bohrnke op cit at 11. 
87 Bohmke also discusses the perception that African women seem more accepting of violence corrunitted 
against them. Quoting Braine, Bless and Fox (1995) he writes that a study done at the University of Natal 
and University of Transkei found that African women were less sensitised to and more tolerant of gender 
violence. He attributes this to the customs and practices that are common among Africans that perpetuate 
gender violence. 
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3.4.2 THE PREVENTION OF FAMILY VIOLENCE ACT 133 OF 1993 
It is the view of many that this Act was promulgated as a means to clinch the female vote 
in the April 1994 election. Its enactment was not accompanied by government funding 
for support structures or by programs to address gender bias in the police and court 
system. It provides for an "improved" and "expedited" procedure through which a 
woman can seek an interdict against an abusive partner. An abused woman can file for an 
interdict at the nearest magistrates' court. If the magistrate believes that the woman is in 
danger of abuse, he or she may grant an interdict, accompanied by a suspended warrant 
of arrest in order to prevent the abuser from further assaulting or threatening the woman. 
Once the abuser is served notice by the sheriffs office, a governmental agency separate 
from the Department of Justice and the Police Services the interdict comes into effect88 
One of the most important sections in this Act states that a husband may be convicted of 
the rape of his wife. The commencement date for this Act was 1 December 1993 and the 
Domestic Violence Act 116 of 1998 later amended this Act. The summary of this Act is 
found in the title, which provides the objectives of the Act in the following terms: 
"To provide for the granting of interdicts with regard to family violence; for an obligation 
to report cases of suspected ill-treatment of children; that a husband can be convicted of 
the rape of his wife; and for matters connected therewith." 
For African women, this Act seemed like the dawn of a new era, albeit being fraught with 
many difficulties. As noted above the fact that African women are often economically 
dependant on their male counterparts meant that once the violence was reported they 
found themselves in the streets with nothing to sustain them. Again the fact that the Act 
was restricted to married persons (both those married in terms of civil and customary 
law) ironically was not enough for many African women. Due to migrant policies many 
women in urban areas found themselves living with men outside the realm of any formal 
legal relationship. It was not unusual for an African man to maintain two relationships, a 
wife by customary law in the rural areas and a partner in the urban areas where he 
worked. 89 The Act did not protect women in these cases. It can also be gleaned from the 
"Human Rights Watch op cit at 67-68 . 
89 ibid. 
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Act that the fact that the Act was meant to protect individuals in marital relationships, 
could be problematic for African women in that, for years they had been placed in 
positions as mere minorities. The principle of patriarchy is such that they were not only 
considered the property of their husbands but of all male relations in the family. So they 
were under the tutelage of fathers, uncles and brothers and often experienced abuse at the 
hands of all. Women were, therefore, often abused by a male relation and still would not 
be protected by the Act. They instead had to resort to applying for interdicts in the High 
Court, a procedure which was complicated and which would cost money they did not 
have. The 1995 Human Rights Report on Domestic Violence notes that the most 
important shortcoming of the Act lies in the fact it was unavailable to former homelands 
(i .e. former TBVC states that had legislative competence and did not have to apply the 
Act within their boundaries). Although the Act made provision that if a woman were 
unable to pay the fee for the interdict, it would be carried by the state, many African 
women often could not afford this fee and had to endure long delays within the sheriffs 
office. It is obvious that such delays led to unfavourable consequences. Because of these 
various limitations, the South African Law Commission launched a project to investigate 
domestic violence. A team of experts, chosen from the non-governmental sector, the 
magistracy, private law firms and academia was put together to devise a new Act that 
would remedy the shortcomings of the Prevention of Family Violence Act90 Tackling 
these problems, the team produced draft legislation based on a better understanding that 
domestic violence was linked to financial, psychological and other social issues91 For 
African women this legislation was an acknowledgement by the legislature of the 
predicament they often find themselves in. 
3.4.3 THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT 116 OF 1998 
The Act, which became operational in December 1999, was promulgated to give the 
victims of domestic violence protection from domestic abuse. The objective of the 
measure is to initiate methods, which seek to guarantee that the relevant organs of state 
give full significance to the provisions of the Act. It would seem from the wording of the 
'0 Act 133 of 1993. 
'I P. Parenzee et al200l:3. 
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Act that the lawmakers took into consideration the fact that domestic violence is a serious 
social evil and that there is a high occurrence of domestic violence within South African 
society, which leaves that victims of domestic violence among the most vulnerable 
members of societyn Therefore, this Act is a reflection of the South African 
Government's commitment to the eradication of domestic violence, which was mostly 
directed to women. The Act is founded on a broader and enhanced understanding of what 
domestic violence means to women and what relationships are considered to be 
"domestic" in nature. It includes in its ambit a wider selection of what constitutes abuse93 
and it also extends the definition of a domestic relationship to include not only those 
married to each other, but those in a dating or customary relationship and those who share 
the same residence. For black women this means that uncles, brothers and fathers who 
may abuse are not exempt from the ambit of this Act. In passing this legislation, the 
South African government has to an extent fulfilled the commitments and obligations 
made under CEDA W. This Act allows South African women a quick, affordable legal 
remedy to combat abuses in the domestic sphere.94 Unfortunately, a report in 2000-2001 , 
which was conducted to monitor the implementation of the Act, has yielded some 
disappointing results. Parenzee95 et a/ states: 
"Despite the South African government's ratification Of various international 
agreements that condemn violence against women, as well as national legislation, there 
seems to be no significant changes to women's lives. Women continue to be primarily the 
victims of violence and to be subjected to secondary victimisation when they seek 
assistance from policing and criminal justice sectors. Part of this secondary victimisation 
flows from the impoverished knowledge, sensitivity and resources of the very personnel 
assigned to implement protective legislation." 
For the greater number of black women in the rural areas, who are uneducated, this Act 
brings little relief. The process of obtaining a protection order is not only a daunting one, 
it requires that the woman think and react outside her paradigm. For so long she has been 
identified and defined according to her family, to her this means a shift from the view 
" Act 116 of 1998 
93 ibid. The exhaustive list of abuses in the Act includes: physical, sexual, emotional, verbal, psychological 
and economic abuse and any behaviour, which may cause imminent harm to the safety, health and well 
being of the complainant. 
94 ibid. 
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that she is a wife and a mother, to her seeing herself as a victim of violence. Often ' she 
has to think about her economic circumstances and weigh the advantages of taking this 
route. It is reported that 9 out of 10 times complainants withdraw their complaints96 For 
the Act to be effectively implemented it is suggested that the factors that cause domestic 
violence must be investigated. These include gender equality, financial oppression, power 
dynamics and patriarchal attitudes. These changes should affect not only men in the 
domestic situations, but also the police whose attitudes towards black women are often 
nonchalant and intolerant. 
3.5 AFRICAN WOMEN AND MARRIAGE REGIMES 
It is no exaggeration to state that nowhere in discussions concerning African women's 
rights is there the greatest criticism and the greatest opposing views than in the realm of 
marital laws. The fact that the marriage regime and the field of family law receive more 
attention than any other, comes as no surprise. As stated in the thesis a woman's status 
was largely determined by marriage and was centred within the domestic sphere. Much of 
women's oppression stemmed from their disadvantaged position in marriage97 Marital 
power has been described as "the most notable example of glaring inequality in our 
law.,,98 The legal capacity of married women to perform juristic acts with regard to 
leasehold and ownership came about in 1985 with the amendment of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927. In Natal and KwaZulu the Codes stipulated that wives 
were to fall under the "marital power" of their husbands provided that this power "in civil 
marriage out of community of property may be excluded by an anti-nuptial contract." It 
might seem at first glance that this provision was more progressive than the minority 
clause in the Black Administration Act, but what this meant was that the husband was 
allowed decision-making authority over the family, control over his wife's person and the 
right to administer as he wishes the matrimonial estate99 BennettlOO comments that "by 
95 Parenzee el al 3-7. 
96 ibid. 
97 With respect to the Black Administration Act section I I (3), the Kwa-Zulu Act on the Code of Zulu Law 
and section 37 of the Transkei Marriage Act, African women were deemed minors with the effect that they 
were subjected to unbearable legal, social and economic consequences. 
98 1. Sinclair 1996:13. 
99 Bennett op cil at 335. 
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mid-twentieth century it was obvious that the African family was not what it had been at 
the time of colonial conquest, and that legal reforms were urgently needed to ameliorate 
the position of women and children." It was only the monogamous marriages lOI that were 
recognised as valid in South Africa. Because African unions were potentially 
polygamous, they were considered invalid unless solemnised by a marriage officer. 102 
For the white woman some improvements had been made with the promUlgation of the 
Matrimonial Affairs Act of 1953 and the Matrimonial Property Act of 1984103 which 
stated in section 11 that: 
"marital power which a husband has over the person and property of his wife .. . was 
abolished." 
But also explicitly states In section 25 that mamages governed by the Black 
Administration Act (which meant many African unions) were not included. In 1985 the 
Law Commission recommended the full recognition of customary marriages. The reason 
for this was that the anomalies that resulted in non-recognition had led to great injustices 
for the African woman. I04 It was only in 1988 with the Marriage and Matrimonial 
Property Law Amendment Act that the legislature accorded limited recognition to 
customary unions providing in essence that polygamy was recognised only were 
subsequent marriages were customary unions. For Africans, although there was no 
specific section abolishing marital power, it can be gleaned from the Act that civil 
marriages between two black people celebrated after December 1988 were not subject to 
marital power. The 1993 General Laws Fourth Amendment Act abolished marital power 
completely giving no preference to the dates on which the marriage was celebrated. This 
was not made applicable to Kwa-Zulu and the former Transkei. The KwaZulu Code of 
100 Bennett op cil 146. 
101 Taking the rationale of Hvde and Woodmanse 1886 LRIP AD 130, which stated "that marriages as 
understood in Christendom may . . . be defmed as a voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to 
the exclusion of all others." 
102 A. Costa 1994:915. 
103 Amended by the General Law Amendment Act 93 of 1962, Maintenance Act 23 of 1963, Matrimonial 
Affairs Amendment Act of 1966, Matrimonial Affairs Amendment Act 13 of 1976, Divorce Act of 1979, 
Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, General Law Fourth Amendment Act 132 of 1993, Guardianship Act 
192 of 1993, Justice Laws Rationalisation Act 18 of 1996. 
104 For example there was a reciprocal duty of support or any claim for maintenance as a surviving spouse 
and the stigma attached to all children under this union being considered illegitimate. 
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Zulu Law Act 16 of 1985 and the Transkei Marriage Act 21 of 1978 continued to 
stipulate that women were to be subjected to marital power. It was only with the 
provision of the Interim Constitution of 1993, which created one "national territory" that 
the 1988 Act was extended to the former Transkei and Kwa-Zulu. 105 
The fact that customary marnages should be gIven full recognition has received 
overwhelming support. For African women, the dual system of law did nothing more 
than confuse them as to what legal regimes determined the spouses' rights and duties. 
The 1988 legislation meant that civil marriages automatically terminated customary 
unions. Section IS(3)(a) of the Constitution authorises Parliament to promulgate 
legislation recognising "marriages concluded under any tradition, or a system of personal 
or family law." lo6 Although dealing with Muslim marriages, the case of Ryland v 
Edros107 is an indication by the Constitutional Court of the need for tolerance and 
acceptance of cultural and religious diversity as per the promises made by sections 30 and 
31 of the Constitution. 
3.5.1 THE RECOGNISTION OF CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES ACT 120 OF 
1998 
Having done a report into the marriages and customary union of Africans, the Law 
Commission of South Africa established a project committee on the Harmonisation of 
Common Law and Indigenous Law and conferred on it the task of investigating the 
marriage regimes that existed in South Africa. The main aim of this Committee was to 
create a code of marriages, which would apply to an institution that was in many ways 
common to all the cultures in South Africa108 The Act is a result of an extensive 
consultative process. During the development of the Bill, the Law Commission published 
on separate occasions an Issue Paper and a Discussion Paper. These documents were 
disseminated and discussed at a total of twenty-three provincial and national workshops 
105 S ' l' . 129 mc aIr op CIt at . 
106 South African Law Commission Report on Cuslomary Marriages 1998:29. 
107 1997 (1) BCLR 77 (C). 
108 South African Law Commission Report on Customary Marriages op cit at 8. 
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that involved non-government organizations, women 's groups, traditional leaders, the 
legal profession, state departments, and the religious community. The Discussion Paper 
alone elicited written submissions from five national state departments, two provincial 
departments, three Houses of Traditional Leaders and seven women's organizations. 
After the passage of the Act another extensive process of consultation was fonowed in 
the drafting of the necessary regulations to facilitate implementation. ID9 
The result of such an initiative was responses from different interested bodies, which 
contributed to the finalisation of what became the recognition of Customary Marriages 
Act. The main objective of the Act is to give full legal recognition to marriages entered 
into in accordance with customary law or traditional rites. The result is that it brings the 
majority of women and children in this country into the protective realm of our 
Constitution. In accordance with sections 9, 15, 30 and 31, Constitutional provisions had 
to be made that ensured that African cultural institutions and those of the Western 
traditions were given equal effect. By improving the position of women married into and 
children born of marriages conducted under traditional rites, the law-makers have 
introduced measures that align customary law with not only the provisions of the 
Constitution but also with South Africa's international obligations. II D The promulgation 
of the Act was not without much criticism and objection from interested parties. There 
were many who felt that the "new" South Africa must not create a duality in the marriage 
system and believed that by recognising customary marriages, it would somehow be 
"divisive" and "racist" doing more evil than good. Their main argument was based on the 
view that a uniform marriage law would promote national unity. Many also felt that the 
proposals of the Discussion Paper, which formed the foundation for the Act, were too 
western and Euro-centric. The House of Traditional Leaders (both in the Eastern Cape 
and the Northern Provinces) was of the view that duality ought to be maintained but such 
that the law must not in any way interfere with customary marriage regimes. They felt 
that proposals made by the Commission on spousal and parental consent, on marital 
power, property and anti-nuptial contracts were concepts that were alien to African 
109 ibid_ 
110 C. Gillwald 2000: 1. 
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culture and laws. III At the end of it all, the decision that had to be made was one that 
would give effect and respect to the Constitution and one which gave due consideration 
to the Bill of Rights and to the promises made by South Africa in the International arena. 
There is no denying that this Act is a landmark in two respects. It brings to a welcome 
conclusion the "tyranny of a dictatorial recognition of civil and other Euro-centric faith 
based marriages at the expense of marriages concluded in accordance with customary 
law."112 For the African woman, it brings to a resounding conclusion the oppressive laws 
that had applied to them, one being the notorious section 11 (3)(b) of the Black 
Administration Act and the others including sections 22 and 27(3) from the Kwa-Zulu 
Act on the Code of Zulu Law of 1985 that entrenched the view that a man in a marriage 
is not only the head of the family, but is also the holder of the marital power. The 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act recognises all marriages both monogamous and 
as per section 2(3) polygynous, which were valid at customary law and existing at the 
commencement of the Act as valid for all purposes. Pienaar!!3 regards it as unacceptable 
that despite the Act, customary unions are still not recognised for the purposes of 
intestate succession. The new legal system endeavours to reconcile culture and tradition 
with the competing claims posed by the constitutional requirement to establish norms of 
equal treatment and non-discrimination. 
Section 6 ofthe Act provides for the following: 
"A wife in a customary marriage has, on the basis of equality with her husband and 
subject to the matrimonial property system governing the marriage, full status and 
capacity, including the capacity to acquire assets and dispose of them, to enter into 
contracts and to litigate, in addition to any rights and powers that she might have at 
customary law." 
When discussing the implementation of this Act, one of the most contentious points 
involved lobolo 114and polygamy. From the very beginning, the Commission 
III South African Law Commission Report on Customary Marriages op cil4. 
"' C. Gillwald op cil at 3. 
"' 1.M. Pienaar 2003:261. 
II. Known to the different cultures in different terms. The most commonly used being bogadi. bohali. 
munywalo, iklzazi. xuma, lumal and thaka. 
92 
acknowledged that the gIVIng of property by a husband to his wife's family was an 
important and much practised custom among the Afiican people. As noted above, 
colonial administrators frowned upon the practice seeing it as the sale and trade of a 
woman. Feminists who feel that such a practice only serves to subjugate women have 
adopted the same view. They argue that such a practice only serves to perpetuate the view 
of women as goods rather than as persons with rights in a society. Traditionalists, on the 
other hand, argue that such a practice worked as a symbol to bring together the two 
families, to protect wives against abuse by their husbands. I IS For the traditionalist lobolo 
was a practice to which they formed deep attachments. From a survey which was done in 
Kwa-Zulu Natal, it was concluded that 95 per cent those questioned were in favour of 
retaining lobolo. So the recommendation was that this practice ought not to be prohibited. 
However this did not mean that it was an essential requirement for a marriage. Section 3 
indicates the requirements to be as follows: 
"For a customary marriage entered into after the commencement of this Act to be valid 
(a) the prospective spouses-
(i) must both be above the age of 18 years; and 
(ii) must both consent to be married to each other under customary law; and 
(b) the marriage must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance 
with customary law." 
One of the more surprising retentions was that of polygyny. The Act in section 4(b) 
recognises the practice. Writers such as Govender, Samuel and Nkosi feel that it 
entrenches women's oppression and as the snap survey done in Empangeni reports a 
li S It is not uncommon that husbands who mistreated their wives were often penalised when returning 
Zabalo on divorce. The Report on the Act has noted in fact that some writers have gone so far as to state 
that lobalo "was the Bantu woman's Charter of liberty." Advocate J.Y. de Koker in this same document, 
expresses the view that although the original purpose of lobolo is not to humiliate, denigrate or objectify 
women, it serves to strengthen the authority of the male over his wife. 
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great percentage l 16 it would seem that it served no purpose. It is the claim of many, 
including Professor Dlamini, that if a woman (i.e. the first wife) is happy with the 
husband taking on a second wife, then they should be allowed that choice. 117 The writer 
would, however, like to state that in reality such a choice is rarely given to the woman, or 
if given is most times disregarded, this leaves women in a marriage that is often 
dissatisfying. Often African women are placed in a difficult position and forced because 
of their lack of economic empowerment and access to resources to submit to the wishes 
of the husband. The recommendation was, however, that such a ban would be almost 
impossible to enforce and that because of the practice seems to be waning, such a move 
was unnecessary. 
Section 7(6) provides that: 
"A husband in a customary marriage who wishes to enter into a further customary 
marriage with another woman after the commencement of this Act must make an 
application to the court to approve a written contract, which will regulate the future 
matrimonial property system of his marriages." . 
The effect of this is that it confers a wide discretion on the court with regard to the 
division of the assets. The court must scrutinize the proposed settlement and ensure that 
all vulnerable parties are protected with the emphasis being placed on equity. Further, the 
Act provides for a far more equitable dissolution of customary marriages. Traditionally 
customary law allows marriages to be dissolved (extra-judicially) by the spouses' 
families. This meant that women were at risk of being sidelined. Also a woman could not 
resort to repudiating the marri age in her own right, because she was a minor under the 
control of her guardian and she had to enlist the assistance of her guardian who often 
would be reluctant for fear of losing the lobolo. African women were left trapped in very 
unsatisfactory unions and often marriages that were abusive. On divorce she also 
automatically lost custody of her children as they were considered the "property" of her 
husband's family. The Act compels that any subsisting customary marriage may by 
116 80 per cent of women were against polygyny and 70 per cent of men were for it. 
117 This view is shared by many traditionalists. In an article that appeared in the Daily Dispatch on 12 
August 2003 titled "Polygamy debate fuelled by top soapie ]sidingo" the Contralesa leader chief Mwelo 
N onkonyana described polygamy as entrenched "moral value" that cannot be abandoned. 
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tenninated by a decree of the court. Only one ground of divorce is recognised - an 
irretrievable breakdown of the marriage - as in civil law. Courts granting divorces are 
given the powers they already exercise in respect of marriages contracted under the 
Marriage Act of 1961. The discretion enjoyed by the courts will allow them to take into 
account customary principles such as maintenance already paid under customary law. 
The court is now able to use its discretion to make decisions that protect the best interests 
of the children born from a traditional marriage. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the Act is monumental, however, as with the other Acts 
that concern the position of women in the realm of customary law, it is fraught with 
problems. In her article Pienaar l 18 lists them and concisely describes the problems that 
this Act is likely to face in the future. Firstly, as with most of the newly enacted Acts that 
benefit women, there is a great disparity that exists between the de jure and de facto 
situations. African women are not only among the most illiterate in the country, but very 
few of them have any access to the information about the laws that affect them. The 
above writer quotes research done by Govender, which indicates that since the inception 
of the Act the women in Transkei are still of the opinion that the Transkei Marriage Act 
applies to them. It is also true that although formal equality may be achieved and even if 
the laws on paper allow for equality in the law, it is difficult to change the mentality of 
the persons involved in reality. In their day-to-day lives oppressive customary principles 
are still practised and this cannot be prohibited merely by formally declaring them 
invalid. JJ9 The community and individual mind sets ought to be changed both among men 
(who believe in their superiority) and women, who because for years they have been 
placed as minorities, are programmed to accept this status quo. It is for this very reason 
that I would disagree with Professor Dlamini's assertion that if women choose to be in 
relationships that can be potentially harmful (for example polygamous marriages) then 
they must be allowed to exercise that choice. It is the writer's opinion that such a choice 
118 Pienaar op cit at 269-273. 
119 In an article "When custom leaves you out in the cold" in the Sunday Independent dated 08/1212002 
written by K. Margadie, she quotes the Deputy President of the Johannesburg Family Court as stating that 
African women in their bid to implement this Act were faced with so many bureaucratic hurdles. One of 
them involved problems faced in wanting to get their marriages registered. She describes the exclusion of 
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ought only to be exercised when women are fully educated about what their rights and 
duties are, and what the consequences of their actions are. So while the right to choice 
should be exercised, it ought to be an informed choice. 
Secondly,120 despite the assertion of equality for women, the Act still does not provide for 
women whose husbands die without leaving a will i.e. intestate. African wives in 
customary partnerships cannot claim, as do partners in civil unions, automatic 
qualification in terms of the Law of Succession Act of 1981. Their marriages were until 
recently governed by the law of primogeniture. 121 Although the gap between customary 
unions and civil unions has been reduced substantially, there still remain some disparities 
that impact negatively on the African woman. Section 7 sets out a detailed understanding 
of the proprietary consequences of a customary marriage and differentiates between 
marriages entered into before and after the commencement of the Act. The Act does not 
have a retroactive effect on existing property arrangements. What this means is that 
existing proprietary consequences are those of customary law and continue to place a 
negative burden on thousands of women married pre-the Act. Although there is provision 
that spouses may change the property system in their marriage under the supervision of a 
court of law, the practicalities remain that most of the African women find themselves 
without the know-how and in most African homes; such decision-making is often left to 
the husband. 122 
Although the Act faces many practical difficulties involving trying to balance traditional 
culture and modern constitutional rights, it still remains a monumental piece of 
legislation and is one of the most fundamental Acts post- 1994 to affect African women. 
customary marriages before 2000 as "the frozen status of customary law ... blamed on pussyfooting and 
deference by court officials." 
[20 Pienaar op cit at 273. 
121 This position has been changed by Bhe v The Magistrate Khavelitsha and Others 2004 (I) BCLR 27 
(C). In this case the Cape High Court ruled that the principle of primogeniture was unconstitutional. 
122 ibid. 
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3.6 AFRlCAN WOMEN AND THE RlGHT TO INHERlT - THE POST-1994 
SITUATION 
In a recent decision of Magaya v Magava,123 the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe confirmed 
a magistrate court's decision to prevent a female child from inheriting from a deceased 
father's estate. In his decision Judge Muchechetere was of the opinion that while 
customary laws of succession do discriminate on the basis of gender, in terms of 
customary law the duty to support surviving family dependants is also ancillary to 
inheritance. Zimbabwe, like South Africa, has also obligated itself in the international 
arena, to upholding gender equality. However, it was the opinion of the court that: 
"to allow women to inherit in a broadly patrilineal society would not only 'disrupt the 
African customary laws of that society' but would be tantamount to bestowing' additional 
rights' upon women." 
While the judgment in Zimbabwe is not binding, traditional leaders who are opposed to 
the system that allows women to inherit have used it to justify the principle of 
primogeniture. It is their opinion that allowing women to inherit would be disruptive to 
the customary laws that form a basis of living for most African people in this country. 
The case of Mthembu v Letsela l 24 demonstrates reluctance by the judges to develop the 
customary rules of succession. In this case which involved succession to the whole of the 
estate of a deceased person who died intestate, the respondent who was the father of the 
deceased opposed an application by the widow, who acted on behalf of the daughter to 
succeed to the estate. It was the opinion of the respondent that he as the male figure ought 
to succeed to the estate. He based this on the fact that firstly this would be the result of 
the rules of primogeniture and secondly that section 30 of the Constitution protected 
persons and gave them the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice. The 
applicant, on the other hand, sought to have the provisions of section 23 (2) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927 nullified, claiming that they were in conflict with the right 
not to be discriminated on the basis of gender. In this case Le Roux J held that even 
123 1999 ICHRL 14. 
124 1997 (2) SA 936 (T) . 
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though customary rules of succeSSlOn appear to discriminate against women, such 
discrimination was not unfair and accordingly would not violate the equality clause. 
When referred for hearing of further oral evidence, Mynhardt J I25 took the traditionalist 
approach to equality. He argued that the rules of succession were merely a perceived 
inequity and that customary law ought to be defined as moral codes unique to a 
community. He held that the courts ought to "guard against applying Western norms to a 
rule of customary law which is still adhered to and applied by many African 
people .... ,,126 Considering that the majority of the South African population are women 
and that rural African women form a large portion of this population the decision in 
Mthembu is indeed surprising and for many feminists disappointing. Nkala 127 writes that 
the duty to interpret and develop customary law in view of the changing social climate 
lies within the courts. It is his opinion (and I humbly agree) that by upholding the 
primogeniture system of customary law, the courts seemed to have failed in their duty of 
developing the customary law system, which could be viewed as oppressive, and 
infringing upon women's dignity. The Mthembu case was decided before the Recognition 
of Customary Marriages Act but as can be seen from the above expose still forms a basis 
for argument by traditionalist ofretaining the system ofprimogeniture. 128 
The rule of succession ties in closely with the capacity of women under customary law to 
acquue land. Previously legislation in South Africa restricted the right of women to 
acqUIre land and limited it to a privileged few. The legacy of apartheid meant that 
because the majority of South African were black and the majority of the black 
125 1998 (2) SA 675 (T) 
126 At 688 B. 
127 M. Nkala 1999:39. 
128 The recent case of Bhe v The Magistrate. Khavelitsha and Others 2004 (I) BCLR 27 (C) reflects COUItS' 
willingness to abolish the principle of primogeniture. The case held in the Cape High Court, sought to 
challenge the provisions of the Black Administration Act of 1927. This, after two Khayelitsha girls were 
prevented from inheriting from their fa ther because of their gender. In the application before Judge 
President John Hlophe and Judge Jerome Ngwenya, the girls sought a court order that the principle of 
primogeniture under black law and custom be interpreted and developed in line with the Constitution, 
particularly the rights to dignity and equality. Alternatively, the girls asked the court to order that 
primogeniture (the system by which the eldest son inherits everything) was unconstitutional. The judges 
concluded "We should make it clear in this j udgment that a situation whereby a male person will be 
preferred to a female person for purposes of inheritance can no longer withstand constitutional scrutiny. 
That constitutes discrimination before the law" They ordered that sections of the Black Administration Act 
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population were women, African women were the most disadvantaged. Apartheid 
policies pushed millions of black South Africans into overcrowded and impoverished 
reserves, homelands and townships. The culture of excluding females from inheriting 
land has its roots in the Black Administration Act. Regulations and proclamations denied 
women the right to acquire and hold land in their own name. Although in 1985 an 
amendment was made to the "perpetual minority" rule and thereafter allowed women to 
perform any "juristic acts" with regard to the acquisition of rights of leasehold under the 
Blacks (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, such concession were given on 
paper and hardly ever followed in practice. A further amendment in 198i 29 saw to it that 
black women living under customary law were conferred the capacity to own land, yet 
again like the earlier amendments the provisions not only never accented to the 
homelands but even within the Republic were hardly ever practiced. This discrepancy 
between the de jure and de facto abilities of women under customary law continues to 
exist despite the several legislative and constitutional measures taken by the South 
African government to ensure equality. The Black Administration Act in section 23 
regulates both testate and intestate succession. While according to the Intestate 
Succession Act 81 of 1987 at section 1(1): 
"a person (hereinafter referred to as the "deceased") dies intestate, either 
wholly or in part, and -
(a) is survived by a spouse, but not by a descendant, such spouse shall inherit 
the intestate estate;" 
Yet it goes further to note at section 1 (4) (b) that: 
"intestate estate includes any part of an estate which does not devolve by virtue of a will 
or in respect of which section 23 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act No. 38 of 
1927), does not apply" 
Because the customary law of succession is based on the Black Administration Act, what 
this means is that for African women, the laws of primogeniture applied and as a result 
women would be prevented from acquiring land. Although through this Act, a widow 
was unconstitutional and invalid, as well as the offending section of the Intestate Succession Act. The 
Constitutional Court still has to confmn the order. 
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was not permitted to benefit from intestacy, it was the duty of the heir to maintain the 
widow and to provide a residence for her. llo One of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme's lll major aims was to establish a land reform programme that recognised the 
fact that women face specific disabilities in obtaining land. As a result one of its central 
aims was to target women and to review institutions, practices and laws that discriminate 
against women. Such an endeavour would recognise that the mere abolition of Land Acts 
was not enough to redress inequities and that support services and training were 
paramount to ensure the effective utilisation of the land. This would no doubt assist in 
bridging the gap between the formal laws and the substantive equality for women. The 
Equality Act aims to see to it that there is a total abolition of the principle of 
primogeniture (inspite of the fact that there is an argument that this Act will not pass the 
test in light of the rights embodied in sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution). The 
Amendment of Customary Law Succession Billl J2 attempted to level the playing ground 
by allowing widows from customary unions the same rights as their male counterparts 
and as the other women married under civil law. III While the Communal Land Rights 
Bill of 2003 recognises equality rights of women to benefit from land and to participate 
in all decision-making processes. ll4 
The practice of denying women the right to land is not one that is particular to the South 
Afiican community. In many Afiican countries customary laws, cultural practices and 
129 Constitutional Laws Amendment Act 32 of 1987. 
130 A.M. Van Rensburg 2003 :286. 
'31 R.D.P. op cit at 21. 
"'1090fI998. 
133 Van Rensburg op cit at 292. 
134 Other legislation that moves away from a male gendered approach to a more equality based approach 
includes the Constitution Act 108 of 1996, which requires in section 25(5) that "The State must take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable 
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis." The White Paper on Land Reform referred to in 
Chapter One, illustrates the lawmakers' commitment to facilitating women in the acquisition of land. The 
Communal Property Association Act 28 of 1996 seeks to uphold the principles of justice and equality in the 
establishment of an association and recognizes that previous forms of ownership did not benefit African 
women. The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 which 
in its preamble promises "to provide for the prohibition of unlawful eviction of occupiers." The last part of 
the preamble promises a "commitment to consider the rights of households headed by women." Further 
legislation affecting women are the Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991 , the Upgrading 
of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991, the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 and the 
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. 
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traditional norms are used to justify the disinheritance of widows and invoked to override 
statutory or constitutional provisions for women that may provide them with a legal right 
to inherit. The International Human Rights Law group observes that in Nigeria, for 
example, customary law settles approximately 80 percent of land disputes at the expense 
of women ' s rights. This Human Rights group has established an international advocacy 
campaign that acknowledges the economic disadvantages faced by African women 
because of their lack of access to land and views a connection between denial of 
women's right to inherit with violence against women and extreme poverty. Its aims are 
to provide measures that allow for trans formative change. 135 One of its main areas of 
focus is the South African situation, where African women were not only affected by 
apartheid but the principle of primogeniture as well. 
3.7 THE PROMOTION OF EQUALITY AND PREVENTION OF UNFAIR 
DISCRIMINATION ACT 4 OF 2000136 
As Professor Gutto 137 points out, many parliamentarians have often described the Act as 
the "mother of all equality legislation." It commenced on 1 September 2000 and gives 
expression to the constitutional equality clause. Given the history of sexism and racism 
that formed the foundation of South Africa, it is not surprising that many would hold this 
Act in such high regard. So the Act was promulgated to: 
"give effect to section 9 read with item 23 (1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996, so as to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination and 
harassment; to promote equality and eliminate unfair discrimination; to prevent and 
prohibit hate speech; and to provide for matters connected therewith."l38 
Marius Pieterse l39 contends correctly, in my opinion, that few topics have received as 
much legal attention as the tension that exists between customary law and the 
Constitution. The Equality Act, as with other legislation, again brings to the forefront the 
135 At http ://www.hrlawgroup.org accessed on 22 September 2003. 
136 From hereon to be referred to simply as the Equality Act. 
137 Gutto op cil at 123. 
138 Equality Act 4 of 2000 long title. 
\39 M. Pieterse 2000:627. 
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disparities that exist between the two systems of law. Although the Constitution has 
acknowledged the right to ones culture, it has stressed and the courts have also reiterated 
that certain changes must occur within the realm of customary law to allow it to reflect 
the views of the new democratic order. The preamble ofthe Equality Act highlights that: 
"consolidation of democracy in our country requires the eradication of social and 
economic inequalities, especially those that are systemic in nature, which were generated 
in our history by colonialism, apartheid and patriarcby, and which brought pain and 
suffering to the great majority of our people; Although significant progress has been 
made in restructuring and transforming our society and its institutions, systemic 
inequalities and unfair di scrimination remain deeply embedded in social structures, 
practices and attitudes, undermining the aspirations of our constitutional 
democracy.,,140 
For African women this is a fundamental legislation that, in the opinion of many, is not 
only an articulation of the principles held in the Constitution. It goes further than the 
other Acts in that it is not minimalist but provides a broad scope of application that gives 
expression to both formal and substantive equality.141 Section 8 of the Act lists customary 
and social practices, which have for years formed the basis of oppression against women 
and it accordingly abolishes them. 142 The preamble emphasizes international treaty 
obligations on gender and in section 4 (2) expresses the need for elimination of gender 
inequality. It is the opinion of Pieterse that, far from giving effect to the right to practise 
one's custom, the Act as he puts it, hammers in a "final nail in the customary law 
140 My emphasis 
141 P. Maduna quoted in Gutta op cit. He notes that this Act prioritises race and gender issues giving effect 
to both de jllre and de facto equality. 
142 " ... no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground of gender, including -
(a) gender-based violence; 
(b) female genital mutilation; 
(c) the system of preventing women from inheriting family property; 
(d) any practice, including traditional, customary or religious practice, which impairs the dignity 
of women and undermines equality between women and men, including the undermining of 
the dignity and well-being of the girl child; 
( e) any policy or conduct that unfairly limits access of women to land rights, finance, and other 
resources . ... " 
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coffin,,143, and instead only succeeds in totally eliminating customary law and placing its 
practise as inferior. Section 8(d), which prohibits "any practice which impairs the dignity 
of women and undermines equality between women and men" can be seen as a sweeping 
clause that could be used to justify the abolition of several customary practices 
entrenched in African traditions. These would include the payment of lobolo, polygamy 
and primogeniture. Although the case of Mthembu v Letsela 144 guards against the total 
abolition of the system of primogeniture and reflects a tolerance for the indigenous laws 
of succession, the Equality Act manages to ensure the total eradication of this practice. So 
while the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act allows for the practice of polygamy, 
the Equality Act unambiguously calls for the eradication of patriarchy and orders that the 
judiciary follows this by holding that polygamy discriminates against women. Section 
8(C) appears to deal with the lacunae that are left by the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act and states "no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the 
ground of gender, including the system of preventing women from inheriting family 
property." Pieterse145 is of the view that by banning customs that govern African 
succession the Act has managed to abolish practices that are inherent to customary law. 
He describes the systematic elimination of customary law in the Act as reeking of Euro-
centrism and as placing customary law in an inferior position, a practice that in his 
opinion reflects what the previous political regime was trying to achieve: 
"The fight for equality is not simply a process of progressive Westernization. African 
institutions, like their Western counterparts, can be progressively transformed in 
accordance with the principle of equality. The notion that people must be treated with 
equal concern and respect is both a precondition and a consequence of democracy. And 
democracy is the political form that South Africans have overwhelmingly chosen.,,146 
While the writer is in total agreement that it is very unfortunate that customary law and 
the principles that govern traditional indigenous people seem to be slowly eroded by the 
Act, there is, however no denying that the customary law of succession though based on 
the commendable family structures that govern Africans are blatantly discriminatory 
143 Pieterse IDe cit. 
144 1998(2) SA 675 (T) discussed in detail below. 
14S Pieterse op cil at 635. 
146 ibid. 
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against women. It is also fundamental that South Africans look to the Constitution that 
they have pledged allegiance to. The Constitution of South Africa147 promises a state 
founded on principles of "non-sexism". The Equality Act does nothing more than adhere 
to these founding values. 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
While the Constitution and other legislation have played an integral role in the 
advancement of women's rights, legislation has no effect if the issues concerning women 
are not dealt with at grass root level. African women need to be involved in any policy 
making and policy makers are obliged to seek the advice of women before enacting any 
legislation. Until women's voices are heard in every legal, social and political arena, the 
right to equality will remain elusive and unobtainable. It is a key priority of the 
government to include women when developing policy strategies. An example of glaring 
absence of women's participation is in the economic policy and African initiative of the 
New Partnership for African Development (NEP AD), which has its foundations in South 
Africa. One of the long-term objectives of NEP AD is "to promote the role of women in 
all activities.,,148 However, analysts argue that NEPAD instead results in the 
marginalization of women. Sara Hlupekile Longwe 149 writes that gender goals are 
expressed in this policy document in a vague and lacking manner. NEP AD's main goal is 
to "enhance Africa's rapid integration into the world's economy." This interprets to serve 
the interests of market forces and does not coincide with the interests of those previously 
disadvantaged. The result is the social and economic exclusion of African woman and the 
further entrenching of patriarchal patterns in policy making150 It is the view of the 
present writer that the government needs to go beyond the mere paying of lip service 
147 Act 108 of 1998. 
148 Paragraph 67 
149 Referred to by B. Muritala "African NGO's Battle over NEPAD as Forum Unfolds" reported on 16 
October 2002 in the Daily Dispatch at 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/soceconlinitiativeI200211 0 16nepad.htm accessed on 4 October 2003. 
1>0 "NEPAD, Gender and the Poverty Gap" at www.web.neticcartJdebtsap/nepadgender.htm accessed on 4 
October 2003. 
104 
I 
" 
when it comes to ensuring gender equity. The law and policies must be equitable and 
gender-sensitive and ought to ensure economic and social justice. 
105 
CHAPTER FOUR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION - SOUTH AFRICA AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS 
Equality and non-discrimination have been the cornerstone principles of the United 
Nations since the inception of the Charter in 1945 and more particularly since the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Ironically, it is in the same year that apartheid 
became "accepted" political ideology in South Africa and the same year that the 
government coined the term "separate development of races." Subsequent to this, while 
the rest of the world had reaffirmed "faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person, and in the equal rights of men and women", I South 
Africa had lagged behind. Prevented from any participation in international relations 
because of its apartheid policies, the concept of gender equality seemed an unattainable 
goal. From as early as 1960, the General Assembly and the Security Council of the 
United Nations had taken a firm resolution against the system of apartheid culminating in 
resolution 418 (1977) of 4 November 1977, whereby the Security Council unanimously 
imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa under Chapter VII of the 
Charter2 It was this that marked the point where South Africa was considered an outcast 
among other nations. 
This chapter attempts to investigate the commitments made by the new South Africa and 
its participation in international relations post-1 994. By so doing it aims to illustrate that 
feminism is not Euro-centric but an international commitment to fighting discriminatory 
practices against women. Whereas the history of modem South Africa covering close to 
three and a half centuries (since 1652), has witnessed a lengthy and unmatched 
construction of a society based on racial discrimination and racism, the subordination, 
exploitation and oppression of females by males has been a feature of South Africa long 
before even European domination. For black women the racial colonisation of South 
Africa served only to deepen their subordination and oppression3 This has often been 
I L. Van Zyl 1996: 257. 
2 A. Sachs 1990:39. 
3 S.B.O. Gutta 2001:152. 
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aptly described as a double-edged sword that managed to inflict unheralded stab wounds 
to the African woman. While it is conceded that the cause for women's rights is a global 
phenomenon and that women's experiences cut across racial groups, in South Africa the 
issue was compounded by statutory provisions which impacted negatively on African 
women in particular. Further, social and economic restrictions resulted in African women 
being trapped in a web of inferiority. In this chapter the writer will demonstrate that the 
struggle for equality is not merely a reflection of Western culture, but a global issue 
which transcends racial and cultural barriers. By acknowledging first that women operate 
in different contexts, South African feminists ought to look beyond their contexts and 
seek answers from the West. An essentialist's view of African culture would regard 
women's rights as alien yet in spite of working within differing cultural paradigms, it is 
the firm opinion of the writer that the oppression of women and the need for protection of 
women's rights is a universal struggle. The answer, writes Alice Mogwe,4 lies in 
recognising that despite the differences that may exist between African and Western 
women, patriarchy is the common enemy for both. Mogwe writes that: 
"Patriarchy, or a system of male domination is manifested in the control of women 
through culture, racism, class domination e.t.c. While the significance of the specific 
cultural context should not be overlooked, patriarchy as a concept, cannot be excluded 
,,5 
The pledge made by South Africa not only in the Constitution, but also to the 
international community is proof of the government's commitment to gender equity. 
Non-racialism and non-sexism are among the core constitutional values that run through 
the veins of not only the Bill of Rights but also the Constitution as a whole6 This same 
document has not only ensured equalit/ but has gone further to create bulwarks that 
make certain that South Africa is bound to International Conventions, which protect 
women. South Africa has ratified and continues to ratify many international human rights 
instruments that serve to guarantee equality and non-discrimination. Binding themselves 
4 A. Megwe "Patriarchy and the New Law: The marginalisation of Women" in Jagwanth, Schwikkard and 
Grant (eds) Women under the Criminal Justice System, 1994:4. 
, ibid. 
• Gutte op cit at 152. 
7 Section 9 (1). 
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to these treaties is a pledge by the South African government to observe and implement 
within their domestic policies promises made to prioritise gender equality. 
4.2 CULTURAL RELATIVISM VS UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
The concept of non-discrimination, or rather equality of treatment, occupies a prominent 
position in human rights discourse. It has taken centre-stage in the human rights agenda 
both nationally and internationally. This is an acknowledgement of the importance of this 
principle in human rights debate. Moreover, it is an indication that the complexity of non-
discrimination and equality of treatment requires special attention. The argument remains 
among many anti-feminist that the concept of women's rights as human rights is one 
relative and only applicable to Western ideology. This is based on the premise that 
"values are culture-bound and that there cannot be such a thing as universal human 
rights."s Perhaps the best illustration of this clash between culture and what are 
considered "universal human rights" is found in the case of Attorney General or 
Botswana v Unity Dow 9 The principles decided on in this case are an illustration of how 
the court dealt with the issue of the overlap between universal rights and cultural 
traditions. This case is not only relevant to Botswana but to the region as a whole and 
seeks to analyse the construction of discrimination clauses found in the various 
Constitutions. 
In this case· Unity Dow sued the Attorney General of Botswana challenging the 
Citizenship Act of Botswana, which stated that: 
"A person born in Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by birth and descent if, at the 
time of his birth - Ca) his father was a citizen of Botswana or Cb) in the case of a person 
born out of wedlock, his mother was a citizen of Botswana." 
In terms of this law, it appeared as though the youngest of her two children was not a 
citizen of Botswana because her father was not a citizen of Botswana. Unity Dow applied 
8 R. Gaete 1999:197. 
, 1992B.L.R 119. 
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for an order declaring that section 4 of the Citizenship Act was ultra vires the 
Constitution of Botswana since it violated her fundamental rights to pass her citizenship 
to her children. In particular, the said provision discriminated against her in that unlike 
male citizens of Botswana married to foreigners, she could not pass her citizenship to her 
children. The argument by the applicant was that the distinction between the sexes was in 
direct violation of the Constitution of Botswana, which guarantees all persons equal 
protection of the law. Commenting on the reaction of the public to this case, Ann-
Belinda S. Preis 10 writes that goverrunent ministers "vehemently attacked the decision as 
an unacceptable affront to Tswana culture." The reason for this was that many of them 
regarded gender equality as alien to African culture. Van Blerkll quotes Rebecca Cook,12 
a professor at the University of Toronto and founder of the International Women's Rights 
Watch as saying: 
"This was a significant victory because the President of the court, Judge Arnissah said 
that custom could not be used to justify discrimination against women and domestic law 
could not be used to avoid a country's International human rights obligations." 
4.2.1 CULTURAL RELATIVISM 
Steiner et al writes that: 
"Cultural relativism is the position that all points of view are equally valid and that all 
truth is relative to the individual and his or her environment. All ethical, religious, 
political and aesthetic beliefs are truths that are relative to the cultural identity of the 
individual. Relativism can include moral relativism (ethics are relative to the social 
construct), situational relativism (right and wrong depend on the particular situation), and 
cognitive relativism (truth is relative and has no objective standard)."!) 
The advocates of cultural relativism claim that rights and rules about morality are 
encoded in and thus depend on cultural context; hence the notions of right (and wrong) 
and moral rules necessarily differ throughout the world because cultures in which they 
10 U. Dow in her contribution to Putting Women on the Agenda edited by S.Bazilli 1991:260. 
" A.E. Van Blerk 1996: 190. 
12 See Rights: A Lawyers for Human Rights Publication 1993:24. 
13 R.J. Steiner and P. Alston 1996: 192. 
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inhere themselves differ. 14 Dlamini and Mqekel5 argue that not all the institutions of 
customary law are in conflict with the current notions of human rights: 
"Between the two poles of cultural and human rights there is a continuum suggesting that 
"a weak cultural relativism" is feasible. In other words, not all the norms currently 
grouped under the role of human rights are so fundamental that they must be applied to 
South Africa. Nor should all the norms of the current version of customary law be 
recognised. This would suggest that a less intransigent approach be ado~ted, and 
available techniques of the existing system be used to ameliorate the situation." 6 
So, while the human rights advocate sees such international instruments as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as landmark, to the relativist these instruments are nothing 
more than a show of the "arrogance or cultural imperialism of the West.,,1 7 Moreover, 
such "universalism of norms" in the opinion of many relativists serves to destroy the 
diversity of cultures and amounts to "homogenisation of the modern world."IB It is no 
exaggeration to state that this same view has been the basis for the argument held by 
many anti-feminists and those who do not advocate for equality and non-discrimination. 
During an inquiry into initiation practices at academic institutions and a subsequent 
preliminary inquiry into cultural initiations, traditional leaders claimed that the Human 
Rights Commission did not understand their culture. This assertion was a response to 
discussions involving customary practices lobolo negotiations, the thwala (or abduction 
practices), and the customary principle of (male) primogeniture practices. 19 According to 
Ruth Meena,20 culture has been used by African male scholars and particularly those who 
have taken a nationalistic perspective as an excuse to conceal existing gender relations 
14 ibid. 
15 South African Law Commission "Final Report on Group and Human Rights" 1994:204 quoting R.B. 
Mqeke who argues that the customary law of delict is not incompatible with the doctrine of the Bill of 
Rights. C.R.M. Dlamini argues that as human beings, all people should be treated with respect and dignity, 
but all people are not equal. 
16 R.J. Steiner and P. Alston op cit at 192. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 L. Wessels Pretoria News 12 November 2002. 
20 R. Meena "Gender Research! Studies in Southern Africa: An Overview" in Meena (ed) Gender in 
Southem A/i-ica: Conceptions and Theoretical Issues, 1992: 9. 
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and legitimise the perpetuation of these oppressIve relations. Professor Bennett21 
summarises the conflict between customary law and human rights as follows: 
i) Human Rights emphasise the individual while customary law emphasises the 
group or community. 
ii) Customary law stresses duties while human rights naturally stress rights. 
iii) Customary law is imbued with the principle of patriarchy, which means that 
any freedoms of thought, speech, movement or association are qualified by 
the respect due to all senior men. 
The period of decolonisation for many African nations spanned a couple of decades. 
Although there were some movements geared towards promoting equality for men and 
women, among South African women during the 80's and 90's (particularly 80's) the 
status of women was hardly criticised and was held as being under the jurisdiction of 
culture. The question of the legal disabilities of African women occupied the backseat as 
more attention was given to the fight against repressive racial laws: 
"Debates on human rights are determined to a great extent by two contradictory 
paradigms; on the one hand, the Western pressure on the "third world" to adopt human 
rights standards as they have developed during the last three centuries in the West; and, 
as a response, the claim by the "third world" that the concept of human rights and of the 
individualism underpinning them is alien to their culture. ,,22 
A great criticism of human rights is that it is largely a Western creation based on the 
European tradition that individuals are separable from society. Because cultural practices 
and traditions by their very nature thrive in social settings, such a notion as presented 
above would arguably be in complete contradiction to those societies that are collectivist 
or comrnunitarian in nature. The view held by the latter would, therefore, be that 
individuals are "indivisible elements of the society.,,23 
21 T. W.Bennett 1991:18 at23. 
22 Gaete op cit at 193. 
23 Heard 2001: 1. 
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As noted above, the rhetoric of "culture" has become one that is so socially and 
politically accepted in most realms it has become a justification for the oppression of 
women and more so for African women. Culture is seen as standing in opposition to 
rights, hence the common reference of Rights versus Culture.24 Phillip Iya25 states that in 
South Africa culture has, in the past, been used negatively as a divisive tool. It is his view 
that racial segregation and fragmentation of South Africa was often justified on the basis 
of cultural differences: 
"Racial segregation and fragmentation of South Africa into separate homelands was 
justified by the understanding that the population was naturally divided into different 
(and implicitly hostile) cultures, whose competing interests could be accommodated only 
by territorial and social separation.,,26 
As Simons27 has observed colonialists sought to uphold a clear divide between Europeans 
and Africans, modelling a separate system of law - the former became common law and 
the latter customary law. Thus as Griffiths notes,28customary law was relegated to the 
African "other" and a view of culture arose that separated the African from the European. 
The result was that conceptual oppositions arose that became frames of reference for 
comprehending culture and much to the detriment of women's rights - human rights 
became Euro-centric and the idea of women being inferior to men operated largely in the 
realm of "African culture." This is not to say that such inequalities in treatment were 
exclusively felt among black women, but needless to say such divisions were more 
obvious among African women. The relationship between customary law and common 
law established boundaries between legal and social domains and the rules associated 
with them. These domains, as noted by Griffiths, exist in a hierarchical relationship, so 
that common law took precedence over social and cultural practices. What this has led to 
is that persons wishing to maintain the status quo, that is, keeping women in positions of 
inferiority, have used the argument of cultural relativism as a means to motivate political 
opportunism. Critics of feminists frequently argue that human rights and women's rights 
'4 Cowan ef a/ 2001: 4. 
" P.F. Jya 2000:228. 
'6 Jya op cit at 235. 
27 H.J. Simons 1968: it. 
28 Cowan op cit at 103. 
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are incompatible with "traditional African values". The rejection of theories of human 
rights is most often a tactic used to bolster individual groups' power and to resist any 
international denunciations of African policy. Tripp summarizes this as follows: 
" ... those who defend practices that are harmful to women in the name of preserving their 
religious, ethnic, or other cultural identity are also often seeking to protect certain 
political and/or economic interests. They have a vested interest in maintaining the status 
quo and a set of power relations that are tied to certain practices. This is not to say that 
cultural preservation and identity concerns are not real, but rather that they are often tied 
to a broader political and economic context that affects their sustainability.Cultural 
rationales are used throughout the world to protect the status quo when it comes to 
advancing women's rights.,,29 
In the submission on the draft White Paper on Traditional Leaders and Governance 
(2003), Provinces throughout South Africa were consulted on the issue of allowing 
representation and participation of women as traditional leaders, or amakosi. Their 
response was almost all unanimous, the code of conduct was such that it was accepted 
that ubukhosi was a "man thing", and that according to African culture, although it was 
acceptable for women to act on behalf of their children until they came of age, it would 
be unacceptable for women to be chiefs. The following response from Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Provincial Report30 is worth noting: 
"If then a woman [sic 1 wants to be an amakhosi they will have to be sterilised and not get 
involved (in a relationship) and they should not get married and must never get pregnant. 
There are certain times where a woman cannot be amongst men due to their menstrual 
cycle, and so for a woman in that condition to stand in front of the people which have 
men representation may be a problem as this is against Ama-Zulu culture." 
Such a response is highly surprising and seems almost antiquated in the era of the 21 st 
century, yet the submissions are unanimous in that they truly believe that the inclusion of 
women as part of representation in traditional governance is an importation from 
European way of thinking and as such alien to the African way of life. What is ironic, 
however, is that while all these provinces were most vocal against the intrusion of 
29 A.M. Tripp "The Politics of Women's Rights and Cultural Diversity in Uganda" in Molyneux and 
Razavi (eds) Gender Justice, Development and Rights, 2002:414. 
30 Submissions on Draft White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance Val 2. 
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European ways of thinking, they vehemently appeal for increment in remuneration for 
traditional leaders (iziduna), something that is truly alien to the African culture. It would 
be true to say that traditional leaders were never in the past part of government payroll. 
This inconsistent attitude towards westemisation makes the rejection of women's rights 
discourse in the name of "African values" highly suspicious. The new South African 
Constitution has done little to alleviate the criticisms given by traditionalists. Based on 
concept of "individual liberty" this document also finds itself under intensive attack from 
those who feel that customary law ought to be separated from any constitutional scrutiny. 
In his 2002 Progress Report on customary law and the 1996 Constitution, Lyov Hassim 
writes: 
"Constitutional supremacy has substituted for white supremacy and it is my opinion that 
in an ironic twist of fate, Customary Law while recognised and dignified by the 
Constitution retains a status no different from that which it enjoyed under apartheid but · 
also has the added threat of the Bill of Rights which is grounded on a particular 
conception of individual liberty." 
It is his opinion that subjecting customary law to the Constitution is merely placing it in a 
subordinate position and the recognition of customary law may just be the state's way of 
paying lip-service to the traditional authorities. He further comments that to apply 
customary law only where it is in tune with the principles of public policy and natural 
justice, is tantamount to reverting to the "repugnancy clause" of the previous apartheid 
era. Proponents of human rights as discussed below dispute such a view. 
4.2.2 UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
As shown above more often than not the debate on universalism and relativism is 
presented and debated in such a manner that one ought to embrace either one or the other, 
but seldom ever both. The emergence of an ever-growing body of human rights 
agreements has been used as justification for the high moral ground occupied by human 
rights. As Andrew Heard31 observes, because of this, political activists, commentators 
:;1 Heard op cit at 1. 
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and many feminists are content to see this state as acceptance that internationally 
recognised rights are universal and inalienable. The Vienna Final Act thus declares: 
"All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The 
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on 
the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and 
regional peculiarities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be 
borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural 
systems, to promote and protect all human rights.,,)2 
It is the opinion of the writer that such a view of human rights is flawed and as will be 
discussed further down as simplistic. The concept of universalism has its roots in the 18th 
Century French Enlightenment Period. Western philosophers put forward the idea that 
there exists what is known as 'natural law'. This postulates that there is an absolute 
source oflaw (be it God, nature or the universe), they posit immutable and eternally valid 
principles that govern and guide mankind3JCicero notes (as quoted by DembourJ4) : 
"one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and for all times .... " 
John Locke developed this theory that there existed innate, inalienable human rights. It 
was reason that taught men that there were equal and that they possessed natural liberties. 
It was not up to man to relinquish principles of equality and liberty. Such ways of 
thinking were reiterated by men such as Rousseau and later Charles Louis Montesquieu. 
Modem manifestations of a belief in natural law include the concept of universal human 
rights . The problem with such a view is that it assumes that everyone comes to the same 
conclusion as to what is universally accepted "principles of law". The adherents of 
universality claim that international human rights like equal protection or physical 
security or free speech are and must be the same everywhere. DembourJS suggests, 
however, that human rights do not exist outside the specific political and social history 
from which they have evolved, so while the 1948 United Nations Declaration of human 
32 H.J. Steiner and P. Alston op cil at 196. 
33 Cowan op cil at 57. 
34 Dembour referred to with approval by J. Khumalo 1998:16. 
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rights seemed to posit universally accepted concepts, especially in light World War Two, 
these same concepts were specific to the political and social atmosphere of the times. 
Cultural relativism, on the other hand, can be viewed as indifference and resistance to 
change, yet it would be just as equally justifiable to look upon universalism as an 
arrogant way of thinking. Dembour36 describes it succinctly as "undue assumption of 
knowledge." The attraction of human rights is that they are often thought to exist beyond 
the determination of specific societies. Tripp suggests, however, that when seeking for 
gender equity, Western feminists do not necessarily "earn the right to speak out against 
injustice. ,,37 She suggests that feminists ought to acknowledge that patriarchy and gender 
inequality exists in both Western countries and African countries. The recommended way 
forward is to avoid dichotomising rights into cultural versus international but instead to 
seek common solutions to the dilemma of gender inequality: 
"There needs to be a shift from thinking about the "liberal West versus the rest" to seeing 
the commonality of our problems and solutions, and our common humanity.,,38 
On the one hand, South Africa finds itself striving to preserve its Constitutional 
commitment to respect culture and cultural practices, and on the other, acknowledging 
the existence and influence of foreign and international conventions that shape the 
international world, of which South Africa is now actively a part. It is the opinion of the 
writer that both can be achieved without prejudice to another. What must be remembered 
is that South Africa is not an island but part of an international community. By respecting 
the customs and traditions that are essential and positive and at the same time looking to 
the outside for guidance, we achieve a society that is unlikely to make the grave mistakes 
it made in the past. 
35 ibid. 
36 ibid. 
37 Tripp op cit at 415. 
38 Tripp op cit at 417. 
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4.3 MEETING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 
In March 1993 the Constitutional negotiations began in earnest in the fonn of the Multi-
Party Negotiating Process. With much resistance from several traditional leadership 
groups, consensus was reached which allowed representation by women in the 
negotiation process. The result of such negotiations became part of what is known as the 
1993 Interim Constitution. This new Constitution seeks inter alia, to promote "equal 
protection and benefit before the law,,39 as well as to giving due consideration to 
International law when interpreting the Bill of Rights 4 0 
It is clear that between 1975-1985, commonly tenned the United Nations "Decade for 
Women", the issues pertinent to women were for the first time forged into the 
international arena. The chant of the time was encompassed in the phrase "women' s 
rights are human rightS.,,4] According to Van Zyl,42 not only were issues of equality and 
non- discrimination the forte of the United Nations, but several organisations began to 
realise that the fight for women's rights and more particularly equality between men and 
women, could be included in the realm of international human rights. The issues 
pertaining to women could no longer be confined to the jurisdiction of nations but were 
extended to include international involvement. While in the process of establishing a 
democratic government, South Africa saw itself caught in this whirlwind of change. In 
1993 the government signed four international human rights conventions and one 
important regional Convention relating to women. These Conventions were an indication 
of the commitment by the South African government to ensuring equality. 
4.3.1 CONVENTION ON THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN 
The Convention was signed by South Africa on the 29 January 1993. However, this 
instrument was only ratified in 1996. The Convention was created on the 31 March 1953 
39 Section 9 (1) of Act 108 of 1996. 
40 Section 39 (J ) (b). 
41 Van ZyJ op cit at 266. 
42 ibid. 
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but only came into force in 1954. Its main aims are to implement the principle of equality 
of rights for men and women contained in the Charter of the United Nations. Its 
objectives are summed as follows: 
"Recognising that everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, 
directly or indirectly through freely chosen representatives, and has the right to equal 
access to public service in his country, and desiring to equalize the status of men and 
women in the enjoyment and exercise of political rights, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. ,,43 
This Convention is in line with the African National Congress' Women's League aim to 
mobilise and organise South African women and to encourage their participation in the 
public sector, taking into account their involvement in the struggle against apartheid. The 
Convention is of particular interest to African women, because of their often-
unacknowledged involvement in the political struggles against racial inequalities. 
4.3.2 CONVENTION ON CONSENT TO MARRIAGE, MINIMUM AGE FOR 
MARRIAGE AND REGISTRATION OF MARRIAGES 
South Africa acceded to the Convention on 29 January 1993. Again this Convention has 
its roots in the Charter of the United Nations and it reaffinns commitment to non-
discrimination on the basis of gender/sex. It states: 
"Recalling that article 16 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion. 
have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to 
marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending 
spouses, 
Recalling further that the General Assembly of the United Nations declared, by resolution 
843 (IX) of 17 December 1954, that certain customs, ancient laws and practices relating 
to marriage and the family were inconsistent with the principles set forth in the Charter of 
43 At http://www/.umn.edulhumanrtslinstree/Ol ccmaLhtmaccessedon 16 July 2003. 
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the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Further that all be 
registered in an appropriate official register by the competent authority.,,44 
There is no doubt that the language in this Convention could be in contradiction to 
traditional customary principles. While the South Africa government has committed itself 
to providing a minimum age for marriage, and to ensuring that consent be given by 
parties to a marriage such a provision is alien to customary law. In the August 1998 
Report on the Recognition of Customary Marriages, it is recorded that in modem legal 
systems, the requirement for determining marriage is derived from the individual's 
freedom to decide when and whom to marry. This principle has its origin in the 
eighteenth-century Europe and was introduced in to Africa through colonialism. Under 
pre-colonial customary law, marriage was an agreement between kin groups rather than 
individuals, where consent between the spouses was not necessary. It was not uncommon 
for brides to be promised to a family even before their birth, and was sororal polygamy 
that is where a girl could take the place of an older sister where she dies. This is not to 
say that they were considered as forced marriages, just that marriage was not a unilateral 
consent of the parties involved. Simons notes that though consent was relevant, women 
were still expected to be obedient and to be compliant to the agreement made by the 
families involved45 Although at the recommendation of the above-mentioned report it 
was also suggested that customary marriages should be registered, it is not untrue to say 
that despite effort by traditional authorities, many such marriages exist without 
registration. The rule that unregistered unions would be held as void could work great 
hardship for the spouses and more especially for women who are more often than not the 
powerless and least informed victims of such unions. Similar hardships are encountered 
were the minimum age requirement is involved. Although the Convention does not state 
categorically what this age should be, it is true that in terms of traditional customs, the 
main purpose of marrying was to bear children and therefore in most cases the minimum 
requirement was that the couple be over the age of puberty. Such an approach led to and 
in many cases still leads to an unscrupulous guardian manipulating and taking advantage 
44 ibid. 
45 Simons op cit at 328-9. 
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of a child often to their detriment. Until the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 
of 1998, such a stance was to the disadvantage of African women, who as a result 
remained perpetual minors even in the marriage. 
4.3.3 CONVENTION ON THE NATIONALITY OF MARRIED WOMEN 
The objects of the Convention are to recognise that conflict in law and practice with 
reference to nationality arises as a result of provisions concerning the loss and acquisition 
of nationality by women as a result of marriage, of its dissolution, or of the change of 
nationality of the husband during marriage, and to promote universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
sex.
46 South Africa became a signatory to the Convention on 29 January 1993. One of the 
purposes of the United Nations47 is to promote and encourage universal respect for and 
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion. Married women have not always enjoyed the same 
protection as to loss, and acquisition of nationality than their husbands. As there is no 
justification for discrimination on the basis of gender, the Convention was adopted to 
promote gender equality. Section 9(1) of the Constitution enshrines the equality of all 
persons and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. In terms of this section no 
person or the state may unfairly discriminate against anyone on the grounds of, inter alia, 
gender or sex. Discrimination of women on the basis of their sex has been a reality in 
. many spheres of society. There is a striking similarity between the provisions of the 
Convention and section 9 of the Constitution, in terms of which the State is prohibited 
from unfairly discriminating directly or indirectly against anyone, on the basis of inter 
alia, sex or gender. Women, on an equal basis with men are therefore now 
constitutionally protected against unfair discrimination. The Commission on gender 
equality as set up in Section 187(1) is an important watchdog in this regard. 
" At www.unesco.org/human rights/wae.htm accessed on 16 July 2003 . 
47 ibid. 
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4.3.4 SADC48 DECLARATION ON THE PREVENTION AND ERADICATION 
OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
South Amca signed the SADC Declaration on Gender and Development at a summit in 
Malawi on the 8th of September 1997, committing the country to take urgent measures to 
prevent and deal with the escalating level of violence against women and children49 
Reaffirming the above commitment, an Addendum to the 1997 SADC Declaration on 
Gender and Development on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence Against Women 
and Children was drawn up and signed in 1998. For South Africa this was a follow up to 
its domestic Prevention of Family Violence Act 133 of 1993. The above declaration 
sought to acknowledge that violence against women is a reflection of the unequal 
relationship of power that exists between men and women. This same sentiment was also 
expressed at the Beijing Conference on Women, which reiterated the need to put 
women's issues in the forefront in the public realm50 For the first time, just as feminist 
jurisprudence had asked how women experienced the law, so too did the key players at 
this conference. Seven countries in the SADC region identified the need for the 
elimination of violence against women. These included Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Amca and Swaziland. The Convention sought to prevent 
"any act of gender-based violence that results in physical, sexual or psychological harm 
and suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion, or arbitrary deprivation 
of liberty in the public or in private."Sl Strategies to prevent gender violence have been 
set up in Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Tribunals have been set up in 
these countries to sensitise the public and policy makers and law enforcement agents 
about the adverse effects of domestic violence on the advancement of women. 
48 Southern African Development Community from hereon referred to as SADC. 
49 South Africa is also a signatory to The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which calls upon 
States to ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the 
rights of women ... as stipulated in international declarations and conventions .(Article 18 (3)). 
50 At http ://www.sadcreview.comlaccessed on 28 July 2003. 
" At www.sardc.netlwidsaa/sgml1999/sgm ch6 accessed on 28 July 2003. 
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4.3.5 BEIJING PLATFORM FOR ACTION 
South Africa participated fully in another United Nations initiative in Beijing, in 
September 1995. It addressed as one of the critical areas of concern the need for the 
advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men as a 
matter of human rights and a condition for social justice. The Beijing conference was a 
follow up to the Nairobi Forward·looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women, 
where it had been decided that there was a need for women's active participation in all 
spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in economic, social, 
cultural and political decision-making 5 2 Governments' concerned where encouraged to 
take active participation in order to advance and empower women. Under the Ministry of 
Justice, specific commitments in regard to the implementation of the Beijing Platform for 
Action included the need to combat discrimination and inequality, and the recognition of 
customary and religious marriages53 
4.3.6 CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW) 
CEDA W is perhaps one of the more important Conventions on women signed by the 
South African Government. Again a by product of the United Nations Charter and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this Convention sought to reaffirm the 
fundamental principles of Equality and non-discrimination. According to Van Zyl54 
although the Convention was by far the most significant of all international instruments 
pertaining to women, it was not the first international mandate to concern itself with such 
issues. It is by far one of the most comprehensive Conventions on women's rights and 
focuses on the institutions, systems and ideologies within a society that deny women 
rights. It also recognises the role of culture and stereotyping in the gendering of society 
and encourages the inclusion of equality into several spheres of women's lives including 
52 Fourth World Conference on Women Platform for Action mission statement at 
www.un.orglwomenwatchldowfbeijinglplatformlplatl.htm accessed on 26 September 2003. 
53 ibid. 
" Van Zyl op cit at 258. 
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the law, family life, culture and religion 55 It had been preceded by the Commission on 
the Status of Women created in 1947, which had unfortunately been fraught with 
technical problems. The author makes the following observations on CEDA W: 
"The essence of the obligations of parties to the Women's Convention is to be found in 
article 2, which provides: 'State parties condemn discrimination against women in all its 
forms, (and) agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating discrimination against women' In terms of various other articles of this 
convention, state parties undertake inter alia to address discrimination in the political, 
social, economic and cultural fields, and in customary and other practices .... " ,6 
The Convention has increasingly been recognised as one of the guiding principles in the 
formation of new legislation in South Africa. It is cited explicitly in two of South Africa's 
most important legislation of women namely the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination ActS7 and the Domestic Violence Act5 8 The relevant preambles 
read as follows: 
"South Africa also has international obligations under binding treaties and customary 
international law in the field of human rights, which promote equality and prohibit unfair 
discrimination. Among these obligations are those specified in the Convention of All 
forms of Discrimination against women . .. . " (Act 4 of 2000) 
"And having regard to .. . the international commitments and obligations of the State 
towards ending violence against women and children, including obligations under the 
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against 
Women . ... " (Act 116 of1998) 
Not only has the Convention been clearly recognised in legislature, but has also been 
acknowledged and applied in recent court judgements 59 It is clear from the wording of 
the Convention that a positive obligation is placed on the state parties to ensure that all 
forms of discrimination against women are eradicated, be it in the public or private realm, 
or were custom and cultural practice is concerned. 
55 K. Menell and M . Jobson 1995:4. 
56 ibid. My emphasis 
57 Act 4 of 2000. 
58 Act 116 of 1998. 
59 In S v Bulovi 2000 (I) BCLR 86 (CC) 94 E- 95B, the Constitutional Court emphasised the obligations 
incurred under the Women's Convention. 
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4.4 CONCLUSION: EFFECT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S RATIFICATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS6o 
What does signing all these International treaties/Conventions mean for South African 
women? It should be questioned whether such commitments could be viewed with the 
same disdain that theories of feminist jurisprudence are viewed. Is it a Euro-centric 
approach to African women to involve the international community as a watchdog? In 
terms of the Convention (CEDA W), the South African government has undertaken to: 
" ... take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of 
men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary 
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of 
either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.,,61 
An example of the weakness of such Conventions lies in the fact that they provide only 
mere moral pressure on the signatories involved. The Constitution of South Africa states 
in no uncertain terms that international law is to playa greater role in the new South 
African legal order, especially in the area of human rights law. Although the Constitution 
of South Africa enjoins the government to consider public international law when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, it is also true to word that such instruments at most times 
impose obligations to State parties and not to the individuals involved62 What this means 
is that while State parties can lodge complaints against other State parties, the same 
cannot be done by individuals. Secondly, it is equally true to note that while it may seem 
that these conventions succeed in ensuring formal equality, they fail in taking into 
account actual social and economic conditions of the groups and individuals63 These 
Conventions may succeed in benefiting the minority population of women, but they fail 
to take into account that 50 percent of the black rural population of women are illiterate 
and are most often unaware of the rights they may possess and of the obligation placed on 
their government to ensure equality and equal opportunity. 
60 All the Conventions concerning women to which South Africa bas been a signatory. 
6J CEDA W should always be contrasted with the African Charter on Human and People's Rights to which 
South Africa is a signatory. The charter calls on State parties to promote positive cultural practices. 
62 Van Zyl op cit 263. 
63 J. De Waal etaI2000:184. 
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Further, while the government's ratification of the Conventions without reservation is in 
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, such confinnation could be regarded 
as being in conflict with the traditional principles of customary law. The acceptance of 
such provisions lies not in the theoretical commitments made by heads of state, but in the 
actual acceptance and change by the persons whose right is being protected. It is ironic to 
note that while many feminists have criticised such conventions as being "masculine" in 
their approach, African jurists express the view that they are too Euro-centric. Before 
South Africa can claim to adhere to international human rights, it is essential that it bring 
about refonn in the customary law system. Although much has been done to enact laws 
that transfonn customary practices, discriminatory sti 11 exist as will be shown in the next 
Chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION - REDRESSING GENDER INEQUITY: THE ROLE OF 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN FEMINIST 
Throughout the thesis the writer has endeavoured to present feminism as a global 
phenomenon, contending that feminists ought to look towards alliance building as 
opposed to setting limits to what theories are applicable to different contexts. While 
acknowledging that race and culture play an integral role in defining African women, 
it is the opinion of the writer that feminists must not lose sight of the universality of 
women's oppression. As defined in an earlier chapter, the feminist movement's first 
aim is the support of women's equal rights and the struggle against patriarchy and 
male domination. According to Parvin Paider! the feminist movement is so 
substantially diverse in its theories as to accommodate all women, yet this final 
chapter is a move away from an "academic debate" to one that focuses more on the 
reality of the rights of the African women. The writer contends that by illustrating the 
weaknesses that still exist in South Africa, despite legislation and policies to the 
contrary, African feminists can refocus their energies to what is of importance, 
ensuring that the rights that are enshrined in the South African Constitution become a 
reality. 
The following was research done in the Grahamstown area. The writer's main aim 
was to investigate whether African women in the townships of Grahamstown were 
aware of their legal rights both within the Constitution and in the new legislation 
dealing with equality2 The assumption has been that while the new government has 
done a great deal to ensure that African women's rights are upheld, much of this effort 
has resulted only in "paper law", that is formal equality without the substantive effect. 
The writer was hoping to collect some data on this issue. The research is merely an 
exploratory one, and is not an accurate reflection of the opinions or views of the 
majority of black women in South Africa. Due to time restraints the investigation 
could not be extended to rural women. The aim was not to produce large-scale 
statistics but was merely to get an indication of how the black women 111 
I P. Paider "Encounters between Feminism, Democracy and Reformism in Contemporary Iran" in 
Molyneux and Razavi (eds) Gender Justice, Development and Rights, 2002:240. 
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Grahamstown perceive their legal rights in the new democratic era. Because the work 
is primarily on customary laws, the assumption made by the writer was that the 
majority of those persons, who practised customary law or are married by customary 
traditions, are black. The statistics are based only on those women interviewed. These 
women were chosen randomly. The researcher went into the Joza Township in 
Grahamstown and randomly selected women, based on their willingness to be 
interviewed and on convenience. The researcher also received permission to sit in the 
Department of Home Affairs where a great number of black women registering their 
marriages or were there for other purposes, would be located. Lastly, the writer 
approached randomly selected black women working in the kitchens and residences 
of Rhodes University. The main reason for choosing the Grahamstown location was 
firstly because much of it is peri-urban, not rural, but not truly urbanised. Secondly, 
with information received from the Legal Aid Clinic, it was discovered that 
Grahamstown has one of the greatest concentration of legal resource centres per 
capita. It can be argued that if anyone ought to know about legal rights, it would be 
the women in Grahamstown. There are among others, the Legal Aid Clinic which 
houses the Domestic Violence Unit, the Centre for Social Development which works 
closely with the Ikwhezi Women's Development Forum that seeks to disseminate 
information about the rights of women, the MTN Crime Prevention Centre housed at 
Rhodes University and dealing with gender violence as well as F AMSA and the High 
Court of Grahamstown. The question remained whether despite all this African 
women knew about the rights they possessed and if they applied them in their day-to 
day-lives. Or whether patriarchal traditions were so inculcated that laws guaranteeing 
equal rights had no impact in the society. The focus of research surrounds two main 
laws, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and the Domestic Violence Act, 
chosen specifically for their significance to African women. 
5.2 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The research was conducted through structured interviews and participants were 
chosen randomly. Because the greater numbers of participants were Xhosa speaking, 
an interpreter who had a working knowledge of the law was used. It should be 
2 Including as discussed in previous chapters, the rights enshrined in Chapter 2 of the Consti tution of 
South Africa, the Equality Act 40[2000 and the Recognition of Customary Mamages Act 120 of 
1998. 
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mentioned here that the writer has a surface understanding of Xhosa and so much of 
what the participants said was well understood by the researcher. The research is both 
qualitative and quantitative in nature. Firstly, it aims to see how many women are 
aware of the laws that protect their rights; secondly, to provide a detailed description 
seeking to present the reality through the eyes of the participants. 
Qualitative research is based upon the search for detailed description, seeking to 
represent reality through the eyes of participants and to be sensitive to the 
complexities of behaviour and meaning in context. What this inevitably amounts to is 
a research approach that stresses the importance of capturing subjectivity and 
construction of knowledge via a relationship between the researcher and participant.3 
It is a non-statistical means of analysing and interpreting data that is collected through 
interviews and document analysis.4 Quantitative research, on the other hand, is 
expressible in terms of quantity. It is a procedure that relies "principally on the use of 
quantitative data" and then is subsequently contrasted with qualitative analysis 5 
According to Schwadt,6 both research methodologies can be used simultaneously to 
produce accurate research. It is the intention of the writer to use both the methods so 
as to provide a comprehensive reflection of the impact that the Constitution and 
equality legislation as referred to above, have on women's day-to-day lives. 
43 women were interviewed over a period of about 37 days. The results were varied 
but a few trends could be interpreted from these results. Of the 43 women, all were 
aware of the Constitution and the fact that as women they had rights. All of them 
placed much emphasis on their rights in terms of race relations. One 44 year old street 
vendor stated her views as follows : "We are now allowed to work and sell our wares 
in the street without fear of being chased away by the white man." 17 women only 
were aware of their rights as women, all of them citing that in the new Constitutional 
order men are no longer allowed to beat their wives without facing criminal sanctions. 
It seemed like most of the women that were confident about their rights were the 
young women, that is, those less than 30 years old who had some level of formal 
education or exposure to "town li fe", most either worked for the university or had 
3 W. Brohmke quoting from Henwood & Pidgeon 2001: 13. 
4 T.A. Schwandt 1997: 13. 
5 ibid. 
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been educated up to matric level. All the interviewees unanimously felt that 
customary traditions played a critical role in their lives, lobolo was a central part of 
their marriage regimes and though they could be married under civil rites, all of the 
married women had had lobolo paid for them and felt that it was a tradition worth 
keeping. Of the women interviewed, 29 were married and all of them expressed the 
fact that they knew that patriarchal traditions still existed in society, that the man was 
still the head of the family and society. Family viewed the involvement of the police 
in marital problems, i.e. domestic violence, in a negative manner. The issue of marital 
rape was alien to most of them, eliciting laughter from a great number of them and 
confusion at the notion that a man can rape his wife. 
The Xhosa culture seems to present inheritance in a different manner from either the 
Sotho or the Zulu tribe. It seems acceptable for a first-born girl to inherit from the 
deceased father and all the women expressed this without any reservations. All the 
women knew that there were resources available to them, yet few could correctly 
identify where exactly they would go, aside from the police. One woman who was 
selling fruit right next to the Legal Aid Board offices said adamantly that she did not 
know where to go in order to enforce her legal rights. 
One thing that is obvious is that much more has to be done to make the women aware 
of their rights. This is not to completely ignore the great work that is being done by 
organisations such as F AMSA, yet so much more has to be done to reach the ordinary 
black woman. The society is still largely patriarchal and greatly oppressive to women 
and much of the work done by lawmakers is merely giving new laws to a society 
based on old traditions. These structures that are patriarchal have to be broken down 
in order to allow for true emancipation of women. 
The following two interviews are included to illustrate some of the women's 
responses. They represent two differing perspectives on the issue of women's rights . 
One is of a 38-year-old woman who has matric as her highest standard of education 
and works in an environment were much is being done to make her aware of her 
6 ibid. 
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rights. The other is a 56 year old woman who sells wares in the street and has only 
Grade 7 as her highest education. 
5.3 INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPTIONS 
Interview 1 
The first woman was a catering employee at the Rhodes University kitchens; she had 
been working for Rhodes for 6 years. She is 38 years old and has been living 
Extension 4 in the township of Grahamstown for 9 years. The interview was 
conducted on 29 September 2003 in Xhosa and the transcription is a translation 
thereof. 
Question: "Firstly, a few preliminary questions. How old are you?" 
Answer: "I am 38 years old." 
Question: "Are you married?" 
Answer: "I am not married." 
Question: "Where do you live?" 
Answer: "'B' Street in the location area of Grahamstown." 
Question: "How long have you been living there?" 
Answer: "I have been living here for the past 9 years." 
Question: "Where did you previously reside before coming to Grahamstown?" 
Answer: "I stayed with my sister in Yeoville in Johannesburg." 
Question : "How important are African customs and traditions to you as a black 
woman? Do you practise them often?" 
Answer: "I appreciate African customs and find them very important in my day-to-
day living." 
Question: "In light of the new democracy, what do you as a black woman understand 
about your position and the legal rights that you now possess?" 
Answer: "I know that I do possess rights." 
(Elaborate?) "Ummm (pauses) well, well I see that we do have rights." 
("Can you name any?") Well in the past we were beaten and nothing 
would be done about it and I was told that it was something that had to be 
kept silent within the family. Now I know that I have the right to go and 
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report it to the police." 
Question: "How do the men in the society react to these changes?" 
Answer: "The men you mean? They don't like it . .. they don't like it at all. 
(Why?) "they say that we are disrespecting them and rubbing it in their 
faces ... so they don't like it at all." 
("How do you feel about these reactions?") "Ahbhh as far as I am 
concerned we are not disrespecting them, they are just bitter because they 
don't have any power, they cant just thoroughly beat us without the law 
intervening. " 
Question: "Do you see a difference in your legal rights as a woman since the post 
1994 elections and the advent of the New Constitution?" 
Answer: "There is some difference, if only the men in the society would learn to 
accept change." 
Question: "What does the equality clause mean to you? How does it impact your day-
to-day lives as a woman?" 
Answer: "I do understand equality and I am glad that this change has come about. 
Women seem to react very positively to these rights but the men in the 
society really hate this." 
Question: "Can first born girls inherit property that is left by their deceased father? 
Are they allowed to inherit in terms of your traditions and customs?" 
Answer: "As far as I know in the Xhosa culture, women can inherit. As long as the 
girl is the first born child there ~s no reason why she should not inherit. 
After all what if there is no male in the house. Who inherits then? It is 
only fair that girls also inherit and this is how it is practised." 
Question: "Are women still considered subordinate? Do the men take a superiority 
attitude towards women in the society?" 
Answer: "Oh they try, they really try, they are dying to do that. But now there are 
human rights and they don't have a chance in hell. The introduction of 
human rights has changed that position with regards to women as 
subordinate to men." 
Question: "Is the payment of labala still a part of your culture and traditions. How do 
you feel about it, is this a good or bad practice?" 
Answer: "Yes, labala is still practised, I still find that it serves a purpose in our 
lives. African men ought to pay labala for their woman." 
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("What about the assumption that men owns you? Do you not fear men 
saying I paid cows for you therefore you are mine - bought and 
delivered?"). 
Answer: "Ah, ifhe says that I will tell him, I never said that you should buy 
me,you saw it fit to pay money, so don ' t think you own me cause I 
never agreed to be bought." 
(So what is labala to you, ifits not buying ,what is it?) 
"My parents raised and educated me so I could contribute to the 
household. He must pay for the expenses incurred by my parents in my 
upbringing. I am now working for his family and no longer my own, he 
must therefore compensate my family for this loss and these expenses." 
Question: "What do you feel about polygamy?" 
Answer: "No! No! No! this is no longer practised. I'm sorry I cannot accept that ... 
it cannot happen to us (as modem women) I will never agree I will never 
agree." 
Question: "What do you understand by the term rape? Domestic violence?" 
Answer: "Rape is when a man forces himself on a woman, and domestic violence is 
when he raises his hand to a woman he is married to and wants to hit her." 
Question: "So with that knowledge, is it possible for a man to rape his wife?" 
Answer: "A man can rape a wife, I have heard that you can report this, I wont 
hesistate .... " 
Question: "What do your families or societies feel about and react to domestic 
violence or the crime of marital rape? If you were to be raped by your 
husband, what steps would you take both in your community and in terms 
of the law?" 
Answer: "Its between the two of us, I will not approach the family structure because 
I know they will discourage me, I will just report to the police 
straightaway. I guess it differs from person to person. The family will 
make it difficult. Aunties will disapprove and tell me to resolve it. It is 
my right to choose the means of dealing with it. It is my right." 
Question: "Are you aware of the legal resources that are available to you in 
Grahamstown?" 
Answer: "I know them but I don't know where they are (Pause: has to consult with 
another fellow male worker). Where are those places (she 
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asks) . .. hmmm umm FAMSA, and, and, and what is it called ... social 
workers?" 
Question: "Do you feel that enough is being done to protect the women in 
Grahamstown ?" 
Answer: "Yes they work especially F AMSA" 
(End of Interview. Tape was stopped.) 
Interview 2 
The second participant was a 55 year old woman, who sold wares in the streets of 
Grahamstown. She had been born and raised in the farms that are just outside 
Grahamstown, and had a fairly better view of customary laws than the previous 
participant. Again the interview was conducted in Xhosa and the following is a 
transcription thereof. The interview was conducted and audio-recorded on the 
morning of 12 October 2003. It was approximately 35 minutes in duration. 
Question: "Firstly, a few preliminary questions. How old are you?" 
Answer: "1 was born in 1948 (that makes her 55 years old)." 
Question: "Are you married?" 
Answer: "Yes I am, I have been married since 1977." 
Question: "By custom or civil marriage?" 
Answer: "I was married in 1977 by customary rites; it is only in 1989 that I married 
in the civil manner." 
Question: "Where do you live?" 
Answer: "5665 Extension 6, in the location of Grahamstown." 
Question: "How long have you been living there?" 
Answer: "1 started saying here in 1998." 
Question: "Where did you previously reside before coming to Grahamstown?" 
Answer: "Before then I stayed in Joza, a location in Grahamstown. I was born and 
raised at a farm nearby." 
Question: "How important are African customs and traditions to you as a black 
woman? Do you practise them often?" 
Answer: "1 grew up with these traditions, they have been a central part of my life. I 
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cannot now stop and say that 1 do not love these practices. What 1 did 
when 1 was growing up, 1 practise now." 
Question: "In light of the new democracy, what do you as a black woman understand 
about your position and the legal rights that you now possess?" 
Answer: "1 understand about rights, 1 know that in the past we didn't possess these 
rights ("Can you name any of these rights?"). An area that has changed is 
in the workplace for example. There was discrimination in the workplace 
where men were paid more than women for the same work done. It was 
something that bothered us as women, caused us great pain." 
Question: "How do the men in the society react to these changes?" 
Answer: "We as women appreciate this change, we really do. This is more 
especially where there are issues of domestic violence. Men thought 
they could do this without any consequence, but the new democracy does 
not allow for this. In the past even when you knew that such happenings 
were wrong, a woman had to accept this without questioning. It was the 
way of the society. ("So are you saying that with the new democracy 
this does not happen any more?") Its not that this has totally changed. 
There are some men who still believe that it is alright to hit a woman. 
Those men haven't changed, they still hold on to these "cavemen" 
mentalities." 
Qnestion: "What does the equality clause mean to you? How does it impact your 
day-to-day lives as a woman?" 
Answer: "I am happy that 1 now possess these rights, and that 1 can do things on an 
equal footing with a man, but this creates a problem especially in the 
Xhosa culture. The right to equality is alien to Xhosa men. Traditionally 
women are subservient to men. Tradition has cultured people to assume 
certain gender roles. Men are supposed to do manly things and women are 
supposed to do feminine things. With the new Constitution 1 need not 
prescribe to these gender roles." 
Question: "Can first born girls inherit property that is left by their deceased father? 
Are they allowed to inherit in terms of your traditions and customs?" 
Answer: "For the Xhosa people the first-born child inherits, it does not matter 
whether it is a girl or a boy as long as it is the first-born child." 
Question: "Are women still considered subordinate? Do the men take a superiority 
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attitude towards women in the society?" 
Answer: "That is going to take time to change. For example I have been married for 
a long time and cannot assume that my husband will change over night. 
He was the man of the house before the Constitution and he will remain 
the man of the house now that we have this new democracy. Maybe for 
the younger children who are marrying now, perhaps their households 
will be different." 
Question: "Is the payment of lobolo still a part of your culture and traditions. How do 
you feel about it, is it a good or bad practice?" 
Answer: "I encourage the payment of lobolo, I understand that modern girls may 
want to do away with lobolo but it is such an important part of our 
tradition. It has stood the test of time for a reason. Lobolo is about 
creating a relationship with two different families, a man has no 
obligation to take care of his wife ifhe is not obligated to her family and 
community. ("What about the notion believed by some men that, ifhe 
pays lobolo he owns you and has the right to do as he wishes with you?") 
That is the wrong interpretation of what lobolo is ... it is criminal that it 
should be interpreted as such. Lobolo is such a positive thing in the 
Xhosa culture, the exchange of cattle created a bond between the two 
families; it brings dignity to the families. It is an occasion that should be 
celebrated and brings joy to the community." 
Question: "How do you feel about polygamy?" 
Answer: "This was done in the past, by men who had great wealth and possessed 
lots of cows, in order to show off their wealth. It was a good thing in the 
past. The wives in the different houses respected each other and got along 
well. It doesn't have a place in this day; relationships between people are 
no longer what they used to be." 
Question: "What do you understand by the term rape? Domestic violence?" 
Answer: "When a man takes advantage of woman against her will. That 's rape. 
Domestic violence is when a man beats a woman. Domestic violence is a 
crime. However if it happens once ... say when he is drunk that can be 
forgiven, but if it keeps happening over and over then it becomes a 
crime." 
Question: "So with that knowledge, is it possible for a man to rape his wife?" 
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Answer: "That's a funny notion, to say a woman has been raped by her husband. I 
have never heard of that, how does a man rape his own wife? Women can 
be naughty, we have affairs and satisfy our lovers and refuse our husbands 
their conjugal rights . It is their rights. This is when a woman says they 
have been raped, when a husband demands sex." 
Question: "What do your families or societies feel about and react to domestic 
violence or the crime of marital rape? If you were to be raped by your 
husband, what steps would you take both in your community and in terms 
of the law?" 
Answer: "In my family reporting a man to the police doesn't happen. Ifhe beats you 
up, it is agreed that you must come home and it will be talked through. I 
wouldn't go to the police. There are times when you are beaten and you 
feel so much anger you want to report it. Yet if! go back horne its not that 
same, I have children to take care of and I would not want my family to 
look at me as ifin shame." 
Question: "Are you aware of the legal resources that are available to you in 
Grahamstown ?" 
Answer: "Yes F AMSA. Yet even at F AMSA they require so much, they will tell 
you to go back horne and corne back at a certain date. This is tiring and I 
ended up giving up." 
Question: "Do you feel that enough is being done to protect the women in 
Grahamstown ?" 
Answer: "I only know F AMSA." 
(End of Interview: Tape was stopped.) 
The interviews clearly indicated that there was a gap between formal laws and the 
reality of women 's lives. This is not to minimize that work done by feminists or the 
government; yet more could be done. It is the opinion of the writer that while 
recognising the differences in cultures between women from the West and African 
women, it should not be the main focus of the feminist agenda. Instead, the focus 
should be on making women's rights a reality for African women. More should be 
done to include African women in policy making and in providing services for the 
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enforcement of women's rights. 7 The system of patriarchy and male domination also 
has to be eradicated and African femini st ought to campaign for the retention of only 
those customs that respect and uphold the rights elaborated on in the Constitution of 
South Africa. As Thandabantu Nhlapo writes the emancipation of women requires 
more than a declaratory commitment to equality and legislation prohibiting 
discrimination: 
"A declaration that there shall be no di scrimination on the basis of gender is necessary 
and serves as a statement of intent and has a normative value. However such a 
deciaration, whether or not it is entrenched in a constitution, can amount to no more 
than a token gesture, if material, ideological, educational and cultural underpinnings 
of gender oppression are simultaneously address so as to provide a basis for the giving 
of reality to notional equality.,,8 
7 See suggestions made by the writer for women 's participation in Governmental initiatives such as 
N.E.P.A.D. 
8 T. Nh1apo 1995:2. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The years between 1975-1985 represented crucial years for women all over the world, 
in what was known as the United Nations decade for women. It was during these 
years that global feminists increased the attention and awareness to women's issues 
and brought to the forefront the idea that women all over the world must come 
together in solidarity to ensure that their rights were respected. I For South African 
women, 1994 heralded the dawn of a new era. Since 1913 their rights had been 
sidelined in favour of the liberation struggle. With the new Constitution, not only 
were South African women able to demand that their rights be respected but also there 
was greater participation by women in the international arena. South African women 
were no longer alone; they became significant players in the international world. Once 
again and this time for positive reasons, all eyes looked upon South African women to 
see how they dealt with gender rights in the post apartheid years. The final 
Constitution was a result of much debate and compromise; South African women had 
to deal with the fact that, for the first time they could fully participate in the 
international world, yet at the same time respect the cultural and ethnic practices that 
existed within the country. While equality was fully entrenched in the document, the 
status and role of traditional leaders and customs had to be recognized. From this 
arose much debate on the role that feminist jurisprudence played in the development 
of women's right in the "new South Africa." Did the theories of feminism hold a 
place in the South African context? Writing in 1911 Olive Shreiner2, having the 
position of African women in mind, addressed this issue. She writes that African 
women in the past had to deal with issues of racial discrimination and economic 
empowerment before dealing with the issue of gender equality. Because of this the 
rise of feminism in South Africa was often stifled. She comments that women of any 
race or class hardly ever revolt against their disabilities, however severe their 
suffering. In South Africa this position as martyr was emphasised all the more by the 
political situation of the time. In a new era of democracy, it is the opinion of the 
writer that the challenge of the modem feminist go far beyond mere academic rhetoric 
I U.I. Bola 1995:85. 
'a. Shreiner is quoted by Simons 1968:10. 
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and to challenge structures that allow for the continuation of practices that are 
oppressive to women. To question whether theories of Marxist feminism or radical 
feminism have a place in South Africa is not the aim; the aim should be to identify 
what Conaghan3 states is the "reality gap" between women's perceived and actual 
positions. Feminism is not about slogans or about male bashing; it is about realizing 
the legitimacy of women's claim to equality. In order to do this, women have to look 
to those who have been through the struggle and succeeded somewhat in achieving 
the aim of the right to equality. What this means is that while acknowledging the fact 
that feminism grew out of a Euro-American context, there is no need to totally discard 
the principles it advocates for simply on the basis that it is not set within the African 
context. There can be no denying that the foundations of feminist legal scholarship are 
applicable to South African women. Whether one should call themselves "feminist" 
or "womanist" is mere semantics; what should be the aim is making equality a reality 
in the African woman's daily life. By recognizing that feminism is situated within 
different validatory frameworks, feminists will realize that different theories will be 
received and perceived differently4 This must not lead to them discarding the basis of 
their theories but ought to provide motivation for feminists to look to and impact all 
women. Feminist jurisprudence is not exclusive to Euro-American women. It is a 
useful theoretical and practical strategy that can be used in a sensitive manner and that 
can acknowledge the multiplicity of women's lives. As seen above, South Africa can 
respect its cultures and traditions and still actively involve themselves within the 
international context. It is the opinion of the writer that the variety and breadth of 
feminist scholarship is so great that there is no necessity in essentialising it. Where 
one theory may fail, the other will succeed. For every theory applicable to Western 
women, another is applicable to African women in their contexts. The law, both 
national and international, should be used as a tool for positive change for African 
women. The law can be used without jeopardizing those positive core values that 
underlie African customs and traditions. Time should not be wasted in academic 
debate and rhetoric about who "owns" feminism, but should be used to assess the 
different needs of African women and in achieving the aims set by the Constitution to 
ensure equality and equal opportunity for all women. 
3 J. Conaghan 2000:35l. 
4 Conaghan op cit 356. 
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